Analysis: Europe’s Intelligence Challenge in an Era of Strategic Bipolarity

May 5, 2026 by 4 Comments

European UnionThe United States remains the most powerful military actor in the Western alliance system, but recent conflicts have exposed serious limits in American strategic capacity. For Europe, this lesson is no longer speculative. It must now shape the intelligence planning, defense preparedness, and executive decision-making across NATO’s European pillar. This requires a major shift in how European intelligence communities define their mission and operational priorities.

For decades, European intelligence services operated within a strategic environment shaped by American primacy. Their task was often to complement U.S. intelligence collection, support NATO operations, monitor regional threats, and provide national-level warning. That model is no longer sufficient. In an emerging bipolar order dominated by U.S.-China competition, Europe must develop intelligence structures capable of supporting greater strategic autonomy, faster defense mobilization, and more sophisticated political warfare responses—especially in the cognitive domain.

THE U.S. IS FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO WIN WARS

The U.S. appears increasingly ill-prepared for the demands of modern warfare. This is not a realization born solely of the present war in Iran. Rather, Iran represents the latest data point in a longer pattern of strategic underperformance that includes Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. The current war in Iran further reinforces concerns about coherence and strategic direction. Public messaging by the administration of President Donald Trump has emphasized kinetic successes—such as the degradation of Iran’s naval and air capabilities. But it has offered limited clarity on broader strategic objectives. This mirrors earlier patterns in Afghanistan, where overwhelming tactical superiority failed to produce durable political outcomes. It is worth noting that the Taliban did not require a navy and air force in order to defeat American forces; if that is so, then why would the Iranians require them? For intelligence professionals, the lesson is clear: battlefield metrics must be analytically divorced from strategic indicators. This means that intelligence support to policymakers must explicitly distinguish between momentary tactical achievements and their long-term strategic significance.

The historical record suggests that such misalignment between tactics and strategy is not easily concealed from domestic audiences. After more than two decades of sustained conflict, the American electorate has shown clear signs of fatigue, frustration, and declining confidence in ruling elites. This sentiment has contributed the rise populism and of polarizing political figures, which has in turn led to the erosion of bipartisan consensus on foreign policy in Washington. One is understandably surprised by how long it has taken European planners to incorporate this domestic dynamic into their assessments of America’s reliability as a strategic ally. The fact is that the element of continuity in American foreign policy is nowhere near guaranteed—and the sooner European leaders understand that, the better. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Austrian officials warn of increased spying against military targets

April 26, 2026 by 9 Comments

Austrian military - PSTHE AUSTRIAN DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE Agency, the Abwehramt (AbwA), as well as the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, have publicly warned in recent weeks that intelligence targeting of the Austrian military, the Bundesheer, has increased markedly. There has not only been a significant rise in unauthorized drone flights near and over military installations, but also instances of individuals gathering information through vehicular-based surveillance outside facilities. Traditional recruitment methods by foreign intelligence services have also been observed—although no public disclosure has emerged on how frequent these attempts are.

Reinhard Ruckenstuhl, head of the AbwA, notes in his contribution to the Risk Monitor 2026 – The End of Order, which provides brief risk assessments for public consumption, that “[t]he armament and defense efforts of Austria and its neighboring countries […] represent particularly attractive tar­gets for foreign military intelligence services.” He states that, while technological developments open new avenues for gathering information and facilitating espionage, human agents and sources remain important, even “en vogue,” as he puts it. Here he identifies a problem since “[i]n Austria, [foreign agents] are predominantly deployed under diplomatic cover. In the case of this type of cover, they particularly benefit from the strong presence of international organizations and the respective national missions in Austria.”

Ruckenstuhl continues by specifically naming Russia, noting that its intelligence services are “increasingly relying on civil­ians recruited digitally to carry out their missions.” These assignments “range from simple tasks such as carrying out socially polarizing actions to spying on military support for Ukraine to specific acts of sabotage.” The individuals recruited in this way do not receive any training. Although not mentioned in his assessment, it is now a widely held view in German-speaking Europe that it is part of the calculus of the Russian intelligence services, that such individuals will be caught sooner rather than later. This has led to them being labeled “Wegwerfagenten” (“throwaway agents”). While Ruckenstuhl does not address this aspect, he clearly states that the success of this method will likely lead other (antagonistic) intelligence services to adopt similar approaches, which he describes as a “non-professionalization.” As a result, he concludes that “this confronts Austrian intelli­gence services with challenges that will have to be met with equally adapted methods backed by an appropriate legal basis.” Ruckenstuhl finishes with what seems—in the eyes of this author—like a thinly veiled cautionary note to executive and legislative decision-makers when he notes that, noting: “At the same time, the penalties for foreign intelligence oper­ations in Austria lag behind those in other European countries, thereby limiting their deterrent effect. Austria will therefore remain an important hub and safe haven for foreign intelligence services.” Read more of this post

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The Real War Is About To Begin: Iran Transitions to Full-Scale Insurgency

March 30, 2026 by 12 Comments

Iran War 2026THE IRAN WAR OPENED with a shock. In minutes, the United States and Israel struck deep into Iran’s command structure, killing nearly fifty senior figures—among them the Supreme Leader and much of the military high command. It was a ruthless display of intelligence, surveillance, and targeting at a level rarely seen in modern warfare. Russian forces only wish they could have achieved even a fraction of this effect in Ukraine in 2022. Had they done so, the war’s trajectory might have unfolded very differently. But this kind of operational success is exceptionally hard to deliver in warfare.

