Analysis: Austrian officials warn of increased spying against military targets

THE AUSTRIAN DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE Agency, the Abwehramt (AbwA), as well as the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, have publicly warned in recent weeks that intelligence targeting of the Austrian military, the Bundesheer, has increased markedly. There has not only been a significant rise in unauthorized drone flights near and over military installations, but also instances of individuals gathering information through vehicular-based surveillance outside facilities. Traditional recruitment methods by foreign intelligence services have also been observed—although no public disclosure has emerged on how frequent these attempts are.

Reinhard Ruckenstuhl, head of the AbwA, notes in his contribution to the Risk Monitor 2026 – The End of Order, which provides brief risk assessments for public consumption, that “[t]he armament and defense efforts of Austria and its neighboring countries […] represent particularly attractive tar­gets for foreign military intelligence services.” He states that, while technological developments open new avenues for gathering information and facilitating espionage, human agents and sources remain important, even “en vogue,” as he puts it. Here he identifies a problem since “[i]n Austria, [foreign agents] are predominantly deployed under diplomatic cover. In the case of this type of cover, they particularly benefit from the strong presence of international organizations and the respective national missions in Austria.”

Ruckenstuhl continues by specifically naming Russia, noting that its intelligence services are “increasingly relying on civil­ians recruited digitally to carry out their missions.” These assignments “range from simple tasks such as carrying out socially polarizing actions to spying on military support for Ukraine to specific acts of sabotage.” The individuals recruited in this way do not receive any training. Although not mentioned in his assessment, it is now a widely held view in German-speaking Europe that it is part of the calculus of the Russian intelligence services, that such individuals will be caught sooner rather than later. This has led to them being labeled “Wegwerfagenten” (“throwaway agents”). While Ruckenstuhl does not address this aspect, he clearly states that the success of this method will likely lead other (antagonistic) intelligence services to adopt similar approaches, which he describes as a “non-professionalization.” As a result, he concludes that “this confronts Austrian intelli­gence services with challenges that will have to be met with equally adapted methods backed by an appropriate legal basis.” Ruckenstuhl finishes with what seems—in the eyes of this author—like a thinly veiled cautionary note to executive and legislative decision-makers when he notes that, noting: “At the same time, the penalties for foreign intelligence oper­ations in Austria lag behind those in other European countries, thereby limiting their deterrent effect. Austria will therefore remain an important hub and safe haven for foreign intelligence services.”

This sentiment was echoed by Rudolf Striedinger, Chief of the General Staff of the Austrian Armed Forces, when asked about foreign intelligence activities targeting the Bundesheer and Ruckenstuhl’s assessment in the Risk monitor 2026: “Our country is still something of a paradise for spies. This is partly due to our legislation. You can see this in Austria in the large number of Russian and other embassy staff members who clearly have a background in espionage. So, the potential is definitely there.” Striedinger explained that, because Austria is closely interconnected not only with other European Union (EU) member states but also with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—of which it is not a member but cooperates with at various levels—its armed forces use very similar or identical weapons systems and methods. Consequently, intelligence gathered on the Bundesheer may provide valuable insights into the development and current procedures of Western armed forces more broadly. In response to this intensified unwanted interest, the AbwA has launched a major awareness campaign within the Bundesheer, and soldiers on guard duty have been specifically instructed on what to watch for and immediately report. Striedinger is well aware of the challenges the Austrian military faces regarding foreign intelligence, since he was Ruckenstuhl’s predecessor as chief of the AbwA before becoming Chief of the General Staff.

In the view of this author, the remarks by these two high-ranking Austrian generals are noteworthy for two reasons. First, both explicitly name Russia as a foreign actor targeting Austria. This is likely part of Austria’s broader effort—also reflected in its Intelligence Community—to signal to Western, particularly European, partners that the country is firmly in their camp and committed to shared values. It may also be part of a broader attempt by Austria’s security institutions to “clean house” or, perhaps more accurately, to restore their standing after several incidents and revelations led to the country being labeled a “den of (Russian) spies”—and worse by some. While, in retrospect, some of these assessments appear exaggerated relative to the actual scale of legal issues and cases, Austria’s international reputation has nevertheless suffered in recent years.

Second, these public statements may form part of a broader push by counterintelligence and security institutions to prompt political action—particularly to tighten criminal law. This has long been a demand of the Austrian Intelligence Community, especially the domestic service, the Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst (DSN).

This push may have gained traction: it was recently reported that the Social Democratic-led Ministry of Justice has provided the other two governing parties, the conservative People’s Party (ÖVP) and the liberal New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS), with a draft introducing more comprehensive criminal offenses related to intelligence gathering and other activities by foreign services. While the Ministry has confirmed the existence of the draft, the actual legal wording has not yet been publicized, and the amendment remains under negotiation among the governing parties. It is therefore not yet possible to make a reliable prediction about how Austria’s legal framework on espionage may change in the near future—although such changes now appear more likely than ever.

► Author: Paul Schliefsteiner* | Date: 27 April 2026 | Permalink

* Paul Schliefsteiner is the Director of the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (ACIPSS) and the Editor of the Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS). He studied History, Philosophy and Law at the University of Graz, as well as International Security Studies at the University of the Bundeswehr Munich and the George C. Marshall Centre in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. He was previously a guest researcher at the Institute for Peace Preservation and Conflict Research at the Defence Academy of the Austrian Armed Forces in Vienna