Hamas’s sophisticated deception strategy enabled October 7 attacks, study shows

July 4, 2026 by Leave a comment

Israel Hamas warA STUDY OF HAMAS documents seized by Israel during the Israel-Hamas war reveals the extent of sophistication of Hamas’s deception campaign. The Palestinian group deliberately portrayed itself as essentially deterred and focused on economic stability and on governing Gaza, rather than on a military confrontation with Israel. This successful misdirection repeatedly influenced Israeli security discussions. The key takeaway is that Hamas used deliberate deception tactics, including economic distraction, a West Bank focus, and covert military exercises, to mask its preparations for a large-scale attack against Israel.

The first comprehensive study of these seized documents, conducted by experts at the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute in Israel, reveals that Hamas leaders, headed by Yahya Sinwar and military commander Mohammed Deif, saw Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 as a major strategic success for the Palestinians. Building on this perception, they began developing what they saw as a decisive future campaign against Israel, believing that key parts of the Israeli operation reflected significant operational achievements that shaped this new strategy. By September 2022, Hamas’ military intelligence had called for a comprehensive deception plan encompassing political, military, economic, and media dimensions.

The goal was to create conditions for a surprise attack that would outdo Hamas’ past confrontations with Israel. The seized documents reveal that manipulating the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) organization, a distinct militant group that is active in Gaza, was key to Hamas’ approach. One key element was a policy of restraint and controlled escalation: Hamas avoided open military confrontation with Israel, and its leaders were told to contain violent incidents, which ultimately helped foster a perception of Israeli deterrence. Read more of this post

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US spy agencies resisting White House plan to create master list of espionage threats

July 1, 2026 by 10 Comments

ODNI DNIAMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES are reportedly refusing to abide by a White House directive that requires them to turn over the names of all individuals who are believed to be spying on the United States. The directive aims to build a master list of all known foreign intelligence actors with the goal of streamlining American counterintelligence efforts against them. However, according to a New York Times report, senior counterintelligence officials are concerned that such a centralized master list could leak and result in a catastrophic compromise of national security information.

Citing “people familiar with the matter”, the Times said on Monday that the effort to create a master list of foreign spies and Americans who are spying on behalf of foreign intelligence services is being led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The agency has asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI to provide the names of all individuals who have been found to engage in espionage and are being watched by the Bureau. Likewise, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been asked to provide names of foreign espionage operatives that populate its lists of potential assets—foreign spies who may in time be turned by the CIA.

The master list of spies would potentially allow the entirety of the United States Intelligence Community (IC) to monitor the global activities of these espionage operatives and share information about them in real time. Additionally, the existence of such a list would in theory prevent operational duplication and help deconfliction within the IC when it comes to counterintelligence efforts. The central idea behind the master list dates to National Security Presidential Memorandum – 7, a directive issued by President Donald Trump in October 2017, during his first term in office.

However, senior counterintelligence officials are reportedly concerned that giving the ODNI full access to such a comprehensive master list of espionage threat actors could potentially compromise the integrity of counterintelligence operations. Information about espionage operatives and assets—both current and prospective—is usually protected behind several layers of classification and compartmentalization that shield it even within individual intelligence agencies. Additionally, some of the information relating to these individuals is acquired through counterintelligence activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and is thus subject to tight restrictions.

At a deeper level, the resistance of senior counterintelligence officials to surrender sensitive information about espionage to the ODNI reflects years of mutual suspicion and turf wars within the IC. According to the Times, these officials have yet to agree about how such a master list would be constructed, what information it would contain, who should have access to it, and how it should be maintained and updated.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 1 July 2026 | Permalink

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Opinion: Gofman’s Mossad appointment poses major challenges to Israeli Intelligence

June 19, 2026 by 9 Comments

Roman GofmanTHE APPOINTMENT OF MAJOR General (res.) Roman Gofman as director of the Mossad spy agency has emerged as a flashpoint in Israel’s security landscape, underscoring sharp divisions over senior leadership choices. Announced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in December 2025, the appointment has sparked intense debate among political, legal, and security circles. Supporters emphasize Gofman’s innovative, battle-tested military credentials, while detractors challenge both the process and his suitability to head Israel’s top foreign intelligence agency. This controversy mirrors the backlash against Netanyahu’s prior nomination of Major General David Zini as head of the Israel Security Agency (ISA), raising persistent questions about the decision-making process for key intelligence appointments.

The Appointment Process

On 4 December 2025, Netanyahu announced his decision to appoint Gofman as the next director of the Mossad. At that time, Gofman was serving as Netanyahu’s military secretary. Gofman was selected to replace outgoing Mossad Director David Barnea, whose five-year term was scheduled to end in June 2026.