And yet, as Carl von Clausewitz cautioned centuries ago, the outcome of war is not governed by formulaic calculus. No matter how astounding, operational sophistication and technological prowess do not guarantee success. Instead of an immediate collapse, the decapitation of the Iranian regime appears to have produced a series of unpredictable second-order effects. At the very least, it physically eliminated Iran’s few pragmatic leaders who have historically favored restraint. Their demise effectively handed over power to the hardliners of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Moreover, the war appears to have paralyzed Iran’s domestic opposition, whose adherents may despise the regime but—unlike the U.S. and Israel—do not want to see their country break up into ethnic statelets.

Most importantly, the February 28 decapitation strike convinced Iran’s surviving leaders that this is an existential fight—not a limited confrontation like the Twelve-Day War. Today’s ruling Principalists in Iran differ sharply from the cosmopolitan, Western-educated elite of the 1960s and 1970s. They are largely provincial in origin, domestically rooted, and lack the international ties that once offered pathways of exit. They do not hold dual citizenships, do not maintain Q Quoteforeign residences, and few of them possess the linguistic or social capital to relocate abroad. Simply put, they have no viable exit. For them, defeat is not exile—it is annihilation. Under such conditions, the expectation is not capitulation, but resistance to the very end.

Activating the Iranian Asymmetric Doctrine

Starting in 2001, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq offered Iranian war planners a prolonged and unusually comprehensive vantage point from which to study the American way of war in their immediate neighborhood. For over two decades, the Iranians analyzed these methods, learned from them, and internalized their logic into their own asymmetric warfare doctrine. And now, having survived the February 28 decapitation attack, the Iranian regime has put that doctrine into operation. Iran’s asymmetric doctrine channels the state’s military, civilian, economic, and informational assets into a multi-domain, protracted insurgency campaign designed to inflict maximum pain on its enemies. In doing so, it rests on what is perhaps the Islamic Republic’s greatest asset: its asymmetric patience—i.e., its capacity to endure more physical and emotional torment than its Western opponents and their allies.

The Iranians refined their asymmetric patience skills during what they refer to as the “War of Holy Defense” (1980-1988), one of the 20th century’s longest conflicts and the deadliest conventional war ever fought in the developing world. The then-newly formed Islamic Republic suffered over 500,000 casualties—many of those due to exposure to chemical warfare—but managed to bring Saddam Hussein’s Western-backed Iraq into a standstill and force it into a truce. To do so, they even resorted to so-called “human wave assaults”, large masses of mostly unarmed youth who swarmed enemy positions and overwhelmed them by the sheer power of their number. That was largely how the Basij, the Iranian regime’s paramilitary street gangs that continue to operate in modern-day Iran, were initially formed.

Iran’s “Economy of Resistance”

On March 28, the Telegram channel belonging to the Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued an infographic titled “The Path to Defeating the Enemy in the Economic War”. The infographic reflects the Islamic Republic’s concept of “economy of resistance”, which was first developed in 2014 by Mojtaba Khamenei’s father, the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The central idea behind this concept is restructuring the Iranian economy, not simply to reduce its susceptibility to Western-imposed sanctions, but to allow it to stabilize and even develop. The goal of the economy of resistance is to prevent the destruction of the Islamic Republic and the Westernization of Iranian society. Through the economy of resistance doctrine, and with crucial help by China and Russia, Iran has largely managed to insulate its economy from the global economic system that is now reeling under Iran’s own asymmetric attacks. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Escalation Without Endgame and the Limits of Defeating Iran

March 3, 2026 by 5 Comments

Iran Israel United States warTHE ONGOING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN Iran and its adversaries unfolds against the backdrop of a regime that is strategically depleted yet politically combustible. Yet strategic exhaustion does not equate to imminent collapse. Indeed, the potential degradation of Iran’s coercive institutions raises a more complex question: what follows tactical success? Thus, while Iran appears weakened and vulnerable, the longer-term trajectory of the conflict remains uncertain, fraught with the risk of protracted instability and regional spillover at a level that could make Libya and Syria seem mild by comparison.

Iran is Strategically Depleted and Vulnerable

Decades of crippling sanctions have ruined Iran’s economy and demoralized its population, causing an already polarized society to further-disintegrate. Outside of a small population of religious zealots, Iranians have little interest in martyrdom, and very few are willing to die for a regime that most see as politically and ideologically bankrupt. The stunning degree of the regime’s penetration by Israeli and American intelligence agencies is indicative of the disillusionment of ruling elites, let alone rank-and-file functionaries.

Militarily, this is hardly a war between equals. Even before bombs started falling in Tehran on February 28, Iran’s armed forces and its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had been severely degraded by prior military engagements with the U.S. and Israel. Even with the assistance of its proxies and allies, Iran is demonstrably unable to match the military and intelligence resources of its opponents. As many have noted, Tehran’s retaliatory strikes appear to emphasize economic disruption and psychological pressure on civilian populations. But the marked inconsistency in the scale and delivery of Iran’s retaliatory attacks suggests that it is struggling to respond in a coherent fashion.

Russia, meanwhile, is nowhere to be seen. As in the cases of Venezuela and Cuba, Moscow has restricted its response to this crisis to diplomatic condemnations and offers to mediate, rather than offering military assistance to its Middle Eastern ally. This is hardly surprising, given Russia’s broader strategic priorities and its desire to further its ongoing expansionist goals in Europe by avoid overextension elsewhere.

