Germany charges businesswoman with espionage, expels her alleged Russian handler

Russian embassy in GermanyGERMAN FEDERAL PROSECUTORS HAVE formally charged a businesswoman with espionage on behalf of Russian intelligence, claiming she was tasked with gaining access to political and military circles in Germany. The woman, 56, officially identified only as Ilona W., is believed to hold German, Russian, and Ukrainian citizenship. She was arrested on January 21, 2026, and remains in pre-trial detention. The indictment was filed by Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office on September 7, 2026.

The woman reportedly ran a consulting firm in Berlin and chaired a lobbying association. Through her role, she allegedly gained substantial access to elite political and military spheres across Germany. Prosecutors allege she had been in contact with a Russian intelligence officer stationed at the Russian Embassy in Berlin since October 2023. Throughout this time, it is alleged she provided her handler with intelligence on high-value political events. This information enabled him to attend some of these events under a false identity, with the aim of cultivating contacts for intelligence purposes.

The woman reportedly attended the events herself in order to identify and recruit potential contacts and targets—particularly from Germany’s Defense ministry and defense industry. Prosecutors claim she “compiled background information on participants in high-profile political events and gathered information on arms industry sites, drone tests and planned deliveries of drones to Ukraine”. The woman was also photographed at the December 2025 German-Ukrainian Economic Forum in Berlin, seated several rows behind Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. It is also claimed the alleged spy cultivated a former head of the German Air Force’s 61st Test and Evaluation Center and a retired officer from Büchel Air Base, which stores United States nuclear weapons. Neither individual was detained and it remains unclear whether she obtained valuable intelligence from either of them.

The woman’s arrest triggered an immediate diplomatic confrontation between Berlin and Moscow. Within 72 hours of her detention, the German government expelled a Russian diplomat, identified as Andrei Mayorov, a colonel at the Main Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces’ General Staff—commonly known as GRU. Mayorov was serving as a deputy military attaché at the Russian Embassy in Berlin. He is accused of directing the alleged spy’s intelligence-gathering activities. His expulsion drew strong condemnation from Moscow, which vowed to retaliate.

This case reflects a broader pattern of Russian intelligence activity across Europe following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, which blurs the line between legitimate diplomatic activity and covert intelligence-gathering.

► Author: Molly Jones | Date: 19 September 2026 | Permalink

Spanish NATO officer suspended from duty for dating Russian-born woman

Northwood Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM)A MILITARY OFFICER FROM Spain—a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member—has been suspended from duty following an investigation into his relationship with a woman born in the former Soviet Union, amid fears she may have been spying for Moscow.

The unidentified Spanish naval commander, a married father of two, served at the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) at Northwood Headquarters in Hertfordshire, United Kingdom. MARCOM duties include the monitoring of Russian submarines, warships operating in United Kingdom waters and tracking sanctioned oil tankers from the Russian ‘shadow fleet’—a network of tankers used by the Russian state to clandestinely transport crude oil and evade international sanctions.

The Spaniard reportedly met Janina White, 49, on the online dating app Tinder in October 2024. White is believed to have been born in the Soviet Union but relocated to Poland and then to the United Kingdom as a teenager. She currently resides in Romford, London and holds joint Polish-British nationalities. Shortly prior to entering into a romantic relationship with the Spanish naval commander, White reportedly split from her British husband. The NATO commander is also believed to have separated from his wife shortly before starting a relationship with White.

Initial concerns were raised in December 2024 when, according to court documents, the couple attended a Christmas function at Northwood Headquarters. The following day, White reportedly accompanied her boyfriend to Oeiras, Portugal, while he attended an official meeting at Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO. The facility serves as NATO’s primary platform for integrating United States maritime forces into the Alliance’s operations. White maintains this was her only visit of substance to a NATO facility and insists she never entered classified areas. Read more of this post

Chinese-Belgian national charged with espionage involving microchips

State Security Service BelgiumA CHINESE-BELGIAN NATIONAL and former senior employee at a now-bankrupt microchip manufacturer remains in custody in Belgium on suspicion of espionage involving semiconductors. The suspect, who worked for BelGaN, is accused of attempting to transfer specialized intellectual property and trade secrets involving gallium nitride semiconductors—a technology critical to next-generation civilian and military devices.