The choice was notable because Gofman came from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) rather than from within the Mossad itself. Reports indicate that Netanyahu bypassed Mossad’s existing leadership, including candidates reportedly favored by outgoing director David Barnea, in selecting Gofman.

Following the announcement, Israeli law required the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments to review senior security appointments. Chaired by former Supreme Court President Asher Grunis, the committee examined Gofman’s candidacy and approved it in April 2026. After /approval, Netanyahu signed the appointment documents.

Nevertheless, the Committee’s approval did not resolve all disagreements. Gofman’s nomination soon became the subject of legal challenges before Israel’s High Court of Justice. Only after the Court rejected petitions seeking to block the appointment was Gofman able to assume office as Mossad Director in June 2026.

Why Netanyahu Chose Gofman

Supporters of Gofman’s appointment emphasized that, following the outbreak of the Israel-Gaza War in October 2023, Gofman brought extensive military experience and was closely involved in national security decision-making. Netanyahu’s office highlighted Gofman’s wartime operational leadership, his service as military secretary, and his coordination with intelligence agencies, including Mossad. Supporters also emphasized Gofman’s reputation as an unconventional and creative commander. During his military career, Gofman commanded armored formations, led operational units on Israel’s northern and southern fronts, and was wounded while fighting Hamas militants during the attacks of 7 October 2023. His supporters argued that the post-October 7 security environment required fresh thinking and leadership from outside traditional intelligence circles.

Lack of Intelligence Background

The most common criticism of Gofman’s appointment concerned his professional background. Unlike most recent Mossad directors, Gofman had spent his career in the military rather than in intelligence operations. Critics argued that running a global espionage organization requires skills and experience different from those needed to command military units. Several commentators noted that he would be among the few Mossad chiefs appointed without a substantial career in the intelligence service. Supporters countered that the Mossad has historically benefited from leaders with diverse backgrounds and that strategic leadership skills can be transferable across intelligence organizations. His critics emphasize his lack of experience, as four days after his appointment he fired the No. 2 at the Mossad, who had strong credentials and successful experience at the agency. It looks like more senior officials at Mossad may leave the agency, as they are not satisfied with Gofman’s nomination.

Allegations of Political Loyalty

Another major point of contention is Gofman’s close relationship with Netanyahu. As the prime minister’s military secretary, Gofman worked directly alongside Netanyahu and was regarded as a trusted adviser. Some observers stated that his appointment was based on personal loyalty rather than solely on professional considerations, and noted that Netanyahu bypassed candidates favored by the outgoing Mossad leadership.

Some warned that intelligence chiefs should provide independent assessments to political leaders, even when those assessments are unwelcome. Gofman’s nomination was included in a broader discussion about political influence over Israel’s security institutions.

The “Minor Informant” Affair and Legal Challenges

A further complication emerged during scrutiny of Gofman’s tenure as an IDF commander. Critics questioned his involvement in a controversial military operation that used a minor in a sensitive information campaign. This became a focal point during the vetting process and was cited by those challenging his appointment.

Although the advisory committee approved his nomination, the issue caused delays. It also provided grounds for legal petitions.

Gofman’s nomination faced formal legal challenges before the High Court of Justice in Israel. Petitioners argued that aspects of Goffman’s conduct and the appointment process raised concerns regarding standards expected of senior public officials. The litigation delayed the completion of the appointment process and prolonged public debate about the nomination. Ultimately, the High Court rejected the petitions and allowed the appointment to proceed.

Conclusion

Roman Gofman’s appointment as Mossad director illustrates the tensions that frequently accompany senior security appointments in Israel. On the one hand, supporters viewed him as a highly capable commander whose operational experience, creativity, and wartime service made him well-suited to lead the country’s foreign intelligence service. On the other hand, critics questioned his lack of intelligence experience, his close association with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and controversies stemming from allegations of lapses in decision-making and command disputes during his military career.

Despite these challenges, Gofman ultimately secured approval from both the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments and the High Court of Justice, allowing him to assume leadership of the Mossad in June 2026. His performance as director will be subject to close scrutiny.

► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 19 June 2026 | Permalink

* Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

 

 

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Iran has mostly replenished its missile stockpiles: Western intelligence

June 15, 2026 by 5 Comments

Iran War 2026IRAN USED THE EIGHT-week ceasefire with the United States and Israel to replenish its military arsenal to at least three-quarters of its pre-war levels, according to Western intelligence estimates. Tehran has been able to incorporate substantial supplies of Russian-built weapons to its firepower and could easily reach 100 percent of its pre-war arsenal capacity soon, according to reports.