Iran is weak, exhausted, alone. It is teetering on the edge. Yet, instead of cheering, this appears to trouble even seasoned Iran hawks like John Bolton, Trump’s onetime national security adviser. A veteran Republican, Bolton is probably the most consistent and vociferous Iran critic in the Western Hemisphere. The Iranian government has actively planned to assassinate him in recent years. But in a recent interview, Bolton cautioned about the lack of planning behind Washington’s latest adventurism in the Middle East and waned that the current situation may “deepen conflict, create a dangerous power vacuum, and purge the [entire Middle East] into turmoil”. What is Bolton seeing that Trump’s inner circle is not?

This War Will Not End Soon

American air campaigns have a demonstrated history of obliterating Washington’s tactical targets and severely disrupting its adversaries. Iran is unlikely to prove an exception to this rule. However, air campaigns—no matter how sophisticated—cannot by themselves reorder domestic politics and build long-lasting political outcomes. It follows that, despite delivering a series of indisputable tactical successes, including the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader and senior members of his inner circle, American and Israeli airpower cannot by itself ensure a pro-Western outcome in Iran.

Obliterating the Iranian regime’s military capabilities and degrading its ability to dispense violence against its own population is likely to create a power vacuum. But that is not the same as managing the ensuing political fallout. Even if the regime falls—which is not the likeliest scenario—its successor is unlikely to be friendly to the U.S. or Israel. For over a century, Iran has been permeated by a political culture shaped by fervent nationalism, revolutionary narratives and resistance against foreign intervention. This has been particularly so since 1979, with the theocratic regime building the nation’s identity around the idea of its resistance to the “Great Satan” and its regional allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. This identity permeates Iran’s security apparatus, its state institutions and its education system. Even anti-regime Iranians—including the student demonstrators who cheered Ayatollah Khamenei’s demise—espouse core elements of that narrative. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Israeli domestic intelligence agency in crisis as deputy director steps down

January 11, 2026 by 3 Comments

David ZiniIN THE CONCLUDING WEEKS of 2025, the Israel Intelligence Agency (ISA), which serves as its primary internal security and counterintelligence service, experienced two rapturous events that shook the organization to its very foundations. One was the appointment of Major General (retired) David Zini as the organization’s head. The other was the sudden retirement of the its deputy, known as ‘S’ (the first letter of his first name), who had been appointed to that position just two months earlier.

Following the ISA’s failure to warn of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, it was expected that the director’s position would go to someone with extensive intelligence experience to make the necessary changes in the agency. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu preferred personal loyalty over professionalism, as reflected in his personal decision to appoint General Zini as head of the ISA. General Zini’s appointment as head of the ISA drew public criticism for his lack of professional qualifications and his extreme right-wing political views. Several petitions were filed with the Supreme Court of Israel, all of which were rejected. It was also revealed that Zini’s son was a member of an extreme right-wing group that the ISA monitored closely.

The deputy head of the ISA, who resigned late last year, had close to 30 years of experience. He cut his teen in the ISA’s Arab Sector, where he worked in counterterrorism, prior to advancing to senior management positions. He was also involved in non-Arab Sector activities, mainly in counterespionage, and served as head of the ISA’s Research Division and as the organization’s chief of staff. Prior to being appointed as acting head of the ISA (following the resignation of Ronen Bar, who was forced to step down) he was expected to introduce General Zini to the role and brief him on the ISA and intelligence work. But that will no longer happen. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Change in sight as Austria appoints its first-ever female spy chief

December 22, 2025 by 2 Comments

Sylvia MayerIN LATE NOVEMBER 2025 news broke that the selection for the new director of Austria’s domestic intelligence service, the Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst (Directorate State Protection and Intelligence Service – DSN) had been finalized: the new head of DSN would be Sylvia Mayer, a long time member of the Austrian intelligence community and the DSN’s deputy director for intelligence since October 2023. Mayer, therefore, will become the first female spy chief in Austrian history. She will officially commence her new position on the 1st of January 2026, by which time she will have fulfilled her current role as DSN interim director for several weeks.

During the selection process, Mayer did not simply prevail against her competitors, but virtually dominated the field: not only was she the sole candidate rated “highly suitable”—the highest mark in the application process— but all the remaining eleven applicants—among them two other women—were classified as “not suitable”, the lowest possible category.

Mayer being considered highly qualified by the section committee is not surprising, given her impressive career: after graduating from a higher technical education institute (an Austrian school form that educates teenagers from 15 to around 19 years of age) that focused on information technology—which earned her the title of an engineer—Mayer joined the Austrian uniformed police in Linz, the country’s third largest city.

In 2012, Mayer joined the predecessor of the DSN, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism – BVT). Initially tasked with combating extremism, she was soon asked to establish a new unit (Referat in German) for the protection of critical infrastructure, which she consequently began heading in 2013. From 2020 to 2021 Mayer was the interim head of the protection and security department of the BVT. From December 2021 onwards, following the restructuring of the BVT into the DSN, Mayer took over the department of strategy, policy, resources and staff matters (Stabsangelegenheiten in German) within the new agency, before becoming its vice-director for intelligence, as mentioned earlier.

