The Real War Is About To Begin: Iran Transitions to Full-Scale Insurgency
March 30, 2026 12 Comments
THE IRAN WAR OPENED with a shock. In minutes, the United States and Israel struck deep into Iran’s command structure, killing nearly fifty senior figures—among them the Supreme Leader and much of the military high command. It was a ruthless display of intelligence, surveillance, and targeting at a level rarely seen in modern warfare. Russian forces only wish they could have achieved even a fraction of this effect in Ukraine in 2022. Had they done so, the war’s trajectory might have unfolded very differently. But this kind of operational success is exceptionally hard to deliver in warfare.
And yet, as Carl von Clausewitz cautioned centuries ago, the outcome of war is not governed by formulaic calculus. No matter how astounding, operational sophistication and technological prowess do not guarantee success. Instead of an immediate collapse, the decapitation of the Iranian regime appears to have produced a series of unpredictable second-order effects. At the very least, it physically eliminated Iran’s few pragmatic leaders who have historically favored restraint. Their demise effectively handed over power to the hardliners of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Moreover, the war appears to have paralyzed Iran’s domestic opposition, whose adherents may despise the regime but—unlike the U.S. and Israel—do not want to see their country break up into ethnic statelets.
Most importantly, the February 28 decapitation strike convinced Iran’s surviving leaders that this is an existential fight—not a limited confrontation like the Twelve-Day War. Today’s ruling Principalists in Iran differ sharply from the cosmopolitan, Western-educated elite of the 1960s and 1970s. They are largely provincial in origin, domestically rooted, and lack the international ties that once offered pathways of exit. They do not hold dual citizenships, do not maintain
foreign residences, and few of them possess the linguistic or social capital to relocate abroad. Simply put, they have no viable exit. For them, defeat is not exile—it is annihilation. Under such conditions, the expectation is not capitulation, but resistance to the very end.
Activating the Iranian Asymmetric Doctrine
Starting in 2001, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq offered Iranian war planners a prolonged and unusually comprehensive vantage point from which to study the American way of war in their immediate neighborhood. For over two decades, the Iranians analyzed these methods, learned from them, and internalized their logic into their own asymmetric warfare doctrine. And now, having survived the February 28 decapitation attack, the Iranian regime has put that doctrine into operation. Iran’s asymmetric doctrine channels the state’s military, civilian, economic, and informational assets into a multi-domain, protracted insurgency campaign designed to inflict maximum pain on its enemies. In doing so, it rests on what is perhaps the Islamic Republic’s greatest asset: its asymmetric patience—i.e., its capacity to endure more physical and emotional torment than its Western opponents and their allies.
The Iranians refined their asymmetric patience skills during what they refer to as the “War of Holy Defense” (1980-1988), one of the 20th century’s longest conflicts and the deadliest conventional war ever fought in the developing world. The then-newly formed Islamic Republic suffered over 500,000 casualties—many of those due to exposure to chemical warfare—but managed to bring Saddam Hussein’s Western-backed Iraq into a standstill and force it into a truce. To do so, they even resorted to so-called “human wave assaults”, large masses of mostly unarmed youth who swarmed enemy positions and overwhelmed them by the sheer power of their number. That was largely how the Basij, the Iranian regime’s paramilitary street gangs that continue to operate in modern-day Iran, were initially formed.
Iran’s “Economy of Resistance”
On March 28, the Telegram channel belonging to the Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued an infographic titled “The Path to Defeating the Enemy in the Economic War”. The infographic reflects the Islamic Republic’s concept of “economy of resistance”, which was first developed in 2014 by Mojtaba Khamenei’s father, the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The central idea behind this concept is restructuring the Iranian economy, not simply to reduce its susceptibility to Western-imposed sanctions, but to allow it to stabilize and even develop. The goal of the economy of resistance is to prevent the destruction of the Islamic Republic and the Westernization of Iranian society. Through the economy of resistance doctrine, and with crucial help by China and Russia, Iran has largely managed to insulate its economy from the global economic system that is now reeling under Iran’s own asymmetric attacks. Read more of this post
THE ONGOING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN Iran and its adversaries unfolds against the backdrop of a regime that is strategically depleted yet politically combustible. Yet strategic exhaustion does not equate to imminent collapse. Indeed, the potential degradation of Iran’s coercive institutions raises a more complex question: what follows tactical success? Thus, while Iran appears weakened and vulnerable, the longer-term trajectory of the conflict remains uncertain, fraught with the risk of protracted instability and regional spillover at a level that could make Libya and Syria seem mild by comparison.
THE UNITED STATES SECRET Service is among the world’s most prestigious law enforcement agencies. Its institutional experience in protecting US presidents and presidential candidates dates to 1901. Given its high-stakes protective mission —safeguarding the executive leadership of the world’s most powerful nation— the agency has historically placed emphasis on flawlessness: it simply can’t afford to fail.
NO COUNTRY HAS BETTER intelligence on the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (known as ISIS-K) than the United States. American forces have faced ISIS-K almost from the moment the group was founded in 2015 in Pakistan, just a few miles from the Afghan border. It was there that a group of disaffected members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP, commonly referred to as the Pakistani Taliban) began turning their backs on al-Qaeda, which they saw as a failing brand, and joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
not being taken into consideration by the group’s primary targets, namely Afghanistan, Iran, and Russia. Indeed, despite the Washington’s best efforts, its warnings about pending ISIS-K attacks have been ignored by the group’s primary targets. A few days after an ISIS-K attack killed nearly 100 people in Kerman, Iran, The Wall Street Journal
MIDDLE EAST OBSERVERS WERE hardly surprised by yesterday’s news of the apparent assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Lebanon. Not only was al-Arouri a
Yesterday’s assassination at the very heart of Hezbollah’s lair was nothing short of a demonstration of the Mossad’s competency in special operations.