Identified only as H.L., the suspect is a 52-year-old dual Belgian-Chinese national who reportedly held a senior research position at BelGaN, a microchip maker based in Oudenaarde, East Flanders. The company was the last industrial microchip producer in Belgium, specializing in gallium nitride semiconductors. It was overtaken by a consortium of Chinese investors in February 2022 before declaring bankruptcy in July 2024.

H.L. was reportedly arrested by Belgian authorities on May 10 at Zaventem airport in Brussels, as he was preparing to board a flight to Beijing. He faces four charges: espionage, participation in a criminal organization, misuse of company assets, and unlawful disclosure of trade secrets. A second suspect, reportedly former BelGaN CEO Alan Zhou Zhen, remains at large.

Investigators suspect H.L. simultaneously served as a director of Gankool, a company based in China’s Fujian province. Financed by a Chinese investment fund, the company was established a few months after BelGaN’s takeover by a Chinese investment fund. Gankool allegedly produces the same microchip technology as BelGaN. H.L. is accused of illegally transferring BelGaN’s specialized intellectual property and trade secrets to the Chinese firm.

This case highlights a pattern Belgium’s State Security Service explicitly flagged recently, terming it “mirror companies”. The practice refers to cases where Chinese investors acquire promising but underfunded European technology firms. The investors proceed to extract the European firms’ technology and establish a parallel company in China that replicates production at scale—often selling off the original European firm afterward.

► Author: Molly Jones | Date: 13 September 2026 | Permalink

Book Review of “Israeli Security Agency in Crisis” by Dr. Avner Barnea

Book reviewAVNER BARNEA’S ISRAELI SECURITY AGENCY in Crisis: How It Failed to See Storms Arrive (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, May 2026) offers a timely and analytically coherent examination of the Israel Security Agency (ISA/Shabak) and the institutional vulnerabilities that contributed to repeated intelligence failures and strategic surprises over more than five decades. Rather than presenting a simple indictment of the organization, Barnea develops a broader argument about the accumulation of “blind spots”—cognitive, organizational, interagency, and political, that can emerge within successful intelligence institutions and gradually undermine their ability to recognize changing threats.

The book traces a series of major episodes from the late 1960s through the October 7, 2023, attack, including the Munich massacre, the Tyre compound bombing, the Markus Klingberg espionage affair, the Landau Commission and interrogation practices, the Vanunu affair, the First Intifada, the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Second Intifada, Jewish extremist terrorism, the Gaza tunnel threat, the May 2021 intercommunal riots, and the October 7 surprise. These cases are not presented merely as a chronological history. Their purpose is to demonstrate how organizational routines, institutional assumptions, inadequate coordination, and the tendency to rely on successful past models can create strategic rigidity.

The concept of “blind spots” provides the book’s central analytical framework. Barnea shows how intelligence organizations can become prisoners of their own successes. A doctrine that works effectively against one type of adversary may become dangerously inadequate when opponents change their methods, organizational structures, or strategic objectives. The book, therefore, emphasizes the importance of organizational learning, continuous doctrine reviews, and the ability to challenge prevailing assumptions before a crisis exposes their weaknesses.

One of the book’s most important contributions is its emphasis on counterintelligence. Barnea argues that counterintelligence has historically received insufficient institutional status, resources, and strategic attention. The Markus Klingberg espionage affair illustrates the dangers of treating insider threats and hostile intelligence activity as secondary concerns. Barnea’s broader prescription is to place counterintelligence on a level of importance comparable to other major intelligence disciplines and to integrate its insights into national warning and strategic decision-making. Read more of this post

Purchase of Cyprus hotel by Chinese firm raises alarm in nearby British military base

City of Dreams CyprusA CHINESE-OWNED LUXURY hotel in Cyprus has sparked concerns among British intelligence and military officials that it could be used to spy on Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri, one of the United Kingdom’s most strategically important overseas military bases. RAF Akrotiri is located in the Western Sovereign Base Area, which constitutes a British Overseas Territory on the island nation of Cyprus.