While working full-time, Mayer completed a law degree and doctorate in the same field, which was awarded to her in 2021 by the University of Vienna. According to her official biographical note, Mayer also holds a master’s degree in strategic security management from the University of Applied Sciences Wiener Neustadt.

Mayer is also an accomplished athlete: playing soccer since her teen years, she took part in the Austrian national league and joined the Austrian under-19 female national team. As a young girl she is said to have trained at length with the boys—an experience some have pointed out might have proven helpful for a career in Austria’s male dominated Ministry of Interior and the intelligence world. Over the years, Mayer has emphasized on several occasions that she hopes to inspire other women to also assume leadership roles and demonstrate that they are as capable as their male counterparts. Read more of this post

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Opinion: Amidst war with Iran, Netanyahu tries to subjugate Israel Security Agency

June 20, 2025 by 2 Comments

David ZiniTHE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL recently appointed a new acting chief at the Israel Security Agency (ISA, also known as Shabak or Shin Bet). Identified only by their first initial, “S.”, this individual is one of the deputies of the outgoing ISA chief, Ronen Bar, and has reportedly served in the ISA for nearly 30 years. For the first time in ISA’s history, the organization is now being led by someone without a permanent appointment, marking a significant departure from usual practice.

This temporary appointment arises from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on nominating Major General (ret.) David Zini for the position. However, Zini’s nomination has been met with legal challenges. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled that Netanyahu cannot appoint the chief of the ISA, due to a conflict of interest. This is because the ISA is currently conducting a comprehensive investigation into the connections of Netanyahu’s close advisors with Qatar—a case popularly referred to as Qatargate.

Yet, even amidst Israel’s war with Iran, Netanyahu finds time to advocate for Zini’s appointment as ISA chief, arguing that the ongoing war creates an urgent need for a permanent ISA chief. The matter is once again pending a Supreme Court decision. Nevertheless, it seems that, given the unique circumstances that Israel is currently facing, Zini is likely to be appointed head of the ISA.

It is important to note that Zini lacks experience in intelligence operations. Following the failure of the ISA to provide a warning before the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the ISA chief has been expected to have extensive experience in intelligence operations, and to be well-versed in Arab affairs, which are central to ISA’s operations.

The issues surrounding the appointment of Major General Zini are complex. There is concern about the fact that Zini is being nominated personally by the prime minister, who is also requesting that the ISA head relinquish their autonomy and comply with the Prime Minister’s directives. Thus, the ISA could be used as a tool by the Netanyahu administration to advance the prime minister’s own political agenda.

What are the potential immediate risks if Zini is appointed to the role of ISA chief?

  1. Zini will likely respond to Netanyahu’s request and impose secret surveillance on political activists who have long opposed the prime minister. Netanyahu demanded that the former ISA head, Ronen Bar, take similar action. However, Bar refused, asserting that political protest in Israel was legitimate and that political motives, rather than state interests, drove the prime minister’s request.

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Austrian intelligence service report draws international attention over Iran nuke claims

June 2, 2025 by 10 Comments

Direktion Staatsschutz und NachrichtendienstON MAY 26, THE Austrian domestic intelligence service, Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst (DSN) in Vienna officially presented its annual report: the Verfassungschutzbericht (VSB) [Constitution Protection Report].  The document can be downloaded [PDF] via the official homepage of the DSN.

First published in 1997 by the predecessor of the DSN and then titled Staatsschutzbericht [State Protection Report], these reports offer rare official insights into the work of Austria’s domestic intelligence service. While their form and scope have varied over the nearly 30 years of the service’s existence, their aim and structure have roughly stayed the same: the VSB informs the public about the duties of the service, and about recent developments in the fields it is tasked with, monitoring and policing, during the calendar year prior to its publication.

Featured chapters nearly always include political extremism, terrorism, espionage, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protection of critical infrastructure and, since their emergence, sometimes also cyber threats. Often—thought not always—the reports feature anonymized cases from the year before and specialized essays about certain relevant topics. Traditionally the media and public give most attention to those parts of the report that deal with extremism and terrorism of all kinds inside Austria.

VSB 2024 Receives International Attention

This year, however, several paragraphs in the chapter titled “International Illicit Arms Trade and Proliferation” [“Internationaler Illegaler Waffenhandel und Proliferation”] have drawn international attention. The proliferation section—starting on page 154 of the report—deals with a number of states that can be described as partly or fully antagonistic to “the West”. In addition to Russia, China, Pakistan and North Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its activities are described in the chapter. Regarding the Shia theocracy and its nuclear program, the report states (translated by the author with assistance by DeepL):

In order to assert and enforce its political claims to regional power, the Islamic Republic of Iran is striving for comprehensive armament. Nuclear weapons are intended to make the regime untouchable and to expand and consolidate its dominance in the Middle East and beyond. The Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons is well advanced. An arsenal of ballistic missiles is ready to carry nuclear warheads over long distances. [Emphasis added]

All efforts to prevent Iran’s armament with sanctions and agreements have so far proved ineffective. On the contrary: the Islamic Republic of Iran is producing weapons and weapons delivery systems on a large scale—and not just for its own use. [p.158]

Iranian intelligence services are entrusted with the development and implementation of circumvention structures for the procurement of armaments, proliferation-relevant technologies, and materials for weapons of mass destruction. They use front companies and networks inside and outside the Islamic Republic of Iran for this purpose. In particular, the [Islamic] Revolutionary Guards Corps’ widely ramified and difficult to oversee company empire serves proliferation purposes. [p.159]

The report clearly describes a program by Iran to develop nuclear weapons as a fact. It does not only suggest that it might be well advanced, but states this as a given. The report furthermore establishes that transport systems to deploy nuclear weapons—once finalized—are in place and could reach long-distance targets.

