Austria’s revamped security leadership team tackles challenges
July 18, 2025 2 Comments
THE CONTROVERSIES THAT CONTINUE to be associated with the Austrian intelligence agencies today took place before December 2021, when the current Directorate of State Security and Intelligence (Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst, or DSN) was founded. Despite this, the DSN under the leadership of its director Omar Haijawi-Pirchner is still regarded as stable and predictable.
The DSN’s Western partner agencies were more than happy that the new governing coalition in Vienna was able to prevent the rightwing populist and generally Putin-friendly Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) from providing the minister of the interior. The fact that the current Interior Minister Gerhard Karner has been joined by an experienced state secretary is a major plus: Jörg Leichtfried, a Social Democrat born in 1967, has been regarded as a liberal European for many years, including eleven years as a member of the European Parliament. He will be responsible for state security and intelligence agencies.
One of Leichtfried’s stated goals has been particularly well received: he has vowed to improve the country’s national infrastructure and intensify its international cooperation. Various other details, such as the future framework conditions for military intelligence agencies, are also on his list. It is certain that the operational work of the DSN will continue to be led by Haijawi-Pirchner. This is reportedly to be improved, with better monitoring of terrorist threats, made possible by the planned extended access to messenger services.
The Austrian intelligence agencies have always been characterized by the personalities of their individua leaders. It is therefore all the more important who the leadership surrounds itself with—especially as the expectations are high, not least due to the threats from Russia and China. The uncertainty regarding Europe’s partners in the United States also means that the European intelligence agencies are urgently dependent on reliable Austrian partners.
As the political-strategic organization will be the responsibility of Leichtfried, two people who work in his immediate environment, and were previously only known to insiders, have come to the fore: the head of the Cabinet, Christian Strnad, and the head of Strategy and Security Policy, Rastislav Bachora. Both previously worked on the security-policy concept of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), the Social Democratic Strategy for Freedom, Protection and Security.
Born in 1974, Strnad holds a doctorate in philosophy and has worked in foreign intelligence for over 20 years, including four years as Deputy Head of the Africa Section at the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) in Brussels, with responsibility for East Africa. In the area of counterterrorism, Strnad focused on Somalia. In Vienna, he was the senior intelligence analyst responsible for the deployment of the Austrian military in Chad (2008/2009). Born in 1978, Bachora 
holds a doctorate in political science and is associated with several institutions, including the Vienna National Defense Academy, where he teaches and conducts research.
This relatively young team must manage to restore the trust of Austria’s Western partners, particularly in the European Union, but also in the United Kingdom and the United States. The first decisive step has already occurred with the prevention of a pro-Russian influence campaign within the Austrian intelligence agencies. Shortly after taking office, the new team was confronted with a series of current events: first, the mention of Iran’s nuclear program-me in the DSN’s annual report led to international discussion. Iran summoned the Austrian ambassador in Tehran, Michaela Pacher. However, it was a relatively short-lived controversy, given that Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities shortly afterwards, ultimately confirming the Austrian view.
On the other hand, the Austrian intelligence agencies are dealing with an alarmingly rapid radicalization of younger people who do not have a migration background and increasingly come from rural areas—a relatively new phenomenon. It was only on June 10 in Graz that a young gunman shot dead ten schoolchildren before turning his gun on himself. A source told the present author that eight terrorist attacks have been prevented so far in Austria since 7 October 2023. According to the source, Austria will now follow the example of France and Spain and introduce age restrictions and age verification for social media use. The authorities are attempting to integrate internet providers as part of the upcoming Digital Service Act.
► Author: Dr. Stephan Blancke | Date: 18 July 2025 | Permalink
*Dr. Stephan Blancke is a political scientist and analyst whose research focuses on international state and non-state intelligence. He has researched Cyber Warfare in Geneva and worked in an Intelligence & Analysis unit at the UK Home Office. He also worked at the Centre for Science & Security Studies (CSSS) at King’s College London in the field of proliferation and illicit procurement networks. Since November 2022, he has been an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. Dr Blancke writes for Jane’s Intelligence Review, Intelligence Online, NK News, and others. He has published on Chinese and North Korean espionage, extremism and terrorism, as well as illegal trade on the dark web.
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Interestingly Austria has remained out of NATO since NATO’s creation in 1949.
NATO is in a state of flux. Finland and Sweden have moved from neutrality to joining NATO and Trump’s USA is sending mixed signals about its loyalty to NATO.
Trump has provided Russia with 50 days to make advances in Ukraine before a ceasefire favouring Russia might threaten Ukraine’s continued existence.