The latest estimates directly contradict earlier assessments by the administration of US President Donald Trump, which claims Iran’s military firepower has been obliterated in the past three months. In March, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that Iran’s offensive capability had been reduced by as much as 90 percent. Earlier this month, President Trump claimed that Iran’s missile arsenal stood at 60 percent of its pre-war level.

However, Western intelligence estimates now suggest that the Iranian regime’s ability to replenish its military arsenal has been far more advanced than presumed by its adversaries. In a related development, the Reuters news agency reported last week that the United Arab Emirates directly approached Tehran and offered to pay it in return for not being attacked again.

According to Reuters, the UAE agreed to give Iran between $10 and $20 billion in return for halting its attacks on the Gulf state. The news agency claimed that $3 billion of the earmarked funds had already been delivered to Tehran. In a subsequent statement, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the Reuters report as “entirely false and unfounded” and stated that no funds had been “released, transferred or facilitated through the UAE”.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 15 June 2026 | Permalink

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CIA officer found with over $42 million in gold and cash had created ‘fake’ program

June 8, 2026 by 4 Comments

CIAA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY officer allegedly created a fake government program in order to embezzle over $42 million in government funds, according to reports. The Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested David J. Rush on May 19, after he has found in possession of 303 bars of gold worth over $40 million. He was also found in possession of over $2 million in cash and over 30 luxury watches.

Late last week, The Washington Post reported that Rush had built an unacknowledged special access program (SAP). Dating to World War II, SAPs are government-authorized support operations or ‘black’ projects with information-sharing restrictions that exceed those of regular classified projects. Select government personnel are typically ‘read in’ to such projects after signing specialized nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) that exceed the scope of their top-secret clearances.

According to The Post, Rush created a CIA unacknowledged SAP relating to “continuity of government operations”. The term refers to state-wide plans to enable the United States government to continue to perform essential operations in the event of a catastrophic disaster, such as a highly destructive earthquake, a pandemic, or a nuclear war.

Using the ‘read-in’ provisions of SAPs, Rush allegedly read two of his CIA colleagues into the program he created. In doing so, Rush used carefully crafted NDAs that prevented his colleagues from disclosing the program’s existence to others. He then allegedly convinced his colleagues to transfer bars of gold and cash into the program, claiming that the resources were to be used to keep the United States government operating as part of continuity planning.

The accused reportedly remains in detention in Alexandria, Virginia, after a federal judge ruled last week that there was significant likelihood he would abscond or fail to appear for future proceedings.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 08 June 2026 | Permalink

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US, Mexican authorities deny claims CIA is assassinating cartel members in Mexico

May 18, 2026 by 4 Comments

Sinaloa cartelAUTHORITIES IN MEXICO AND the United States have rejected as “fictions” reports in American and Mexican media that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel are directly involved in assassination operations against the cartels. Notably The New York Times and CNN reported last week that the CIA participated in the killing of mid-level Sinaloa cartel member Francisco “El Playin” Beltran and his driver. The two men were killed by a car bomb on March 28 in a suburb of Mexico City.

According to the reports, Beltran’s killing was part of a rapidly expanding CIA campaign in Mexico, which aims to eliminate selected mid-tier members of the cartels. Some of the operations allegedly involve the participation of the CIA’s so-called “Ground Branch”, which is the paramilitary and covert action wing of the CIA’s Special Activities Center (SAC). Some Ground Branch members have directly participated in assassination operations in Mexico, either in collaboration with the Mexican authorities or as teams operating independently, according to the reports.

But Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum issued an outright denial of the claims last Wednesday during her weekly media conference in Mexico City, describing them as “fictions the size of the universe”. Sheinbaum’s claims came a day after Omar Harfuch, Mexico’s Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection, dismissed the reports as “false and salacious reporting”, adding that they serve as “nothing more than a [public relations] campaign for the cartels and [put] American lives at risk”.

American officials insist that the role of American military and intelligence agencies in anti-cartel operations in Mexico is limited to training and intelligence-sharing, and stress that American government personnel have no direct involvement in these activities. However, there is intense speculation about the death of two American embassy officials in a car crash in April, following their alleged participation in a counter-cartel operation in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. According to The New York Times, the two embassy officials were CIA officers.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 18 May 2026 | Permalink

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Analysis: Europe’s Intelligence Challenge in an Era of Strategic Bipolarity

May 5, 2026 by 9 Comments

European UnionThe United States remains the most powerful military actor in the Western alliance system, but recent conflicts have exposed serious limits in American strategic capacity. For Europe, this lesson is no longer speculative. It must now shape the intelligence planning, defense preparedness, and executive decision-making across NATO’s European pillar. This requires a major shift in how European intelligence communities define their mission and operational priorities.