Fox News Picks Up VSB 2024

The VSB was picked up by the American media giant Fox News. The network reported on it under the title “Explosive new intelligence report reveals Iran’s nuclear weapons program still active” on May 28. The Fox News report begins by pointing out that “[t]he startling intelligence gathering of Austrian officials contradicts the assessment of the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)”. It goes on to note that “[t]he Austrian intelligence findings could be an unwanted wrench in President [Donald] Trump’s negotiation process to resolve the atomic crisis with Iran’s rulers because the data outlined in the report suggests the regime will not abandon its drive to secure a nuclear weapon.”

Fox News quotes David Albright, a physicist and founder/president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, DC, as saying: “[t]he ODNI report is stuck in the past, a remnant of the fallacious unclassified 2007 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate]. The Austrian report in general is similar to German and British assessments. Both governments, by the way, made clear to [the] US IC [Intelligence Community] in 2007 that they thought the US assessment was wrong that the Iranian nuclear weapons program ended in 2003.”

The Fox News report also states that “[t]he danger of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism [and its illegal atomic weapons program] was cited 99 times in the 211-page report that covers pressing threats to Austria’s democracy.” All in all, Fox News’ reporting paints a picture that the small European state’s intelligence service has information that contradicts the assessment of the much larger American IC and insinuates that the American assessment—and by implication the political approach to dealing with Iran—is wrong. Read more of this post

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Before resigning, Israeli security official accuses Netanyahu of serious misconduct

May 5, 2025 by 6 Comments

Israel Supreme CourtVETERAN ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER Ronen Bar, who has led the Israeli Security Agency (ISA, more widely known as the Shin Bet) since 2021, has submitted an affidavit to Israel’s Supreme Court, accusing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of serious misconduct. Netanyahu fired Bar in March, but the Supreme Court later suspended Bar’s firing.

Now Bar has submitted an open affidavit alongside a confidential one, alleging serious misconduct by Netanyahu, accusing him of attempting to use the ISA’s investigative powers against protestors and activists. He links this accusation to a number of conspiracies that are circulating in Israel, blaming the ISA for the October 7 intelligence failure. The veteran security official concludes his open affidavit by stating that he “will soon announce the date on which I will end my duties”. Last week, Bar said he would resign in June.

The ISA director also repeats earlier claims regarding the reasons behind Netanyahu’s statement that he “distrusts” him. Among other things, Bar claims that Netanyahu “expressed himself to me more than once in a way that sought to substantiate his expectation that the ISA should act against citizens involved in legal protest activities and demonstrations against the government”. Thus, Bar was asked to provide details about the identities of Israeli citizens, mostly protesting activists, because, according to Netanyahu, they were “following security targets”.

Furthermore, Bar claims he was asked to use the investigatory powers of the ISA to “monitor protest financiers”. He adds he was told during a conversation on the topic that, in the event of a constitutional crisis, he, as the head of the ISA, was required to take his orders from prime minister, and not from the High Court of Justice —another name for the Israeli Supreme Court. Bar notes that the full details of the matter will be provided to the Supreme Court in his confidential affidavit.

In his open affidavit, Bar clarifies that he established several criteria to address the question of whether the ISA should exercise its investigative powers without violating the constitutional right to protest. The criteria were largely based on the legal definition of subversion, defined as illegal activity involving clandestine aspects and has the potential for violence. According to Bar, actions that fail to meet this criterion are not a matter the ISA; rather, if any monitoring is warranted, the police should intervene in the interests of public order. “In borderline cases we consulted with the government’s legal counsel to ensure that the ISA’s broad powers would only be exercised within its designated framework and functions”, states Bar. He adds that “[t]he prime minister’s requests to act contrary to these criteria were refused. In quite a few cases, [Netanyahu] asked to discuss issues related to these issues at the end of working meetings, and after asking the military secretary and the typist, who operates the recording device, to leave the room with the clear goal that the exchange of words would not be recorded”. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Assad’s collapse in Syria was a strategic surprise to Israel

December 20, 2024 by 7 Comments

Syria IsraelTHE COLLAPSE OF THE regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on December 8 caught the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s intelligence community —mainly Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Mossad— by surprise. Assad’s collapse occurred much faster than Israel had estimated. Israel did not expect that the Syrian Arab Army would disintegrate so resoundingly, within 48 hours of the attack by the Syrian rebels.

Israeli intelligence assessed that, despite the shocks it had suffered in recent months, the so-called Axis of Resistance against Israel —mainly Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran— was stable. A scenario of rapid collapse of the government in Syria had not been assessed as a possibility, or even given a low probability tag. That was primarily because the Assad family had governed Syria for almost 60 years.

Following the Assad regime’s collapse, the focus of Israel’s intelligence is on analyzing the intentions of the major rebel organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and understanding how —if at all— it will lead the new administration in Syria. Israel is also examining developments in southern Syria, as well as what is happening at the Syrian and Russian military bases in Latakia and Tartus. Moreover, the IDF is monitoring the activities of Iranian elements in Syria, including on the border with Lebanon, to prevent the possibility of military equipment being transferred from Syria to Hezbollah.

