THE IRAN WAR OPENED with a shock. In minutes, the United States and Israel struck deep into Iran’s command structure, killing nearly fifty senior figures—among them the Supreme Leader and much of the military high command. It was a ruthless display of intelligence, surveillance, and targeting at a level rarely seen in modern warfare. Russian forces only wish they could have achieved even a fraction of this effect in Ukraine in 2022. Had they done so, the war’s trajectory might have unfolded very differently. But this kind of operational success is exceptionally hard to deliver in warfare.
And yet, as Carl von Clausewitz cautioned centuries ago, the outcome of war is not governed by formulaic calculus. No matter how astounding, operational sophistication and technological prowess do not guarantee success. Instead of an immediate collapse, the decapitation of the Iranian regime appears to have produced a series of unpredictable second-order effects. At the very least, it physically eliminated Iran’s few pragmatic leaders who have historically favored restraint. Their demise effectively handed over power to the hardliners of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Moreover, the war appears to have paralyzed Iran’s domestic opposition, whose adherents may despise the regime but—unlike the U.S. and Israel—do not want to see their country break up into ethnic statelets.
Most importantly, the February 28 decapitation strike convinced Iran’s surviving leaders that this is an existential fight—not a limited confrontation like the Twelve-Day War. Today’s ruling Principalists in Iran differ sharply from the cosmopolitan, Western-educated elite of the 1960s and 1970s. They are largely provincial in origin, domestically rooted, and lack the international ties that once offered pathways of exit. They do not hold dual citizenships, do not maintain
foreign residences, and few of them possess the linguistic or social capital to relocate abroad. Simply put, they have no viable exit. For them, defeat is not exile—it is annihilation. Under such conditions, the expectation is not capitulation, but resistance to the very end.
Activating the Iranian Asymmetric Doctrine
Starting in 2001, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq offered Iranian war planners a prolonged and unusually comprehensive vantage point from which to study the American way of war in their immediate neighborhood. For over two decades, the Iranians analyzed these methods, learned from them, and internalized their logic into their own asymmetric warfare doctrine. And now, having survived the February 28 decapitation attack, the Iranian regime has put that doctrine into operation. Iran’s asymmetric doctrine channels the state’s military, civilian, economic, and informational assets into a multi-domain, protracted insurgency campaign designed to inflict maximum pain on its enemies. In doing so, it rests on what is perhaps the Islamic Republic’s greatest asset: its asymmetric patience—i.e., its capacity to endure more physical and emotional torment than its Western opponents and their allies.
The Iranians refined their asymmetric patience skills during what they refer to as the “War of Holy Defense” (1980-1988), one of the 20th century’s longest conflicts and the deadliest conventional war ever fought in the developing world. The then-newly formed Islamic Republic suffered over 500,000 casualties—many of those due to exposure to chemical warfare—but managed to bring Saddam Hussein’s Western-backed Iraq into a standstill and force it into a truce. To do so, they even resorted to so-called “human wave assaults”, large masses of mostly unarmed youth who swarmed enemy positions and overwhelmed them by the sheer power of their number. That was largely how the Basij, the Iranian regime’s paramilitary street gangs that continue to operate in modern-day Iran, were initially formed.
Iran’s “Economy of Resistance”
On March 28, the Telegram channel belonging to the Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued an infographic titled “The Path to Defeating the Enemy in the Economic War”. The infographic reflects the Islamic Republic’s concept of “economy of resistance”, which was first developed in 2014 by Mojtaba Khamenei’s father, the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The central idea behind this concept is restructuring the Iranian economy, not simply to reduce its susceptibility to Western-imposed sanctions, but to allow it to stabilize and even develop. The goal of the economy of resistance is to prevent the destruction of the Islamic Republic and the Westernization of Iranian society. Through the economy of resistance doctrine, and with crucial help by China and Russia, Iran has largely managed to insulate its economy from the global economic system that is now reeling under Iran’s own asymmetric attacks. Read more of this post
US spy agencies resisting White House plan to create master list of espionage threats
July 1, 2026 10 Comments
Citing “people familiar with the matter”, the Times said on Monday that the effort to create a master list of foreign spies and Americans who are spying on behalf of foreign intelligence services is being led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The agency has asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI to provide the names of all individuals who have been found to engage in espionage and are being watched by the Bureau. Likewise, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been asked to provide names of foreign espionage operatives that populate its lists of potential assets—foreign spies who may in time be turned by the CIA.
The master list of spies would potentially allow the entirety of the United States Intelligence Community (IC) to monitor the global activities of these espionage operatives and share information about them in real time. Additionally, the existence of such a list would in theory prevent operational duplication and help deconfliction within the IC when it comes to counterintelligence efforts. The central idea behind the master list dates to National Security Presidential Memorandum – 7, a directive issued by President Donald Trump in October 2017, during his first term in office.
However, senior counterintelligence officials are reportedly concerned that giving the ODNI full access to such a comprehensive master list of espionage threat actors could potentially compromise the integrity of counterintelligence operations. Information about espionage operatives and assets—both current and prospective—is usually protected behind several layers of classification and compartmentalization that shield it even within individual intelligence agencies. Additionally, some of the information relating to these individuals is acquired through counterintelligence activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and is thus subject to tight restrictions.
At a deeper level, the resistance of senior counterintelligence officials to surrender sensitive information about espionage to the ODNI reflects years of mutual suspicion and turf wars within the IC. According to the Times, these officials have yet to agree about how such a master list would be constructed, what information it would contain, who should have access to it, and how it should be maintained and updated.
► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 1 July 2026 | Permalink
Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with counterintelligence, espionage, intelligence sharing, News, ODNI, turf wars, United States