The hotel resort, known as the City of Dreams, is a 15-acre, 16-story complex located approximately 4.5 miles north of RAF Akrotiri. Military and intelligence officials have expressed concerns over its location, as it affords a panoramic view of one of the UK’s most critical overseas military bases. In addition to a host of British military aircraft, the base currently hosts both F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters and Lockheed U-2 (nicknamed “Dragon Lady”) reconnaissance aircraft operated by the United States Air Force. With the resort standing significantly taller than surrounding buildings and dominating the local skyline, British and American officials have noted the site’s potential to provide its owners with the ability to monitor aircraft movement, military personnel and other activity in and around the base. One source said that “there was no world in which the Chinese state would not seek to exploit the hotel’s location”.

The City of Dreams is owned by Melco Resorts and Entertainment, which is led by Chinese-Canadian billionaire Lawrence Ho. Ho reportedly sits on China’s National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which is described as a “patriotic United Front” organization, populated by wealthy, influential, and well-connected individuals. Despite the claims, there has been no official evidence of espionage or wrongdoing by Ho, Melco, or the hotel. The City of Dreams has firmly denied the allegations, describing them as “entirely unfounded”. City of Dreams executives insist that the resort operates solely as a tourism and business destination.

This unease follows increased attention on Akrotiri’s security following the Iranian loitering munition that struck the base on March 1, 2026. It also echoes a 2024 case where the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly raised the alarm over a Chinese-owned hotel overlooking a Swiss military base that housed F-35 aircraft. In a separate case in July 2026, a US senator requested a security review of a Chinese solar manufacturer’s purchase of a facility near a military base in Ohio, calling the manufacturer a potential Beijing “shell company”.

Security sources reportedly told the British press that the RAF base would implement counter-intelligence measures, but noted their limitations in being able to foil espionage operations from the City of Dreams site.

► Author: Molly Jones | Date: 07 September 2026 | Permalink

South Korean court upholds sentence for university professor convicted of espionage

South Korea Defense Counterintelligence CommandSOUTH KOREA’S SUPREME COURT has upheld a five-year prison sentence for a Chinese university professor convicted of espionage, after prosecutors accused him of conspiring with a Chinese intelligence handler to recruit active-duty South Korean soldiers and obtain military secrets, including details on an American-supplied missile defense system.

The convicted agent, identified only as “Qing”, was reportedly spotted and recruited by an espionage cell, referred to as “Ken Jake”, which was led by Chinese Chief Case Officer Liu Nannan whilst completing his PhD in Taiwan. The cell’s primary focus was the collection of high-value secrets from South Korea and Taiwan, through human intelligence (HUMINT) targeting. Investigators stated that the intelligence “Qing” collected included details on the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) mobile missile defense system, US-South Korea joint military exercise plans, Taiwan-related activities, and the location of a South Korean Navy vessel.

“Qing” operated between May 2024 and March 2025, using social media to approach and offer cash payments to soldiers. He also employed espionage equipment—including a camera hidden in a wristwatch—to evade face-to-face meetings while transferring stolen material. “Qing” also made several trips to South Korea’s Jeju Island to establish a dead-drop infrastructure for facilitating physical intelligence exchanges. He also met with individuals he believed were recruited military assets. The spy cell recruited Navy Corporal Jung Da-jung and Choi Hong-jae, a military conscript who reportedly received ₩ 7.1 million (about US $5,100) in exchange for providing military intelligence information. “Qing” also allegedly infiltrated anti-China/pro-Taiwan independence groups and attempted to gain close access to an unnamed female Taiwanese politician.

Following an undercover investigation by the South Korean Defense Counterintelligence Command (DCC), Qing was arrested in March 2025 by South Korean authorities while carrying out a dead-drop exchange on Jeju Island. DCC Lead Investigator Bang Tu-Cheol posed as an active-duty military asset and built credibility and trust through feeding fake documents to “Qing”. This eventually led to “Qing” meeting Bang on Jeju Island. The operation uncovered a broader network vulnerability when Chinese intelligence reportedly sent material obtained from Choi to Bang for cross-verification. South Korean investigators identified a technical link to Chinese-language file-sharing infrastructure, which allowed them to connect previously separate espionage cases. This discovery helped expose the wider “Ken Jake” cell.