For decades, European intelligence services operated within a strategic environment shaped by American primacy. Their task was often to complement U.S. intelligence collection, support NATO operations, monitor regional threats, and provide national-level warning. That model is no longer sufficient. In an emerging bipolar order dominated by U.S.-China competition, Europe must develop intelligence structures capable of supporting greater strategic autonomy, faster defense mobilization, and more sophisticated political warfare responses—especially in the cognitive domain.

THE U.S. IS FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO WIN WARS

The U.S. appears increasingly ill-prepared for the demands of modern warfare. This is not a realization born solely of the present war in Iran. Rather, Iran represents the latest data point in a longer pattern of strategic underperformance that includes Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. The current war in Iran further reinforces concerns about coherence and strategic direction. Public messaging by the administration of President Donald Trump has emphasized kinetic successes—such as the degradation of Iran’s naval and air capabilities. But it has offered limited clarity on broader strategic objectives. This mirrors earlier patterns in Afghanistan, where overwhelming tactical superiority failed to produce durable political outcomes. It is worth noting that the Taliban did not require a navy and air force in order to defeat American forces; if that is so, then why would the Iranians require them? For intelligence professionals, the lesson is clear: battlefield metrics must be analytically divorced from strategic indicators. This means that intelligence support to policymakers must explicitly distinguish between momentary tactical achievements and their long-term strategic significance.

The historical record suggests that such misalignment between tactics and strategy is not easily concealed from domestic audiences. After more than two decades of sustained conflict, the American electorate has shown clear signs of fatigue, frustration, and declining confidence in ruling elites. This sentiment has contributed the rise populism and of polarizing political figures, which has in turn led to the erosion of bipartisan consensus on foreign policy in Washington. One is understandably surprised by how long it has taken European planners to incorporate this domestic dynamic into their assessments of America’s reliability as a strategic ally. The fact is that the element of continuity in American foreign policy is nowhere near guaranteed—and the sooner European leaders understand that, the better. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Austrian officials warn of increased spying against military targets

April 26, 2026 by 9 Comments

Austrian military - PSTHE AUSTRIAN DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE Agency, the Abwehramt (AbwA), as well as the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, have publicly warned in recent weeks that intelligence targeting of the Austrian military, the Bundesheer, has increased markedly. There has not only been a significant rise in unauthorized drone flights near and over military installations, but also instances of individuals gathering information through vehicular-based surveillance outside facilities. Traditional recruitment methods by foreign intelligence services have also been observed—although no public disclosure has emerged on how frequent these attempts are.

Reinhard Ruckenstuhl, head of the AbwA, notes in his contribution to the Risk Monitor 2026 – The End of Order, which provides brief risk assessments for public consumption, that “[t]he armament and defense efforts of Austria and its neighboring countries […] represent particularly attractive tar­gets for foreign military intelligence services.” He states that, while technological developments open new avenues for gathering information and facilitating espionage, human agents and sources remain important, even “en vogue,” as he puts it. Here he identifies a problem since “[i]n Austria, [foreign agents] are predominantly deployed under diplomatic cover. In the case of this type of cover, they particularly benefit from the strong presence of international organizations and the respective national missions in Austria.”

Ruckenstuhl continues by specifically naming Russia, noting that its intelligence services are “increasingly relying on civil­ians recruited digitally to carry out their missions.” These assignments “range from simple tasks such as carrying out socially polarizing actions to spying on military support for Ukraine to specific acts of sabotage.” The individuals recruited in this way do not receive any training. Although not mentioned in his assessment, it is now a widely held view in German-speaking Europe that it is part of the calculus of the Russian intelligence services, that such individuals will be caught sooner rather than later. This has led to them being labeled “Wegwerfagenten” (“throwaway agents”). While Ruckenstuhl does not address this aspect, he clearly states that the success of this method will likely lead other (antagonistic) intelligence services to adopt similar approaches, which he describes as a “non-professionalization.” As a result, he concludes that “this confronts Austrian intelli­gence services with challenges that will have to be met with equally adapted methods backed by an appropriate legal basis.” Ruckenstuhl finishes with what seems—in the eyes of this author—like a thinly veiled cautionary note to executive and legislative decision-makers when he notes that, noting: “At the same time, the penalties for foreign intelligence oper­ations in Austria lag behind those in other European countries, thereby limiting their deterrent effect. Austria will therefore remain an important hub and safe haven for foreign intelligence services.” Read more of this post

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China is now sending missiles to Iran, according to US intelligence agencies

April 13, 2026 by 11 Comments

MANPAD missileTHERE IS MOUNTING EVIDENCE to suggest that the government of China may be supplying missiles to the Iranian armed forces, according to American intelligence agencies. Combined with prior reports about alleged Russian intelligence assistance to Iran, these latest indicators may demonstrate that China and Russia are aiding the Iranian military in a systematic and coordinated fashion in order to contribute to an American strategic defeat in the Middle East.