It is clear to Israel that Turkey stands behind the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization and that Ankara armed and supported the group for a significant period. What is less clear is whether and how Turkey’s involvement in Syria could threaten Israel’s interests, given that Israel’s relations with Turkey have deteriorated dramatically in recent years.

Assad was a key member of the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance. Following his fall from power, Iran and Hezbollah could lose their main logistical hub for producing, transferring, and storing weapons, as well as training their forces and militias. Additionally, Syria under Assad constantly posed the threat of turning into yet another battlefront against Israel. Without Assad, Russia could lose its grip on Syria —the only country in the Middle East where Russian influence dominates that of the United States. The Russians could also lose access to their military bases in Syria, which offered the Russian Navy access to the waters of the Mediterranean.

Despite the fall of the bitter enemy that was Assad’s Syria, and the deep shock suffered by the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance camp that has been dominant in the Middle East in recent decades, Israeli intelligence is not optimistic about the emerging situation in post-Assad Syria. Syria is a collection of minorities —Druze, Kurds, Alawites, and Christians— that have been artificially joined together despite carrying bitter, bloody scores. The latter may erupt sharply, especially against the Alawites. Concepts such as liberal politics, civil society, or a cohesive nation-state, have never existed inside Syria.

It follows that Israel is very concerned about the emerging uncertainty in Syria. Immediately after the fall of Assad, the IDF strengthened its defenses on the Golan Heights border to ensure that the chaos in Syria did not spill over into Israel. Meanwhile, Israel is in contact —both directly and through intermediaries— with several Syrian rebel groups, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The Israeli message at this stage is a demand that the rebels not approach the border, along with a warning that, if they violate the separation of forces agreement, Israel will respond with force.

And a final note: assessments in relation to the Syrian regime’s collapse continue to emerge in the IDF and the Israeli intelligence community. These assessments concern the extent to which the lessons of October 7 have been sufficiently analyzed and assimilated within Israel. Specifically, there are questions about whether this new intelligence surprise in Syria may stem from the fact that an in-depth investigation into the lessons of October 7 has yet to be carried out during the 14 months of the war with Hamas.

► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 20 December 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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Analysis: The fate of Russia’s military bases in Syria seems highly uncertain

December 9, 2024 by 1 Comment

Khmeimim Air Base SyriaTHERE ARE CONFLICTING REPORTS about the fate of Russia’s military bases in Syria, following the complete collapse of the 54-year-long Assad dynasty. Late on Sunday it was announced on Russian state media that the Kremlin had extended Bashar al-Assad and his family political asylum “on humanitarian grounds”. Attention quickly turned to the fate of the Russian embassy in the capital Damascus and the Russian military facilities in Tartous and Khmeimim.

It is difficult to overstate the strategic significance of the Russian military facilities in Syria, some of which date as far back as 1971, when Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s father, assumed power in the country. The Russian naval base in Tartous is currently the only Russian military facility outside of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, it constitutes the sole warm-port fueling and repair facility that is exclusively available to the Russian Navy. It is home to the Russian naval group in Syria, which consists of a submarine and five warships.

Likewise, the Khmeimim Air Base in Syria’s Latakia province is home to dozens of Russian fighter jets, which have been stationed there since 2015, ostensibly in order to protect the Syrian government from the Islamic State. However, Russia regularly uses the Khmeimim Air Base to transport troops and war materiel to Africa, and to project air power in the Mediterranean, through the presence of several bomber aircraft. The latter can be found, not only in the Khmeimim Air Base, but also in the Syrian military airports of Homs and Palmyra.

But these two military airports are now in the hands of the Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces that have captured much of Syria in the past two weeks. It is doubtful that the Russian Aerospace Forces will be able to use them from now on. Moreover, there are reports that Moscow will be forced to engage in a strategic withdrawal of the entirety of its military forces from Syria within hours, if not days.

On Sunday, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a dismissive statement claiming that, although Russian troops in Syria had been placed on high alert, “no serious threat to their security” had been detected. According to the Reuters news agency, the Russian government had been in communication with the leadership of the HTS leadership for several days. As a result of this communication, an agreement had allegedly been struck, which guaranteed “the safety of Russian military bases and diplomatic institutions in Syria”. Read more of this post

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Spy’s release by higher court shows Austria is unable to find its intelligence footing

September 9, 2024 by 1 Comment

Egisto OttON JUNE 26, THE longwinded case of Austria’s counter intelligence failure regarding a possible inside threat took yet another —quite surprising— turn: the state court of Vienna (Landesgericht Wien) released from pre-trial detention (Untersuchungshaft) Egisto Ott, a former member of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT) —Austria’s now-dissolved domestic intelligence agency. Ott, who was accused of spying against Austria, had been arrested (again) at the end of March on suspicion of obtaining classified information for which he could provide no reason, as well as for presumably selling it. Among the suspected recipients of the classified information were Russian assets and —more or less directly— Russian intelligence.

However, the three-judge panel called to decide on the detention complaint came to the conclusion that, while there remains a strong suspicion (dringender Tatverdacht) against Ott, the reasons for his further detention were not sufficiently given. In the judges’ view, all activities that could carry a pre-trial detention were committed before Ott was arrested and released for the first time in 2021. Back then, Ott had also been released after a short detention, following a decision by the same court. Briefly summarized, in 2021 the Landesgericht concluded that Ott could no longer spy against Austria as he did not have access to classified information, having been removed from the domestic intelligence agency years earlier. Additionally, since the BVT was in the process of reorganization and reformation at that point, the judges deemed the possibility of further criminal behavior by Ott to be unrealistic.

