Further technical details emerge on Mumbai attacks

Mumbai attacker

Mumbai attacker

By IAN ALLEN | intelNews.org |
On December 9, we reported that the Pakistani militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, used voice-over-Internet-protocol (VOIP) software to communicate with the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks on the ground and direct the operation on a real-time basis. We further noted that VOIP signals pose severe barriers to communications interception, as well as to the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to locate the source of target calls. The Mumbai attacks were a typical example of this. Thus, even though Indian intelligence services know that the handlers of the Mumbai attackers were located in Pakistan, their VOIP communications data pointed to companies in New Jersey and Austria. Further details have now emerged of a virtual number, 1-201-253-1824, which the handlers of the Mumbai attackers actually generated via a California-based VOIP provider. Read more of this post

Hi-tech Mumbai attacks pose forensics problems for intel agencies

The barriers to government-authorized communications interception posed by the increasing use of Internet-based communications systems by militants or criminals are nothing new. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been struggling with this issue since the late 1990s, when audio-enabled instant messenger services began to rise in popularity. In 2005, a brief report in Time magazine correctly described Internet-based audio communications as a “massive technological blind spot” troubling FBI wiretap experts. It has now emerged that last month the Pakistani militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, used voice-over-Internet-protocol (VOIP) software to communicate with the Mumbai attackers on the ground and direct the large scale operation on a real-time basis. Read more of this post