► Author: Molly Jones | Date: 28 August 2026 | Permalink

Czech businessman detained in China on espionage charges

Czech embassy Beijing ChinaA CZECH BUSINESSMAN, EMPLOYEE of a Czech radar manufacturer based in China, was detained by Chinese authorities in late June 2026 on suspicion of espionage, it has emerged. According to the Czech news outlet Denik N, which reviewed the relevant diplomatic correspondence, the charges concern “obtaining and passing on information without further specification”. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that the Czech citizen had been apprehended on “endangering national security”. However, neither Beijing nor Prague have officially confirmed or elaborated on the specific charges.

This case underscores ongoing diplomatic tensions between the Czechia and China, following the January 2026 arrest in Prague of Yang Yi-min, a Chinese journalist for Guangming Daily, on charges of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign power. Yang remains in custody. The two detentions have fueled speculation of ‘hostage diplomacy’—a term that refers to the apprehension of foreign nationals as a means of exerting diplomatic leverage during disputes between states. However, the Czech Republic’s Minster of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, Petr Macinka, has publicly denied such speculation.

This case should be seen within the broader context of of Chinese-Czech relations in the post-COVID-19 era. Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s government, in office since December 2025, has sought to build a more pragmatic relationship with Beijing after years of tension under his predecessor, primarily over Prague’s positions on Taiwan. It is clear that the recent arrests further-complicate his administration’s China strategy.

Meanwhile, the businessman’s fate remains uncertain. China analyst Katerina Prochazkova, of the Sinopsis research initiative, outlined a range of possible outcomes in this case: a prisoner swap involving the Chinese national held in Prague, or a swifter resolution involving due process, consular access, and release without prolonged detention. However, she pointed to a less optimistic scenario—namely a lengthy investigation marked by limited transparency, noting that past cases have involved multi-year detentions before resolution.

The Speaker of the Czech Chamber of Deputies, Tomio Okamura, visited Beijing last month, with the aim of bolstering tourism and economic ties between the two countries. Reports circulated of a liaison between Okamura and Chinese authorities on a potential prisoner swap. However, as one Czech-China analyst noted, Okamura holds no formal foreign-policy authority and any intervention on his part would be at most an informal gesture.

► Author: Molly Jones | Date: 06 August 2026 | Permalink

Canadian NATO intern arrested on suspicion of spying for third country

NATO SHAPE Mons BelgiumA CANADIAN WOMAN OF Chinese origin was arrested on Friday July 24 on suspicion of spying for a third-party country, whilst serving as an intern at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium.

Belgian authorities stated on July 25 that the woman “is suspected of spying on behalf of a third country and of being a member of a criminal organization”. Security services at SHAPE were reportedly the first to convey concerns to the Belgian Federal Prosecutor’s Office over the woman’s behavior—such as staying at NATO facilities after hours and asking questions of her colleagues. This prompted a raid of the suspect’s residence and workplace inside NATO headquarters, which resulted in an order for her to be held in a one-month pretrial custody.

No official report from Belgian or Canadian authorities has disclosed the third country or criminal organization mentioned in the press release. Moreover, whilst no official authority has disclosed the suspect’s identity, a CBC News investigation reportedly traced her background to the name of Biwei Zhang, a systems engineer with an economics background, who had previously been employed at the Canadian Space Agency and Statistics Canada. The suspect has reportedly used other aliases such as “Claire” and “Catina”.

At a systemic level, this case underscores reservations concerning Canadian national security and the processing of security clearances in Canada. Such lapses can potentially harm the security of Canadian allies; notably, the present suspect allegedly held previous positions at the World Trade Organization and the European Space Agency. This case also flags the role of internships at global security organizations such as NATO. One report described the intern position as an “Achilles’ heel”, as it provides direct insight into the institutions at the core of global security architecture.

► Author: Molly Jones | Date: 03 August 2026 | Permalink

Hamas’s sophisticated deception strategy enabled October 7 attacks, study shows

Israel Hamas warA STUDY OF HAMAS documents seized by Israel during the Israel-Hamas war reveals the extent of sophistication of Hamas’s deception campaign. The Palestinian group deliberately portrayed itself as essentially deterred and focused on economic stability and on governing Gaza, rather than on a military confrontation with Israel. This successful misdirection repeatedly influenced Israeli security discussions. The key takeaway is that Hamas used deliberate deception tactics, including economic distraction, a West Bank focus, and covert military exercises, to mask its preparations for a large-scale attack against Israel.