On Saturday, the US-based international television network CNN cited “three people familiar with recent intelligence assessment” in reporting that China was preparing to deliver to Iran several shipments of shoulder-fired anti-air missile systems, known as MANPADs. These missile systems are highly prized in both low- and high-intensity conflicts because they give individual soldiers a cheap, portable way to destroy multimillion-dollar aircraft. Their low cost and ease of concealment allow ambush-style attacks that are difficult to detect, forcing enemy pilots to fly higher or avoid certain areas. Thus, if utilized appropriately, MANPAD weapons can effectively strip an opponent of their low-altitude air superiority.

Later on Saturday, a report in The New York Times claimed that United States intelligence agencies have obtained evidence that China may have already sent at least one shipment of MANPADs to Iran. The paper noted that the intelligence collected is “not definitive” and that there is no evidence to suggest that the Iranians have received the shipment of missiles from China, or that they have deployed these weapons on the battlefield.

If it is verified, however, the intelligence may indicate that the Chinese are abandoning their traditional reluctance to supply Iran with finished or fully assembled weapons systems—especially for use against the United States armed forces. In the past, China has used a number of state-controlled export companies to supply Iran with fuel, chemicals and hardware components that can, under certain circumstances, be used to aid Iran’s military effort.

If China were to begin to systematically supply Iran with missiles and other weapons systems, it could significantly alter the course of the ongoing conflict between the Islamic Republic and the United States-Israeli alliance. Much of the course of this war depends on the ability of each side to maintain its supply of weapons—especially offensive and defensive missiles, or other interceptor ammunition.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 13 April 2026 | Permalink

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Opinion: The Mossad’s plan to overthrow the regime in Iran was leaked

April 6, 2026 by 5 Comments

Iran Kharg IslandON SUNDAY MARCH 22, The New York Times reported that the United States and Israel launched the war in Iran with a central strategic assumption: that external military pressure on Iran could trigger internal unrest and bring about regime collapse. According to the paper, this expectation was shaped in part by Israeli intelligence assessments, particularly from Israel’s external intelligence agency, the Mossad, which argued that Iranian society was sufficiently discontented to rise up if given the right catalyst. This failed concept, which was chiefly propagated by Mossad Director David Barnea, gained traction within the U.S. administration of Donald Trump and became embedded in broader war planning assumptions, according to The Times.

In Israel, reactions to the article focused primarily on the question of who had an interest in leaking this information to The Times. The leak, which Israeli national security analysts confirmed as accurate, seemed intended to find a scapegoat. It aimed to hold the head of the Mossad responsible in the eventuality that the war did not achieve its goals. Some thought Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself may have been behind the leak.

This impression may have been fueled by Netanyahu’s typical behavior since the October 7, 2023, blunder. The Israeli prime minister has tended to appropriate the Mossad’s operational successes—including the 2024 electronic device attacks targeting the Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah. In contrast, his conduct during the war against Hamas in Gaza has been wildly different. He has evaded responsibility for all shortcomings and has placed blame for the intelligence failures on Ronen Bar, head of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), and for the lack of a rapid response by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi.

The situation is more complex in the case of Iran. So far, Mossad head Barnea has been largely shielded from negative media reports reportedly linked to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s circle. Analysis of The New York Times article suggests two possible sources for the leak: senior American officials, or members of the Israeli security establishment—which might reflect internal tensions.

The first—and more probable—possibility is that the leaks originate from Netanyahu’s own office. This may reflect reputed internal rivalries between the IDF and the Mossad. Within the IDF, military leaders have attempted to describe Israel’s war effort as divided into two camps. One camp consists of the IDF, which includes the Air Force and the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), both of which are responsible for war operations. The other camp consists of the Mossad, whose purported task in this effort has been to provoke mass demonstrations insider Iran. According to optimistic Mossad assessments, these protests would precipitate the regime’s overthrow and its replacement with a more moderate, Western-friendly leadership. Apparently, however, in talks with the Israeli cabinet and the CIA, the Mossad never fully guaranteed that the Iranian regime would fall—and certainly not quickly. Read more of this post

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The Real War Is About To Begin: Iran Transitions to Full-Scale Insurgency

March 30, 2026 by 12 Comments

Iran War 2026THE IRAN WAR OPENED with a shock. In minutes, the United States and Israel struck deep into Iran’s command structure, killing nearly fifty senior figures—among them the Supreme Leader and much of the military high command. It was a ruthless display of intelligence, surveillance, and targeting at a level rarely seen in modern warfare. Russian forces only wish they could have achieved even a fraction of this effect in Ukraine in 2022. Had they done so, the war’s trajectory might have unfolded very differently. But this kind of operational success is exceptionally hard to deliver in warfare.