LAST WEEK THE UNITED States Department of Justice announced the arrest of Victor Manuel Rocha, 73, a former senior American diplomat, whose career included stints as ambassador and advisor to the National Security Council and the United States Southern Command. Cuban intelligence allegedly recruited Rocha when he was a student in the 1970s and inspired him to spend his entire professional life in search of opportunities to supply intelligence to Cuba —and possibly Russia and China. United States Attorney General Merrick Garland
principal officer in the United States Interests Section in Cuba —effectively the second-in-command in Washington’s de facto embassy in Havana.
ARGUABLY NO COUNTRY BENEFITED more from the American invasion of Iraq than the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a war that lasted over a decade, Washington spent over
branch of the Iranian Armed Forces that protects and promotes the ideological inheritance of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
THE HAMAS-LED OPERATION al-Aqsa Flood, which began on October 7, marked the first large-scale conflict within the borders of Israel since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. However, unlike the coalition of Arab armies it faced in 1948, Israel now confronts an alliance of sub-state groups. Led by Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, this alliance includes the Syrian- and Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad and a number of secular groups, such as the Fatah-aligned al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
IN THE EARLY HOURS of June 23, PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin declared the launch of an armed campaign against the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Within hours, several thousand soldiers belonging to Wagner, one of the world’s largest private military companies, had abandoned their positions in eastern Ukraine and were en route to Moscow. Their mission, according to Prigozhin, was to arrest Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, and try them for mismanagement and corruption.
Wagner leader has repeatedly expressed his dismay at being viewed as an outsider by the Ministry of Defense, which it views as an elitist and incompetent bureaucracy. His experience in Ukraine, where Wagner’s forces faced stiff resistance from the local population and the Ukrainian military alike, added fuel to his rage against a host of Russian defense officials. Prigozhin has been voicing his denunciations of the way these officials have managed the war since March of 2022, just two weeks into the invasion of Ukraine.
THE 49-PAGE GRAND JURY indictment, filed last week in Florida by the United States Department of Justice, contains 37 criminal charges against former president Donald Trump. The charges can be summarized into a two-fold accusation: Trump is alleged to have stolen more than 300 classified documents upon leaving the White House in January 2021. Moreover, he allegedly schemed with a group of advisors and aides in order to obstruct efforts by the government to retrieve the stolen documents. Both accusations are spelled out in stark detail in
does it need to. Establishing a motive is not required in order to demonstrate the need for a trial, or indeed a conviction. Given the high stakes of this case, however, establishing a motive can provide much-needed clarity in the public sphere.
his determination to keep them in close proximity to his office and sleeping quarters.
more pugilistic desires”, according to the paper. His attitude was not a show. It was sincere. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that it has subsided since his indictment.
OFFICIALS IN UKRAINE HAVE
Russia’s border with Belarus, two trains were
A BOOK BY A former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer, which alleges that a senior Agency official sabotaged American counterintelligence efforts on orders from Moscow, has prompted a series of fiery exchanges by retired CIA personnel. The primary figures in the dispute are the book’s author, Robert Baer, and Paul J. Redmond, who served as the CIA’s Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Counterintelligence.
GERMANY’S EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), constitutes a liability for Europe’s security and is in desperate need of a drastic and immediate overhaul. That is the conclusion of a blunt
ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30, 2022, an assailant on a motorcycle 






Analysis: Europe’s Intelligence Challenge in an Era of Strategic Bipolarity
May 5, 2026 by Joseph Fitsanakis 2 Comments
For decades, European intelligence services operated within a strategic environment shaped by American primacy. Their task was often to complement U.S. intelligence collection, support NATO operations, monitor regional threats, and provide national-level warning. That model is no longer sufficient. In an emerging bipolar order dominated by U.S.-China competition, Europe must develop intelligence structures capable of supporting greater strategic autonomy, faster defense mobilization, and more sophisticated political warfare responses—especially in the cognitive domain.
THE U.S. IS FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO WIN WARS
The U.S. appears increasingly ill-prepared for the demands of modern warfare. This is not a realization born solely of the present war in Iran. Rather, Iran represents the latest data point in a longer pattern of strategic underperformance that includes Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. The current war in Iran further reinforces concerns about coherence and strategic direction. Public messaging by the administration of President Donald Trump has emphasized kinetic successes—such as the degradation of Iran’s naval and air capabilities. But it has offered limited clarity on broader strategic
objectives. This mirrors earlier patterns in Afghanistan, where overwhelming tactical superiority failed to produce durable political outcomes. It is worth noting that the Taliban did not require a navy and air force in order to defeat American forces; if that is so, then why would the Iranians require them? For intelligence professionals, the lesson is clear: battlefield metrics must be analytically divorced from strategic indicators. This means that intelligence support to policymakers must explicitly distinguish between momentary tactical achievements and their long-term strategic significance.
The historical record suggests that such misalignment between tactics and strategy is not easily concealed from domestic audiences. After more than two decades of sustained conflict, the American electorate has shown clear signs of fatigue, frustration, and declining confidence in ruling elites. This sentiment has contributed the rise populism and of polarizing political figures, which has in turn led to the erosion of bipartisan consensus on foreign policy in Washington. One is understandably surprised by how long it has taken European planners to incorporate this domestic dynamic into their assessments of America’s reliability as a strategic ally. The fact is that the element of continuity in American foreign policy is nowhere near guaranteed—and the sooner European leaders understand that, the better. Read more of this post
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