The first comprehensive study of these seized documents, conducted by experts at the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute in Israel, reveals that Hamas leaders, headed by Yahya Sinwar and military commander Mohammed Deif, saw Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 as a major strategic success for the Palestinians. Building on this perception, they began developing what they saw as a decisive future campaign against Israel, believing that key parts of the Israeli operation reflected significant operational achievements that shaped this new strategy. By September 2022, Hamas’ military intelligence had called for a comprehensive deception plan encompassing political, military, economic, and media dimensions.

The goal was to create conditions for a surprise attack that would outdo Hamas’ past confrontations with Israel. The seized documents reveal that manipulating the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) organization, a distinct militant group that is active in Gaza, was key to Hamas’ approach. One key element was a policy of restraint and controlled escalation: Hamas avoided open military confrontation with Israel, and its leaders were told to contain violent incidents, which ultimately helped foster a perception of Israeli deterrence. Read more of this post

Opinion: Gofman’s Mossad appointment poses major challenges to Israeli Intelligence

Roman GofmanTHE APPOINTMENT OF MAJOR General (res.) Roman Gofman as director of the Mossad spy agency has emerged as a flashpoint in Israel’s security landscape, underscoring sharp divisions over senior leadership choices. Announced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in December 2025, the appointment has sparked intense debate among political, legal, and security circles. Supporters emphasize Gofman’s innovative, battle-tested military credentials, while detractors challenge both the process and his suitability to head Israel’s top foreign intelligence agency. This controversy mirrors the backlash against Netanyahu’s prior nomination of Major General David Zini as head of the Israel Security Agency (ISA), raising persistent questions about the decision-making process for key intelligence appointments.

The Appointment Process

On 4 December 2025, Netanyahu announced his decision to appoint Gofman as the next director of the Mossad. At that time, Gofman was serving as Netanyahu’s military secretary. Gofman was selected to replace outgoing Mossad Director David Barnea, whose five-year term was scheduled to end in June 2026.

The choice was notable because Gofman came from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) rather than from within the Mossad itself. Reports indicate that Netanyahu bypassed Mossad’s existing leadership, including candidates reportedly favored by outgoing director David Barnea, in selecting Gofman.

Following the announcement, Israeli law required the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments to review senior security appointments. Chaired by former Supreme Court President Asher Grunis, the committee examined Gofman’s candidacy and approved it in April 2026. After /approval, Netanyahu signed the appointment documents.

Nevertheless, the Committee’s approval did not resolve all disagreements. Gofman’s nomination soon became the subject of legal challenges before Israel’s High Court of Justice. Only after the Court rejected petitions seeking to block the appointment was Gofman able to assume office as Mossad Director in June 2026.

Why Netanyahu Chose Gofman

Supporters of Gofman’s appointment emphasized that, following the outbreak of the Israel-Gaza War in October 2023, Gofman brought extensive military experience and was closely involved in national security decision-making. Netanyahu’s office highlighted Gofman’s wartime operational leadership, his service as military secretary, and his coordination with intelligence agencies, including Mossad. Supporters also emphasized Gofman’s reputation as an unconventional and creative commander. During his military career, Gofman commanded armored formations, led operational units on Israel’s northern and southern fronts, and was wounded while fighting Hamas militants during the attacks of 7 October 2023. His supporters argued that the post-October 7 security environment required fresh thinking and leadership from outside traditional intelligence circles.

Lack of Intelligence Background

The most common criticism of Gofman’s appointment concerned his professional background. Unlike most recent Mossad directors, Gofman had spent his career in the military rather than in intelligence operations. Critics argued that running a global espionage organization requires skills and experience different from those needed to command military units. Several commentators noted that he would be among the few Mossad chiefs appointed without a substantial career in the intelligence service. Supporters countered that the Mossad has historically benefited from leaders with diverse backgrounds and that strategic leadership skills can be transferable across intelligence organizations. His critics emphasize his lack of experience, as four days after his appointment he fired the No. 2 at the Mossad, who had strong credentials and successful experience at the agency. It looks like more senior officials at Mossad may leave the agency, as they are not satisfied with Gofman’s nomination.

Allegations of Political Loyalty

Another major point of contention is Gofman’s close relationship with Netanyahu. As the prime minister’s military secretary, Gofman worked directly alongside Netanyahu and was regarded as a trusted adviser. Some observers stated that his appointment was based on personal loyalty rather than solely on professional considerations, and noted that Netanyahu bypassed candidates favored by the outgoing Mossad leadership.