And yet, as Carl von Clausewitz cautioned centuries ago, the outcome of war is not governed by formulaic calculus. No matter how astounding, operational sophistication and technological prowess do not guarantee success. Instead of an immediate collapse, the decapitation of the Iranian regime appears to have produced a series of unpredictable second-order effects. At the very least, it physically eliminated Iran’s few pragmatic leaders who have historically favored restraint. Their demise effectively handed over power to the hardliners of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Moreover, the war appears to have paralyzed Iran’s domestic opposition, whose adherents may despise the regime but—unlike the U.S. and Israel—do not want to see their country break up into ethnic statelets.

Most importantly, the February 28 decapitation strike convinced Iran’s surviving leaders that this is an existential fight—not a limited confrontation like the Twelve-Day War. Today’s ruling Principalists in Iran differ sharply from the cosmopolitan, Western-educated elite of the 1960s and 1970s. They are largely provincial in origin, domestically rooted, and lack the international ties that once offered pathways of exit. They do not hold dual citizenships, do not maintain Q Quoteforeign residences, and few of them possess the linguistic or social capital to relocate abroad. Simply put, they have no viable exit. For them, defeat is not exile—it is annihilation. Under such conditions, the expectation is not capitulation, but resistance to the very end.

Activating the Iranian Asymmetric Doctrine

Starting in 2001, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq offered Iranian war planners a prolonged and unusually comprehensive vantage point from which to study the American way of war in their immediate neighborhood. For over two decades, the Iranians analyzed these methods, learned from them, and internalized their logic into their own asymmetric warfare doctrine. And now, having survived the February 28 decapitation attack, the Iranian regime has put that doctrine into operation. Iran’s asymmetric doctrine channels the state’s military, civilian, economic, and informational assets into a multi-domain, protracted insurgency campaign designed to inflict maximum pain on its enemies. In doing so, it rests on what is perhaps the Islamic Republic’s greatest asset: its asymmetric patience—i.e., its capacity to endure more physical and emotional torment than its Western opponents and their allies.

The Iranians refined their asymmetric patience skills during what they refer to as the “War of Holy Defense” (1980-1988), one of the 20th century’s longest conflicts and the deadliest conventional war ever fought in the developing world. The then-newly formed Islamic Republic suffered over 500,000 casualties—many of those due to exposure to chemical warfare—but managed to bring Saddam Hussein’s Western-backed Iraq into a standstill and force it into a truce. To do so, they even resorted to so-called “human wave assaults”, large masses of mostly unarmed youth who swarmed enemy positions and overwhelmed them by the sheer power of their number. That was largely how the Basij, the Iranian regime’s paramilitary street gangs that continue to operate in modern-day Iran, were initially formed.

Iran’s “Economy of Resistance”

On March 28, the Telegram channel belonging to the Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued an infographic titled “The Path to Defeating the Enemy in the Economic War”. The infographic reflects the Islamic Republic’s concept of “economy of resistance”, which was first developed in 2014 by Mojtaba Khamenei’s father, the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The central idea behind this concept is restructuring the Iranian economy, not simply to reduce its susceptibility to Western-imposed sanctions, but to allow it to stabilize and even develop. The goal of the economy of resistance is to prevent the destruction of the Islamic Republic and the Westernization of Iranian society. Through the economy of resistance doctrine, and with crucial help by China and Russia, Iran has largely managed to insulate its economy from the global economic system that is now reeling under Iran’s own asymmetric attacks. Read more of this post

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Investigation uncovers previously unknown Russian covert action unit

March 16, 2026 by 6 Comments

Valery GerasimovA JOINT PROJECT BY the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel and the investigative website The Insider has uncovered the existence and inner workings of a previously unknown Russian intelligence and cover action unit. The unit’s formal name is Military Unit 75127, but it is known within Russia’s intelligence establishment as Center 795. The Russian government reportedly created the unit in December 2022—less than a year following the Kremlin’s full military invasion of Ukraine.

By mid-2023, Center 795 was “fully staffed”, with its ≈500 officers coming mostly from the Main Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces’ General staff (known as GU or GRU). Other Center 795 officers came from ALPHA and VYMPEL—covert action units belonging to the Special Purpose Center of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). A smaller number of officers came from the Russian Armed Forces, the Federal Protective Service, and from the ALPHA Group of the Belarussian security service, known as KGB.

