Interview reveals state of mind of Israeli intelligence prior to October 7 attack
April 1, 2024 4 Comments
ON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.
But on March 23, after about 5 months, Channel 12 aired the original interview with Elya. The retired official spoke with glee about the advanced technological capabilities developed by the ISA in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. Elya said Israeli intelligence had built a unique system, known as “the Tool”, which allegedly provided intimate knowledge about the life of every Palestinian living in the West Bank and Gaza. This technologically advanced surveillance system allegedly monitored every move of its targets, all for the purpose of preventing potential terrorist attacks against the Jewish state. Elya claimed that, as a result of this advanced technological system, there was no chance that Israel would be surprised by Palestinian militants. This system was so advanced, he said, that intelligence agencies from all over the world were coming to Israel to learn about it.
Thanks to Channel 12, we can now examine Elya’s interview retrospectively, and especially in light of the ISA’s poor performance on October 7, as well as its failure to warn Israeli authorities about Hamas’ preparations for the attack. Notably, Elya was interviewed again for the same television program. Predictably, he admitted that his prior assessment had been wrong and regretted being so overly confident about the technology.
This case demonstrates the overestimation by Israeli intelligence of its own capabilities, because of arrogance and over-confidence. This approach refutes the basic premise of intelligence work: be skeptical and be modest. Furthermore, this case highlights that Israeli intelligence agencies overly relied on technology (SIGINT) in the lead-up to October 7, while seemingly neglecting the low-tech activity of gathering information through human intelligence (HUMINT).
The system that Elya described in his initial interview as the ultimate counterintelligence tool was reportedly criticized internally by some in the ISA for gathering huge amounts of information without offering sufficient analytical capability. This imbalance between collection and analysis can render an entire surveillance system practically useless. The bottom line is that, almost by accident, we are now aware of the state of mind that the ISA was in before the sudden attack by Hamas on October 7, which cost so many lives as a result of the ISA’s complacency.
► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 01 April 2024 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
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