The recent assessment that Ott did not conduct additional punishable offences following his first release is surprising, since the prosecutor alleged —with a certain undertone directed against the initial decision to release Ott, which can be noted in the arrest warrant— that Ott had resumed his information-gathering and handling activities immediately upon being set free in 2021. Specifically, Ott is accused of having unlawfully retrieved data from the Central Register of Residents (Zentrales Melderegister) on March 24 of that year and then passing it on. The information accessed by Ott concerned the Bulgarian investigative journalist Christo Grozev, who was living in Austria at the time. Consequently, Grozev had to leave Vienna, since his life was deemed to be in severe danger. Today, whenever Grozev returns to Austria to visit members of his family who remain there, he has to do so under heavy protection by the Austrian authorities.

Between June and November 2022, when Ott had been released from his first pre-trial detention, there was also an alleged transfer to Russia of three mobile phones, or their data, as well as a highly-encrypted SINA-workstation laptop. However, the judges of the Landesgericht concluded that, while information or intelligence provided to foreign services does not have to be secret to constitute criminal espionage against Austria, “concrete and vital interests of Austria” have to be violated by such a transfer. The judges did not deem that the evidence furnished by the prosecutor met their criteria. Die Presse, Austria’s ‘newspaper of record’, published a detailed explanation of the court decision. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Secret Service failed Trump because it can’t keep up with the growing threat

July 15, 2024 by 13 Comments

Trump 2016THE UNITED STATES SECRET Service is among the world’s most prestigious law enforcement agencies. Its institutional experience in protecting US presidents and presidential candidates dates to 1901. Given its high-stakes protective mission —safeguarding the executive leadership of the world’s most powerful nation— the agency has historically placed emphasis on flawlessness: it simply can’t afford to fail.

Yet it did just that on Saturday in Butler, Pennsylvania. Presidential candidate Donald Trump did not survive the attempted assassination because his Secret Service detail neutralized the threat to his safety in time. Instead he survived because the shooter, 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks, from the small suburb of Bethel Park in Pittsburgh, missed. How are we to explain this abject failure by one of the world’s most venerated law enforcement agencies?

POLICING IN A DEMOCRACY

Unlike tyrannical regimes, where law enforcement is nearly omnipresent, policing functions in democratic societies are relatively limited. They rely on what can be essentially described as a numbers game. Under this model, the effectiveness of policing functions inherently rests on the assumption that the vast majority of the population will comply with legal norms voluntarily, and that it will do so most of the time.

Thus, the sustainability of law and order in democratic societies hinges, not just on the capabilities of the enforcement agencies, but significantly on the general populace’s commitment to uphold the rule of law. This tacit social contract allows law enforcement agencies to operate with a relatively small logistical footprint. It also allows police forces to focus their efforts on a relatively small number of individuals, or groups, who do not adhere to the law.

WIDESPREAD BREAKDOWN

The US has relied on this model of policing since the Civil War. However, this model tends to falter once a substantial segment of the population refuses to voluntarily adhere to legal conventions. In such a scenario, the sheer number of non-compliant individuals can overwhelm the policing system, leading to a widespread breakdown in law and order.

The US has witnessed such incidents with alarming intensity in recent years. Examples include the 2014 Bundy standoff and the 2016 occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge by armed groups of anti-government extremists. It also witnessed the —often gratuitously violent— George Floyd protests, as well as the armed occupation of the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle, Washington, in 2020.

Most notably, America witnessed widespread civil disobedience on January 6, 2021, when thousands of frenzied Trump supporters stormed the US Capitol and attempted to bring an end to the Constitutional order in one of the world’s oldest democracies. In addition to exposing the fragility of American democracy, the January 6 attack drew attention to the ineffectiveness of the state’s policing functions, thus further-eroding public trust and compliance.

AMERICANS ARE EMBRACING VIOLENCE

There is no denying that Americans are viewing violence as an element of national politics with an alarming rate. Last summer, a survey conducted by the University of Chicago’s Project on Security and Threats revealed that 4.4 percent of the adult population of the US —12 million Americans— believed that violence was justified to restore Donald Trump to power. Granted, very few of those survey responders would actually be willing to act on such extreme beliefs. But even a mere 1 percent of those 12 million people who appear to endorse violence in support of Trump amounts to 120,000 individuals. That’s an enormously large number of radicalized Americans. Read more of this post

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Notes on the assassination of Iranian IRGC Commander Hassan Mahdawi

April 26, 2024 by 2 Comments

IRGC - ABTHE TARGETED KILLING OF Hassan Mahdawi, a high-ranking member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, was carried out by Israel on April 1, 2024. The actual assassination was based on precise operational intelligence, while Israel’s assessment of Iran’s response was wrong.

On the day of the attack, a building adjacent to the Iranian Embassy in the Syrian capital of Damascus was attacked with rockets. The attack killed seven IRGC members: General Muhammad Reza Zahedi, also known as Hassan Mahdawi, his deputy, and five additional officers. Mahdawi is the most senior Iranian commander to be killed since the assassination of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani by the United States in 2020.