The structure of Center 795 features three directorates: Intelligence, Combat Support, and Assault Operations. The Directorate of Intelligence consists of nine distinct departments tasked with—among other things—collecting and analyzing intelligence from social media platforms, conducting reconnaissance using satellite networks and drones, carrying out signals intelligence, as well as executing human intelligence and covert operations, including assassinations and abductions.

The Directorate for Combat Support is staffed with explosive, air defense, armored warfare, and artillery operatives. It also maintains combat units that conduct technical maintenance, logistics, fortification, and other specialized tasks. The Assault Operations Directorate consists of four departments, which appear to conduct strictly compartmentalized functions that include airborne tasks.

Notably, unlike other special activities units in Russia’s intelligence arsenal, Center 795 does not appear to reside within the GRU. Instead, it appears to operate independently of military intelligence oversight and to report directly to General Valery Gerasimov (pictured), Chief of the Russian Armed Forces’ General Staff of and First Deputy Minister of Defense, or to one of his subordinate deputy defense ministers.

According to the investigative reports, the existence of Center 795 was revealed when one of its officers, Denis Alimov, used Google to translate a message sent to him by a Serbian operative living in the United States. This allowed the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation to use a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) warrant and access the Google Translate transcripts. Alimov was eventually arrested in Bogotá, Colombia, on February 24, 2026, after arriving there on a Turkish Airlines flight from Istanbul, Turkey. He is currently awaiting extradition to New York.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 16 March 2026 | Permalink

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Classified US intelligence report suggests Iran regime unlikely to fall or change

March 9, 2026 by 11 Comments

Iran KhameneiA CLASSIFIED REPORT ISSUED two weeks ago by the United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) found that even a full-scale interstate war against Iran would be unlikely to dislodge or drastically alter the current regime. A summary of the report was revealed by The Washington Post, which cited three anonymous sources the paper said were intimately familiar with the report’s contents.

Composed of senior and highly respected intelligence analysts from across the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), the NIC is tasked with producing classified strategic assessments on critical issues of concern to American decision-makers. Technically NIC reports represent the collective voice of all 18 intelligence agencies that make up the U.S. IC, and come as close as possible to the IC’s consensus view on pressing national security concerns.

According to The Washington Post, the NIC report outlines several scenarios for leadership succession in Iran, resulting from either a surgical “decapitation” campaign against specific elements of regime, or from a large-scale military assault against the entirety of the Iranian security state. It concludes that in both cases the Iranian regime is too entrenched and powerful to fall. Moreover, even in the event of “decapitation”, the regime has substantial human resources to keep replenishing its fallen military and civilian leaders, including the Supreme Leader.

Lastly, the NIC report concludes that the Iranian opposition within Iran and around the world is too disjointed, fragmented and disorganized to pose a credible alternative to the Iranian security state. While discussing a number of different potential scenarios for the takeover of power by the Iranian opposition, the NIC report concludes that such an eventuality remains “unlikely”, The Post reports.

The Post’s report appears to confirm earlier accounts by The New York Times and the Reuters news agency, which suggested that the consensus view among the U.S. IC is that, if killed, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei would almost certainly be replaced by another hardliner, who would be ideologically opposed to both Israel and the West.

Notably, The Washington Post notes that the NIC report does not consider the possibility that the U.S. and Israel might decide to engage in a protracted ground war against Iran. Additionally, the report does not entertain the possibility that ethnic separatist forces within Iran—such as the Kurds, the Azeris or the Balochis—might revolt against Tehran, thus sparking a nationwide armed conflict.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 09 March 2026 | Permalink

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CIA working with Kurdish separatists to foment armed rebellion in northwestern Iran

March 5, 2026 by 1 Comment

Iran KurdistanTHE UNITED STATES CENTRAL Intelligence Agency (CIA) is arming and training ethnic separatists in northwestern Iran with the goal of fomenting an armed rebellion against Tehran in the coming weeks, according to reports. Several news outlets, including CNN, report that Iranian Kurdish opposition forces are preparing to launch a ground operation in northwestern Iran “in the coming days”.

The nearly 10 million Kurds in Iran are one of the largest ethnic minorities in the country, concentrated in the mountainous western provinces bordering Iraq and Turkey. They are predominantly Sunni Muslims in a country governed by a Shia clerical state, creating both religious and ethnic tension. The central government has generally responded to calls for autonomy by various Kurdish factions with security crackdowns and suppression of dissent. Kurdish regions have been subject to heavy surveillance and military deployment, particularly during periods of regional instability.