Between Austria and Ukraine is pro-Russian Hungary.
“Hungary is highly dependent on sources of energy imported from Russia. In the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s long-serving prime minister has been described as pro-Putin.” [1]
What I am getting at is in the medium term Russian influence including special forces and intelligence forces might extend west, from Ukraine and Hungary to the Austrian border.
Austria may need to redeploy more civil and military intelligence resources to meet an evolving Russian threat. Austria even joining NATO and increasing its defense spending from the current less than 1% of GDP [2] to 3% GDP may be warranted.
Austria and European NATO countries cannot rely on US intelligence and military protection against Russia any more.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungary%E2%80%93Russia_relations
[2] https://tradingeconomics.com/austria/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html
En tant qu’officier sous-traitant DoD-CUI, les services de renseignement américains sont essentiels à la défense européenne. En fait, c’est un pilier de la structure de défense européenne, car les services de renseignement américains ont soutenu des initiatives stratégiques contre l’agression russe par le biais de vastes flux de renseignements électroniques, satellitaires et humains (HUMINT). La pause – et la perte potentielle à long terme – de ce soutien réduirait l’efficacité sécuritaire européenne.
Depuis l’open cloud du renseignement, la bataille mettra en évidence la couverture relativement inégale des services de renseignement européens. À long terme, ils présenteraient des risques ; malgré les performances de ceux-ci, ils auront du mal à combler le vide américain, et cela soulèvera des questions importantes et vastes sur l’avenir de la coopération entre les États-Unis et l’Europe en matière de renseignement.
L’Europe ne peut se passer du renseignement américain, malgré que, de toute façon, des programmes aient été mis en place pour le partage d’informations traitant de la sécurité. Au-delà, c’est toute la partie logistique, la partie évaluation provenant des États-Unis, qui est importante si nous tenons compte des ingérences étrangères infiltrant les États européens, en passant notamment par des partis en politique.
Tu as raison Pete, car si l’Autriche ne s’investit pas davantage dans son PIB, elle doit restructurer la surveillance au sein de ses partis d’extrême droite, soutenus par la Russie de Vladimir Poutine. Il a déployé un échiquier dans tous les États européens, ce qui lui donne un accès pour créer de l’ingérence plus facilement, tout en avançant ses fantassins pour réduire l’évolution vers un modèle européen, ou, dans certains domaines, faire évoluer les situations à son avantage, suivant les sanctions qui ont été prises à l’encontre de la Russie.
D’autant qu’aujourd’hui, la remontée des hausses douanières du président Trump force les déplacements des fantassins de Poutine. À nous, officiers traitants, de rester vigilants pour relever le contre-espionnage – créant une ingérence circonstancielle en Europe. CUI.
C’était à prévoir. Soyons réalistes : la Russie dépend aussi d’enjeux énormes depuis les États européens. Par exemple, au niveau de la distribution du gaz, elle n’est plus qu’à 14 % de distribution européenne, contre 40 % avant le conflit ukrainien.
Pete, il y a une perte de confiance des partenaires, certains suspendant ou réduisant les échanges, compliquant la situation ! DoD-CUI.
1. Réduction de la fiabilité américaine
2. Dépendance aux capacités stratégiques américaines
3. Faiblesses structurelles de la défense européenne
4. Capacité de renseignement européenne insuffisamment développée
5. Problèmes spécifiques à l’Autriche
🔧 Recommandations face à ces risques Axe de réponse Explications Élever les dépenses de défense à 3 % du PIBJustifié pour renforcer les capacités nationales dans un contexte où l’appui américain pourrait diminuer. Renforcer les capacités nationales du renseignementInvestissement dans ISR, transformation de la DSN, réforme juridique, coopération intra-européenne. Adhésion à des initiatives européennes Participation à des projets comme PESCO, le Fonds Européen pour la Défense ou le programme Sky Shield pour consolider l’autonomie stratégique.
En résumé, Pete, l’Europe (et tout particulièrement l’Autriche malgré sa neutralité) fait face à une situation où l’hypothèse d’un retrait ou d’un repli américain devient de plus en plus réaliste. Pour consolider sa défense face à la menace russe — militaire ou d’ingérence — l’Autriche doit donc investir davantage dans ses capacités civiles et militaires, structurer sa coopération régionale dans le renseignement, et évoluer vers un modèle moins dépendant de Washington, d’avantage centré sur les agences de renseignement européenne. Sous le regard des Etats-unis/ DOD/CUI/ car en gros nous venons consolider l’autonomie stratégique de la défense européenne, fragilisé CUI.
Belle journée Pete.
Pascal lembree/CUI.