Some warned that intelligence chiefs should provide independent assessments to political leaders, even when those assessments are unwelcome. Gofman’s nomination was included in a broader discussion about political influence over Israel’s security institutions.

The “Minor Informant” Affair and Legal Challenges

A further complication emerged during scrutiny of Gofman’s tenure as an IDF commander. Critics questioned his involvement in a controversial military operation that used a minor in a sensitive information campaign. This became a focal point during the vetting process and was cited by those challenging his appointment.

Although the advisory committee approved his nomination, the issue caused delays. It also provided grounds for legal petitions.

Gofman’s nomination faced formal legal challenges before the High Court of Justice in Israel. Petitioners argued that aspects of Goffman’s conduct and the appointment process raised concerns regarding standards expected of senior public officials. The litigation delayed the completion of the appointment process and prolonged public debate about the nomination. Ultimately, the High Court rejected the petitions and allowed the appointment to proceed.

Conclusion

Roman Gofman’s appointment as Mossad director illustrates the tensions that frequently accompany senior security appointments in Israel. On the one hand, supporters viewed him as a highly capable commander whose operational experience, creativity, and wartime service made him well-suited to lead the country’s foreign intelligence service. On the other hand, critics questioned his lack of intelligence experience, his close association with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and controversies stemming from allegations of lapses in decision-making and command disputes during his military career.

Despite these challenges, Gofman ultimately secured approval from both the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments and the High Court of Justice, allowing him to assume leadership of the Mossad in June 2026. His performance as director will be subject to close scrutiny.

► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 19 June 2026 | Permalink

* Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

 

 

Analysis: Austrian officials warn of increased spying against military targets

Austrian military - PSTHE AUSTRIAN DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE Agency, the Abwehramt (AbwA), as well as the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, have publicly warned in recent weeks that intelligence targeting of the Austrian military, the Bundesheer, has increased markedly. There has not only been a significant rise in unauthorized drone flights near and over military installations, but also instances of individuals gathering information through vehicular-based surveillance outside facilities. Traditional recruitment methods by foreign intelligence services have also been observed—although no public disclosure has emerged on how frequent these attempts are.

Reinhard Ruckenstuhl, head of the AbwA, notes in his contribution to the Risk Monitor 2026 – The End of Order, which provides brief risk assessments for public consumption, that “[t]he armament and defense efforts of Austria and its neighboring countries […] represent particularly attractive tar­gets for foreign military intelligence services.” He states that, while technological developments open new avenues for gathering information and facilitating espionage, human agents and sources remain important, even “en vogue,” as he puts it. Here he identifies a problem since “[i]n Austria, [foreign agents] are predominantly deployed under diplomatic cover. In the case of this type of cover, they particularly benefit from the strong presence of international organizations and the respective national missions in Austria.”

Ruckenstuhl continues by specifically naming Russia, noting that its intelligence services are “increasingly relying on civil­ians recruited digitally to carry out their missions.” These assignments “range from simple tasks such as carrying out socially polarizing actions to spying on military support for Ukraine to specific acts of sabotage.” The individuals recruited in this way do not receive any training. Although not mentioned in his assessment, it is now a widely held view in German-speaking Europe that it is part of the calculus of the Russian intelligence services, that such individuals will be caught sooner rather than later. This has led to them being labeled “Wegwerfagenten” (“throwaway agents”). While Ruckenstuhl does not address this aspect, he clearly states that the success of this method will likely lead other (antagonistic) intelligence services to adopt similar approaches, which he describes as a “non-professionalization.” As a result, he concludes that “this confronts Austrian intelli­gence services with challenges that will have to be met with equally adapted methods backed by an appropriate legal basis.” Ruckenstuhl finishes with what seems—in the eyes of this author—like a thinly veiled cautionary note to executive and legislative decision-makers when he notes that, noting: “At the same time, the penalties for foreign intelligence oper­ations in Austria lag behind those in other European countries, thereby limiting their deterrent effect. Austria will therefore remain an important hub and safe haven for foreign intelligence services.” Read more of this post

Opinion: The Mossad’s plan to overthrow the regime in Iran was leaked

Iran Kharg IslandON SUNDAY MARCH 22, The New York Times reported that the United States and Israel launched the war in Iran with a central strategic assumption: that external military pressure on Iran could trigger internal unrest and bring about regime collapse. According to the paper, this expectation was shaped in part by Israeli intelligence assessments, particularly from Israel’s external intelligence agency, the Mossad, which argued that Iranian society was sufficiently discontented to rise up if given the right catalyst. This failed concept, which was chiefly propagated by Mossad Director David Barnea, gained traction within the U.S. administration of Donald Trump and became embedded in broader war planning assumptions, according to The Times.