British news outlet ITV reports that American and Israeli air strikes have consistently targeted Iranian military installations in western Iran in recent days, in an effort to degrade Tehran’s security assets in the region and provide Kurdish rebel forces with the ability to launch a successful armed campaign. According to ITV, Kurdish rebels have asked Israeli and American forces to provide air cover for an eventual ground campaign—though whether this request has been approved remains unknown.

According to Axios, US President Donald Trump spoke directly with Iraqi Kurdish leaders last weekend, seeking access to Iran’s Kurdish provinces through the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region of northern Iraq. Such access would allow the CIA and US Special Operations Forces to create a supply route for the provision of weapons and other war materiel to Iranian Kurdish rebels. The US president also spoke with at least one Iranian Kurdish leader on Tuesday, according to reports.

CNN said it reached out to the CIA about this story but the agency refused to comment on it.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 05 March 2026 | Permalink

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Analysis: Escalation Without Endgame and the Limits of Defeating Iran

March 3, 2026 by 5 Comments

Iran Israel United States warTHE ONGOING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN Iran and its adversaries unfolds against the backdrop of a regime that is strategically depleted yet politically combustible. Yet strategic exhaustion does not equate to imminent collapse. Indeed, the potential degradation of Iran’s coercive institutions raises a more complex question: what follows tactical success? Thus, while Iran appears weakened and vulnerable, the longer-term trajectory of the conflict remains uncertain, fraught with the risk of protracted instability and regional spillover at a level that could make Libya and Syria seem mild by comparison.

Iran is Strategically Depleted and Vulnerable

Decades of crippling sanctions have ruined Iran’s economy and demoralized its population, causing an already polarized society to further-disintegrate. Outside of a small population of religious zealots, Iranians have little interest in martyrdom, and very few are willing to die for a regime that most see as politically and ideologically bankrupt. The stunning degree of the regime’s penetration by Israeli and American intelligence agencies is indicative of the disillusionment of ruling elites, let alone rank-and-file functionaries.

Militarily, this is hardly a war between equals. Even before bombs started falling in Tehran on February 28, Iran’s armed forces and its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had been severely degraded by prior military engagements with the U.S. and Israel. Even with the assistance of its proxies and allies, Iran is demonstrably unable to match the military and intelligence resources of its opponents. As many have noted, Tehran’s retaliatory strikes appear to emphasize economic disruption and psychological pressure on civilian populations. But the marked inconsistency in the scale and delivery of Iran’s retaliatory attacks suggests that it is struggling to respond in a coherent fashion.

Russia, meanwhile, is nowhere to be seen. As in the cases of Venezuela and Cuba, Moscow has restricted its response to this crisis to diplomatic condemnations and offers to mediate, rather than offering military assistance to its Middle Eastern ally. This is hardly surprising, given Russia’s broader strategic priorities and its desire to further its ongoing expansionist goals in Europe by avoid overextension elsewhere.

Iran is weak, exhausted, alone. It is teetering on the edge. Yet, instead of cheering, this appears to trouble even seasoned Iran hawks like John Bolton, Trump’s onetime national security adviser. A veteran Republican, Bolton is probably the most consistent and vociferous Iran critic in the Western Hemisphere. The Iranian government has actively planned to assassinate him in recent years. But in a recent interview, Bolton cautioned about the lack of planning behind Washington’s latest adventurism in the Middle East and waned that the current situation may “deepen conflict, create a dangerous power vacuum, and purge the [entire Middle East] into turmoil”. What is Bolton seeing that Trump’s inner circle is not?

This War Will Not End Soon

American air campaigns have a demonstrated history of obliterating Washington’s tactical targets and severely disrupting its adversaries. Iran is unlikely to prove an exception to this rule. However, air campaigns—no matter how sophisticated—cannot by themselves reorder domestic politics and build long-lasting political outcomes. It follows that, despite delivering a series of indisputable tactical successes, including the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader and senior members of his inner circle, American and Israeli airpower cannot by itself ensure a pro-Western outcome in Iran.

Obliterating the Iranian regime’s military capabilities and degrading its ability to dispense violence against its own population is likely to create a power vacuum. But that is not the same as managing the ensuing political fallout. Even if the regime falls—which is not the likeliest scenario—its successor is unlikely to be friendly to the U.S. or Israel. For over a century, Iran has been permeated by a political culture shaped by fervent nationalism, revolutionary narratives and resistance against foreign intervention. This has been particularly so since 1979, with the theocratic regime building the nation’s identity around the idea of its resistance to the “Great Satan” and its regional allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. This identity permeates Iran’s security apparatus, its state institutions and its education system. Even anti-regime Iranians—including the student demonstrators who cheered Ayatollah Khamenei’s demise—espouse core elements of that narrative. Read more of this post

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