Mahdawi had close ties with Hezbollah. He maintained a close relationship with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and was perceived by Israel to be directly coordinating the military attacks on Israel from Lebanon and Syria. In Tehran’s collective memory, Israel’s history of attacks against it includes numerous strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, assassinations of scientists within Iran, and actions against Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Traditionally, these attacks have been invariably met with attacks by Iran’s proxies in the region.

This time, it was different. Iran recognized Mahdawi’s assassination as a direct attack on Iran that it could not tolerate, and had to respond to differently. Just days following Mahdawi’s assassination, Iran attacked Israel. According to the Israel Defense Forces, 99 percent of the more than 330 weapons fired at Israel (including at least 185 drones and 110 surface-to-surface missiles) were intercepted, mostly over the territory of countries adjacent to Israel. Iran’s attack on Israel was unprecedented. It was launched directly from Iranian territory in contrast to prior cases, when Iran has used its proxies, supposedly leaving its hands clean.

Israel could not tolerate such a blatant infringement on its sovereignty. After Israeli officials vowed a response to the Iranian attack, the Jewish State counter-attacked, causing minor damage to the Eighth Shekari Air Base in northwest Esfahan, a dozen kilometers from the Natanz nuclear facility. It was a calculated response designed to deliver a message to Iran that Israel could and would respond to an attack. Following Israel’s counterattack, the tensions between Iran and Israel have subsided for the time being.

While the attack on General Mahdawi was based on excellent operational intelligence, it became evident that the Israeli assessment regarding a possible Iranian response was erroneous. The Israeli assessment was that the Iranian response would be similar to what occurred in the past —namely limited attacks by Hezbollah on northern Israel and attacks on the Golan heights by Iranian proxies in Syria. Israel simply did not anticipate a direct Iranian attack on Israel from Iranian territory.

It seems that Israeli senior analysts were entangled in a conception of Iran’s past behavior and anticipated that Tehran’s response would be similar to prior cases, namely utilizing Iran’s proxies. Israel did not pay enough attention to the difference between Mahdawi’s assassination and previous attacks against Iran. This time, the attack targeted the Iranian embassy in Damascus and the target was a very senior official, who was close to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

It appears that Israel’s assessment of the Iranian response to Mahdawi’s assassination was a strategic failure. It appears more likely that the Israeli War Cabinet was provided with an incorrect assessment by the nation’s intelligence community, and less likely that it was provided with an incorrect assessment, which it then decided to ignore. There is concern in Israel that the intelligence assessment was once again wrong, after the colossal failure to anticipate the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 26 April 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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Austria: Arrest raises broader questions about counterintelligence capabilities

April 10, 2024 by 6 Comments

BVT AustriaON GOOD FRIDAY, MARCH 29, Egisto Ott, a former member of Austria’s now-dissolved domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT), was arrested in his house in Carinthia, Austria’s southernmost state. Ott had frequently been at the center of media attention in the past year, in connection with the network surrounding the fugitive financier and alleged spy Jan Maršálek, as well as alleged misconduct relating to carrying out illegal investigations of persons. Ott also seems to have been involved in an alleged attempt to create an intelligence unit, or even an entire shadow intelligence service, embedded inside Austria’s foreign ministry. Now the veteran police and intelligence officer stands accused by the state attorney of abusing his authority and of being part of an “intelligence activity to the disadvantage of Austria” —the only form of spying that is illegal under § 256 of the Austrian criminal code.

Ott’s arrest came several years after intelligence was first shared with Austria by Western partner services —allegedly the Central Intelligence Agency— that reportedly date from as early as November 2017. Back then, Ott allegedly received classified material from his service’s email address to his personal Gmail account. However, Peter Gridling, director of the BVT from 2008 until its dissolution in 2021, stated in a recent interview that the ensuing investigations did not yield actionable results that could be used in criminal proceedings. This statement is highly interesting, as Gridling filed accusations about Ott with the State Prosecutor’s Office himself, and would hardly have done unless he had access to hard evidence. Ott was consequently removed from the BVT and placed in Police Academy Austria (SIAK), which is responsible for training police officers and conducts research related to police and domestic security.

Nevertheless, according to media reporting, Ott seems to have kept and illegally used certain forms of identification that presented him as a police officer. He is also alleged to have maintained access to several police databases and to have retained his network of trusted informants that provided him with intelligence. These included contacts in friendly foreign police services, whom Ott knew from his time as a liaison officer in Italy and Turkey. According to Gridling, these contacts were unaware that Ott had been removed from the BVT under suspicion of being unreliable and potentially even working for Russia. They therefore continued to help him when asked. Ott allegedly deceived his contacts by claiming that he needed information on cases relating to different kinds of extremism. As it turned out, according to the leaked arrest warrant, several of the individuals referred to by Ott as “suspects” in terrorism investigations were in fact Russian dissidents or intelligence defectors who were living as protected persons in Austria and elsewhere outside Russia.

It appears highly probable that Ott also had people inside the Austrian bureaucracy, including former colleagues in the BVT, who continued to provide him with information and assistance, even after the first allegations against him arose in 2017. As of now, at least one other officer from LVT Vienna (the state unit of the BVT) has been found to have illegally provided Ott with Information. It is likely, given the publicly available descriptions of Ott’s activities, that other individuals may be implicated. It also remains to be seen whether individuals involved in this case were able to join the BVT’s successor agency, the new Directorate of State Protection and Intelligence (DSN). Read more of this post

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