In Israel, reactions to the article focused primarily on the question of who had an interest in leaking this information to The Times. The leak, which Israeli national security analysts confirmed as accurate, seemed intended to find a scapegoat. It aimed to hold the head of the Mossad responsible in the eventuality that the war did not achieve its goals. Some thought Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself may have been behind the leak.

This impression may have been fueled by Netanyahu’s typical behavior since the October 7, 2023, blunder. The Israeli prime minister has tended to appropriate the Mossad’s operational successes—including the 2024 electronic device attacks targeting the Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah. In contrast, his conduct during the war against Hamas in Gaza has been wildly different. He has evaded responsibility for all shortcomings and has placed blame for the intelligence failures on Ronen Bar, head of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), and for the lack of a rapid response by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi.

The situation is more complex in the case of Iran. So far, Mossad head Barnea has been largely shielded from negative media reports reportedly linked to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s circle. Analysis of The New York Times article suggests two possible sources for the leak: senior American officials, or members of the Israeli security establishment—which might reflect internal tensions.

The first—and more probable—possibility is that the leaks originate from Netanyahu’s own office. This may reflect reputed internal rivalries between the IDF and the Mossad. Within the IDF, military leaders have attempted to describe Israel’s war effort as divided into two camps. One camp consists of the IDF, which includes the Air Force and the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), both of which are responsible for war operations. The other camp consists of the Mossad, whose purported task in this effort has been to provoke mass demonstrations insider Iran. According to optimistic Mossad assessments, these protests would precipitate the regime’s overthrow and its replacement with a more moderate, Western-friendly leadership. Apparently, however, in talks with the Israeli cabinet and the CIA, the Mossad never fully guaranteed that the Iranian regime would fall—and certainly not quickly. Read more of this post

Israelis with high-level clearances betted on military operations on Polymarket

PolymarketA CIVILIAN AND A reservist with high-level classified access used Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confidential information to place bets on Polymarket regarding future Israeli military operations. Polymarket is among the most prominent platforms in the rapidly emerging cryptocurrency-based prediction market sector.

Polymarket users are invited to bet “yes” or “no” on whether specific events will occur. These events may relate to political, sporting, cultural, security, environmental, or other fields. Prediction market platforms such as Polymarket match buyers and sellers for each event and hold the funds until the event occurs.

An Israeli court permitted publication that the two individuals were identified during a joint operation conducted by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) and the police. According to the indictment, the civilian and the reservist are charged with serious security offenses, alleging that they placed bets on the Polymarket website based on classified military information. The indictment further states that, in the course of their IDF duties, they were exposed to the inside information on which they relied when making bets. The reservist had access to classified intelligence concerning future IDF operations, and the civilian opened an account on Polymarket and placed the bets.

At the conclusion of the investigation, after an evidentiary foundation had been established against the civilian and the reservist, the prosecutor’s office indicted them on charges of serious security offenses, bribery offenses, and obstruction of justice. According to a formal statement: “It should be noted that in June 2025, the two successfully bet on the occurrence of four security events in Israel related to Operation ‘Am Kalavi’ (the Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025). They wagered tens of thousands of dollars and were correct, with remarkable accuracy, in predicting: Israel will attack Iran on Friday; Israel will attack Iran by the end of June 2025; Israel will announce the end of the operation in Iran by July; Israel will attack Iran before July.” According to one source, they earned $150,000.

It was further stated that: “the execution of such bets, relying on secret and classified information, poses a real security risk to the activities of the IDF and to state security. The State of Israel views the acts attributed to the defendants with great severity and will act resolutely to thwart and bring to justice any person involved in the illegal use of classified information.” According to the findings of the investigation, no operational harm resulted from the Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025. The statement added: “The IDF will not tolerate this type of conduct. Following the incident, steps were taken, and procedures will be tightened across all IDF units to prevent similar incidents from recurring.”

