June 19, 2026
by intelNews
THE APPOINTMENT OF MAJOR General (res.) Roman Gofman as director of the Mossad spy agency has emerged as a flashpoint in Israel’s security landscape, underscoring sharp divisions over senior leadership choices. Announced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in December 2025, the appointment has sparked intense debate among political, legal, and security circles. Supporters emphasize Gofman’s innovative, battle-tested military credentials, while detractors challenge both the process and his suitability to head Israel’s top foreign intelligence agency. This controversy mirrors the backlash against Netanyahu’s prior nomination of Major General David Zini as head of the Israel Security Agency (ISA), raising persistent questions about the decision-making process for key intelligence appointments.
The Appointment Process
On 4 December 2025, Netanyahu announced his decision to appoint Gofman as the next director of the Mossad. At that time, Gofman was serving as Netanyahu’s military secretary. Gofman was selected to replace outgoing Mossad Director David Barnea, whose five-year term was scheduled to end in June 2026.
The choice was notable because Gofman came from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) rather than from within the Mossad itself. Reports indicate that Netanyahu bypassed Mossad’s existing leadership, including candidates reportedly favored by outgoing director David Barnea, in selecting Gofman.
Following the announcement, Israeli law required the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments to review senior security appointments. Chaired by former Supreme Court President Asher Grunis, the committee examined Gofman’s candidacy and approved it in April 2026. After /approval, Netanyahu signed the appointment documents.
Nevertheless, the Committee’s approval did not resolve all disagreements. Gofman’s nomination soon became the subject of legal challenges before Israel’s High Court of Justice. Only after the Court rejected petitions seeking to block the appointment was Gofman able to assume office as Mossad Director in June 2026.
Why Netanyahu Chose Gofman
Supporters of Gofman’s appointment emphasized that, following the outbreak of the Israel-Gaza War in October 2023, Gofman brought extensive military experience and was closely involved in national security decision-making. Netanyahu’s office highlighted Gofman’s wartime operational leadership, his service as military secretary, and his coordination with intelligence agencies, including Mossad. Supporters also emphasized Gofman’s reputation as an unconventional and creative commander. During his military career, Gofman commanded armored formations, led operational units on Israel’s northern and southern fronts, and was wounded while fighting Hamas militants during the attacks of 7 October 2023. His supporters argued that the post-October 7 security environment required fresh thinking and leadership from outside traditional intelligence circles.
Lack of Intelligence Background
The most common criticism of Gofman’s appointment concerned his professional background. Unlike most recent Mossad directors, Gofman had spent his career in the military rather than in intelligence operations. Critics argued that running a global espionage organization requires skills and experience different from those needed to command military units. Several commentators noted that he would be among the few Mossad chiefs appointed without a substantial career in the intelligence service. Supporters countered that the Mossad has historically benefited from leaders with diverse backgrounds and that strategic leadership skills can be transferable across intelligence organizations. His critics emphasize his lack of experience, as four days after his appointment he fired the No. 2 at the Mossad, who had strong credentials and successful experience at the agency. It looks like more senior officials at Mossad may leave the agency, as they are not satisfied with Gofman’s nomination.
Allegations of Political Loyalty
Another major point of contention is Gofman’s close relationship with Netanyahu. As the prime minister’s military secretary, Gofman worked directly alongside Netanyahu and was regarded as a trusted adviser. Some observers stated that his appointment was based on personal loyalty rather than solely on professional considerations, and noted that Netanyahu bypassed candidates favored by the outgoing Mossad leadership.
Some warned that intelligence chiefs should provide independent assessments to political leaders, even when those assessments are unwelcome. Gofman’s nomination was included in a broader discussion about political influence over Israel’s security institutions.
The “Minor Informant” Affair and Legal Challenges
A further complication emerged during scrutiny of Gofman’s tenure as an IDF commander. Critics questioned his involvement in a controversial military operation that used a minor in a sensitive information campaign. This became a focal point during the vetting process and was cited by those challenging his appointment.
Although the advisory committee approved his nomination, the issue caused delays. It also provided grounds for legal petitions.
Gofman’s nomination faced formal legal challenges before the High Court of Justice in Israel. Petitioners argued that aspects of Goffman’s conduct and the appointment process raised concerns regarding standards expected of senior public officials. The litigation delayed the completion of the appointment process and prolonged public debate about the nomination. Ultimately, the High Court rejected the petitions and allowed the appointment to proceed.
Conclusion
Roman Gofman’s appointment as Mossad director illustrates the tensions that frequently accompany senior security appointments in Israel. On the one hand, supporters viewed him as a highly capable commander whose operational experience, creativity, and wartime service made him well-suited to lead the country’s foreign intelligence service. On the other hand, critics questioned his lack of intelligence experience, his close association with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and controversies stemming from allegations of lapses in decision-making and command disputes during his military career.
Despite these challenges, Gofman ultimately secured approval from both the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments and the High Court of Justice, allowing him to assume leadership of the Mossad in June 2026. His performance as director will be subject to close scrutiny.
► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 19 June 2026 | Permalink
* Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
South Korean court upholds sentence for university professor convicted of espionage
August 28, 2026 by intelNews Leave a comment
The convicted agent, identified only as “Qing”, was reportedly spotted and recruited by an espionage cell, referred to as “Ken Jake”, which was led by Chinese Chief Case Officer Liu Nannan whilst completing his PhD in Taiwan. The cell’s primary focus was the collection of high-value secrets from South Korea and Taiwan, through human intelligence (HUMINT) targeting. Investigators stated that the intelligence “Qing” collected included details on the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) mobile missile defense system, US-South Korea joint military exercise plans, Taiwan-related activities, and the location of a South Korean Navy vessel.
“Qing” operated between May 2024 and March 2025, using social media to approach and offer cash payments to soldiers. He also employed espionage equipment—including a camera hidden in a wristwatch—to evade face-to-face meetings while transferring stolen material. “Qing” also made several trips to South Korea’s Jeju Island to establish a dead-drop infrastructure for facilitating physical intelligence exchanges. He also met with individuals he believed were recruited military assets. The spy cell recruited Navy Corporal Jung Da-jung and Choi Hong-jae, a military conscript who reportedly received ₩ 7.1 million (about US $5,100) in exchange for providing military intelligence information. “Qing” also allegedly infiltrated anti-China/pro-Taiwan independence groups and attempted to gain close access to an unnamed female Taiwanese politician.
Following an undercover investigation by the South Korean Defense Counterintelligence Command (DCC), Qing was arrested in March 2025 by South Korean authorities while carrying out a dead-drop exchange on Jeju Island. DCC Lead Investigator Bang Tu-Cheol posed as an active-duty military asset and built credibility and trust through feeding fake documents to “Qing”. This eventually led to “Qing” meeting Bang on Jeju Island. The operation uncovered a broader network vulnerability when Chinese intelligence reportedly sent material obtained from Choi to Bang for cross-verification. South Korean investigators identified a technical link to Chinese-language file-sharing infrastructure, which allowed them to connect previously separate espionage cases. This discovery helped expose the wider “Ken Jake” cell.
► Author: Molly Jones | Date: 28 August 2026 | Permalink
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