Interview reveals state of mind of Israeli intelligence prior to October 7 attack
April 1, 2024 4 Comments
ON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.
But on March 23, after about 5 months, Channel 12 aired the original interview with Elya. The retired official spoke with glee about the advanced technological capabilities developed by the ISA in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. Elya said Israeli intelligence had built a unique system, known as “the Tool”, which allegedly provided intimate knowledge about the life of every Palestinian living in the West Bank and Gaza. This technologically advanced surveillance system allegedly monitored every move of its targets, all for the purpose of preventing potential terrorist attacks against the Jewish state. Elya claimed that, as a result of this advanced technological system, there was no chance that Israel would be surprised by Palestinian militants. This system was so advanced, he said, that intelligence agencies from all over the world were coming to Israel to learn about it.
Thanks to Channel 12, we can now examine Elya’s interview retrospectively, and especially in light of the ISA’s poor performance on October 7, as well as its failure to warn Israeli authorities about Hamas’ preparations for the attack. Notably, Elya was interviewed again for the same television program. Predictably, he admitted that his prior assessment had been wrong and regretted being so overly confident about the technology.
This case demonstrates the overestimation by Israeli intelligence of its own capabilities, because of arrogance and over-confidence. This approach refutes the basic premise of intelligence work: be skeptical and be modest. Furthermore, this case highlights that Israeli intelligence agencies overly relied on technology (SIGINT) in the lead-up to October 7, while seemingly neglecting the low-tech activity of gathering information through human intelligence (HUMINT).
The system that Elya described in his initial interview as the ultimate counterintelligence tool was reportedly criticized internally by some in the ISA for gathering huge amounts of information without offering sufficient analytical capability. This imbalance between collection and analysis can render an entire surveillance system practically useless. The bottom line is that, almost by accident, we are now aware of the state of mind that the ISA was in before the sudden attack by Hamas on October 7, which cost so many lives as a result of the ISA’s complacency.
► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 01 April 2024 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
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So it sounds like ISA’s (and probably the Israeli military “NSA’s”) Tool is a huge software program to detect and collect the communications of Hamas members and other categories of people. Probably other detection nodes are CCTVs (including drone mounted) for tracking target individuals and their vehicles.
To avoid the Tool, Hamas and Iranian agents likely decided to avoid using communications, not to use cars much, and avoid cameras. Instead they may have met face-to-face more frequently under trees when planning October 7, 2023.
Limitations of the Israeli intelligence Tool might include: the subjective human factor who created it; the priorities instilled in the Tool; and, what jobs they gave it. There also may have been a large AI content within Tool software to quickly reconfigure for additional uses – with AI making the Tool less useful.
The author is correct that intelligence professionals should avoid hubris, pride, arrogance – or what came to be labelled “slam dunk” evidence (post 9/11).
Command, control and targeting are increasingly complex in war as the number of sensors increases. This is especially complex in Gaza – where there are many entities on the ground (like UN and food aid groups) that are neither IDF nor Hamas.
Mr. Netanyahu was caught on tape saying he hoped a group from Gaza would attack because then they could react and he then treat them accordingly. And as has been discussed in Haaretz he did cut off all aid to militant groups of Palestinians, other than the one that did attack. So … ?
En source ouverte Dod, sous-traitant la situation.
Pete, Anonyme,
1-Ce n’est pas la première incursion israélienne à Gaza depuis que le Hamas a pris le contrôle de ce territoire en 2007. Quelles normes en matière de droits humains Israël a-t-il observées, ou non, lors d’incursions précédentes ?
2-Quand on y utilise des armes explosives à grande échelle, il est prévisible que des civils, notamment des enfants, mourront. Et c’est ce qui s’est produit ces derniers jours, mais aussi lors de la plupart des vagues de violence qui ont eu lieu ces dernières années.
3- Pour ma part, la zone concernée, et que par ailleurs, il ne cible pas directement les civils.
Le renseignement affirme qu’il cible plutôt les terroristes du Hamas tout en cherchant à éviter les pertes civiles, le problème que j’ai déjà évoqué est la mise œuvre du programme lavander, qui est utilisé dans ce conflit à Gaza, qui pose problème dans sa logistique.
4- Le président américain Joe Biden devrait s’entretenir avec les dirigeants du Qatar et de l’Égypte pour « déployer tous les efforts possibles pour convaincre le Hamas d’accepter l’accord [de cessez-le-feu] » la porte-parole de la Maison Blanche, Karine Jean-Pierre. Par ailleurs Je ne vois pas le Hamas accepter autre chose qu’un cessez-le-feu permanent surtout si cela est soutenus par le Qatar, Je les vois céder sur d’autres demandes, mais pas celle-là… Aujourd’hui, L’optimisme et le pessimisme sont réunis dans un seul titre, nous à la Cia, nous le savons c’est l’une des caractéristiques assez courante dans ce conflit de la région autour de terme qui me paraisse plus appropriées ? Il n’a ni direction ni logique en l’état ce conflit, pour l’aider dans son voyage les branches armées, vieux de plusieurs générations vers qui sait quoi et où ? Toute la question repose sur le Moyen-Orient, brasier de la logique destructrice à l’encontre Israël, déterminer un processus de négociation régionaux, c’est obtenir un équilibre dans le conflit Israélien….
Il nous faut une Fin de partie, pour 2024, Notre département à la Cia, y consent.
Mon miroir de conscience, n’as de cesse de percevoir la menace, Israël frappe Gaza alors que le Hamas revendique la responsabilité d’une salve de roquettes depuis le Liban, Téhéran, Cisjordanie, avec le soutien de l’Iran….
C’est à peu près un miroir aussi simple qu’il est possible de le décrypter ou le décapiter !
Le porte-parole de Tsahal, le contre-amiral Daniel Hagari, a annoncé dimanche que la quantité d’aide humanitaire entrant à Gaza augmenterait dans les prochains jours, la difficulté ressort d’établir qu’il nourrît le Hamas, est partout jusque dans les ONG qui redistribue l’aide humanitaire, le rôle de la communauté international, est remise en question autour de son manque de vigilance ils sont laissés la situation allez sans contrôle journalier avant le 7 octobre on donne on donne sans contrôle, et nous sommes face aujourd’hui, au désarroi humanitaire. Dans une guerre qui n’a ni direction ni logique, si nous ne délivrons nos appuis pour en sortir sous une désescalade armée, C’est un conflit compliqué pour des officiers traitant, sous-officier traitant, analyste, renseignement militaire, agent traitant sur place, et surtout nos directeurs opérationnels à la Cia.
Pascal lembree.