The remaining details of the affair remain prohibited from publication for security reasons.

► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 23 February 2026 | Permalink

* Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

Analysis: Israeli domestic intelligence agency in crisis as deputy director steps down

David ZiniIN THE CONCLUDING WEEKS of 2025, the Israel Intelligence Agency (ISA), which serves as its primary internal security and counterintelligence service, experienced two rapturous events that shook the organization to its very foundations. One was the appointment of Major General (retired) David Zini as the organization’s head. The other was the sudden retirement of the its deputy, known as ‘S’ (the first letter of his first name), who had been appointed to that position just two months earlier.

Following the ISA’s failure to warn of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, it was expected that the director’s position would go to someone with extensive intelligence experience to make the necessary changes in the agency. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu preferred personal loyalty over professionalism, as reflected in his personal decision to appoint General Zini as head of the ISA. General Zini’s appointment as head of the ISA drew public criticism for his lack of professional qualifications and his extreme right-wing political views. Several petitions were filed with the Supreme Court of Israel, all of which were rejected. It was also revealed that Zini’s son was a member of an extreme right-wing group that the ISA monitored closely.

The deputy head of the ISA, who resigned late last year, had close to 30 years of experience. He cut his teen in the ISA’s Arab Sector, where he worked in counterterrorism, prior to advancing to senior management positions. He was also involved in non-Arab Sector activities, mainly in counterespionage, and served as head of the ISA’s Research Division and as the organization’s chief of staff. Prior to being appointed as acting head of the ISA (following the resignation of Ronen Bar, who was forced to step down) he was expected to introduce General Zini to the role and brief him on the ISA and intelligence work. But that will no longer happen. Read more of this post

Analysis: Change in sight as Austria appoints its first-ever female spy chief

Sylvia MayerIN LATE NOVEMBER 2025 news broke that the selection for the new director of Austria’s domestic intelligence service, the Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst (Directorate State Protection and Intelligence Service – DSN) had been finalized: the new head of DSN would be Sylvia Mayer, a long time member of the Austrian intelligence community and the DSN’s deputy director for intelligence since October 2023. Mayer, therefore, will become the first female spy chief in Austrian history. She will officially commence her new position on the 1st of January 2026, by which time she will have fulfilled her current role as DSN interim director for several weeks.

During the selection process, Mayer did not simply prevail against her competitors, but virtually dominated the field: not only was she the sole candidate rated “highly suitable”—the highest mark in the application process— but all the remaining eleven applicants—among them two other women—were classified as “not suitable”, the lowest possible category.

Mayer being considered highly qualified by the section committee is not surprising, given her impressive career: after graduating from a higher technical education institute (an Austrian school form that educates teenagers from 15 to around 19 years of age) that focused on information technology—which earned her the title of an engineer—Mayer joined the Austrian uniformed police in Linz, the country’s third largest city.

In 2012, Mayer joined the predecessor of the DSN, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism – BVT). Initially tasked with combating extremism, she was soon asked to establish a new unit (Referat in German) for the protection of critical infrastructure, which she consequently began heading in 2013. From 2020 to 2021 Mayer was the interim head of the protection and security department of the BVT. From December 2021 onwards, following the restructuring of the BVT into the DSN, Mayer took over the department of strategy, policy, resources and staff matters (Stabsangelegenheiten in German) within the new agency, before becoming its vice-director for intelligence, as mentioned earlier.

While working full-time, Mayer completed a law degree and doctorate in the same field, which was awarded to her in 2021 by the University of Vienna. According to her official biographical note, Mayer also holds a master’s degree in strategic security management from the University of Applied Sciences Wiener Neustadt.

Mayer is also an accomplished athlete: playing soccer since her teen years, she took part in the Austrian national league and joined the Austrian under-19 female national team. As a young girl she is said to have trained at length with the boys—an experience some have pointed out might have proven helpful for a career in Austria’s male dominated Ministry of Interior and the intelligence world. Over the years, Mayer has emphasized on several occasions that she hopes to inspire other women to also assume leadership roles and demonstrate that they are as capable as their male counterparts. Read more of this post