Austria: Arrest raises broader questions about counterintelligence capabilities
April 10, 2024 6 Comments
ON GOOD FRIDAY, MARCH 29, Egisto Ott, a former member of Austria’s now-dissolved domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT), was arrested in his house in Carinthia, Austria’s southernmost state. Ott had frequently been at the center of media attention in the past year, in connection with the network surrounding the fugitive financier and alleged spy Jan Maršálek, as well as alleged misconduct relating to carrying out illegal investigations of persons. Ott also seems to have been involved in an alleged attempt to create an intelligence unit, or even an entire shadow intelligence service, embedded inside Austria’s foreign ministry. Now the veteran police and intelligence officer stands accused by the state attorney of abusing his authority and of being part of an “intelligence activity to the disadvantage of Austria” —the only form of spying that is illegal under § 256 of the Austrian criminal code.
Ott’s arrest came several years after intelligence was first shared with Austria by Western partner services —allegedly the Central Intelligence Agency— that reportedly date from as early as November 2017. Back then, Ott allegedly received classified material from his service’s email address to his personal Gmail account. However, Peter Gridling, director of the BVT from 2008 until its dissolution in 2021, stated in a recent interview that the ensuing investigations did not yield actionable results that could be used in criminal proceedings. This statement is highly interesting, as Gridling filed accusations about Ott with the State Prosecutor’s Office himself, and would hardly have done unless he had access to hard evidence. Ott was consequently removed from the BVT and placed in Police Academy Austria (SIAK), which is responsible for training police officers and conducts research related to police and domestic security.
Nevertheless, according to media reporting, Ott seems to have kept and illegally used certain forms of identification that presented him as a police officer. He is also alleged to have maintained access to several police databases and to have retained his network of trusted informants that provided him with intelligence. 
These included contacts in friendly foreign police services, whom Ott knew from his time as a liaison officer in Italy and Turkey. According to Gridling, these contacts were unaware that Ott had been removed from the BVT under suspicion of being unreliable and potentially even working for Russia. They therefore continued to help him when asked. Ott allegedly deceived his contacts by claiming that he needed information on cases relating to different kinds of extremism. As it turned out, according to the leaked arrest warrant, several of the individuals referred to by Ott as “suspects” in terrorism investigations were in fact Russian dissidents or intelligence defectors who were living as protected persons in Austria and elsewhere outside Russia.
It appears highly probable that Ott also had people inside the Austrian bureaucracy, including former colleagues in the BVT, who continued to provide him with information and assistance, even after the first allegations against him arose in 2017. As of now, at least one other officer from LVT Vienna (the state unit of the BVT) has been found to have illegally provided Ott with Information. It is likely, given the publicly available descriptions of Ott’s activities, that other individuals may be implicated. It also remains to be seen whether individuals involved in this case were able to join the BVT’s successor agency, the new Directorate of State Protection and Intelligence (DSN). Read more of this post
THE OCTOBER 7 ATTACK on Israel was a total surprise. There was no warning. There were very few signs of a possible attack. Israeli intelligence evaluated these signs as elements of a routine military exercise by Hamas, and even assessed them as parts of an imaginary scenario. It therefore gave no warning to those Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units that were stationed on the border with Gaza. Meanwhile, what we know about the intelligence failure of October 7 will likely pale before what the commission of inquiry will reveal once it is established. That was precisely what happened in the case of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which made significant revelations while investigating the intelligence failings of the IDF in the run up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
time, in the first two days of the conflict the IDF was confused and acted without direction, in the apparent absence of relevant action plans for what to do in the event of a massive invasion. The IDF was clearly not ready for such a scenario.
for those conclusions to become public. What is to be done in the meantime? There is public pressure to launch the inquiry soon.
MIDDLE EAST OBSERVERS WERE hardly surprised by yesterday’s news of the apparent assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Lebanon. Not only was al-Arouri a 
Yesterday’s assassination at the very heart of Hezbollah’s lair was nothing short of a demonstration of the Mossad’s competency in special operations.
LAST WEEK THE UNITED States Department of Justice announced the arrest of Victor Manuel Rocha, 73, a former senior American diplomat, whose career included stints as ambassador and advisor to the National Security Council and the United States Southern Command. Cuban intelligence allegedly recruited Rocha when he was a student in the 1970s and inspired him to spend his entire professional life in search of opportunities to supply intelligence to Cuba —and possibly Russia and China. United States Attorney General Merrick Garland 
principal officer in the United States Interests Section in Cuba —effectively the second-in-command in Washington’s de facto embassy in Havana.
IT HAS BECOME CLEAR that Hamas had up-to-date intelligence on Israeli targets prior to the attack on October 7, 2023, the largest and most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history. Hamas did not have access to clandestine information sources but rather relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) to understand the structure and weaknesses of Israel’s defense system along the border fence. In addition to publicly available maps, Hamas meticulously gathered online intelligence about specific sites within the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip.
interests of national security, the public’s ‘right to know’ purview is substantial. Thus, significant amounts of information are available online.
the Israeli Military Intelligence was dissolved, for reasons that remain to be investigated. CNN was among many news outlets that have 
SINCE OCTOBER 7, WHEN Hamas launched its surprise attack on Israel, many more details about the intelligence failure have emerged. It appears that Israeli intelligence officials have warned for years about military exercises held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which have included practice raids on cities deep inside Israel. However, the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) did not heed to the warnings, because it considered Hamas operationally incapable of carrying out such raids. Instead, the IMI estimated that the Hamas leadership aimed to arrive at a settlement with Israel. That seems like the result of a highly successful disinformation operation, which added significantly to the effectiveness of the sudden attack on Israel on October 7.
large number of settlements simultaneously. It also believed that such an operation would go against the spirit of Hamas leadership’s spirit intention to settle with Israel.
Indeed, a preventive course of action should have been in place even in the absence of specific intelligence warnings —if only to enable the IDF to repel a surprise attack by Hamas. There was no need to estimate what Hamas would do in order to prepare for a surprise attack.
ARGUABLY NO COUNTRY BENEFITED more from the American invasion of Iraq than the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a war that lasted over a decade, Washington spent over 
branch of the Iranian Armed Forces that protects and promotes the ideological inheritance of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
SEVERAL DAYS HAVE PASSED since October 7, the day when Hamas stunned Israel with a surprise attack against several settlements near the Gaza border. It is now clear that Israeli intelligence was in possession of warning indicators about the attack, and that these indicators were misjudged.
forwarded to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office. The Israeli newspaper that 
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE October 2023 attack on Israel and the Yom Kippur War is reasonable. We still have an obscured perspective on what happened on October 7. But even this partial picture makes it possible to draw a preliminary comparison. Undoubtedly, there is no precedent for such a monumental failure in the history of Israeli intelligence.
for the professionalism and resilience of the IDF, which was there in 1973, continues to exist.
THE HAMAS-LED OPERATION al-Aqsa Flood, which began on October 7, marked the first large-scale conflict within the borders of Israel since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. However, unlike the coalition of Arab armies it faced in 1948, Israel now confronts an alliance of sub-state groups. Led by Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, this alliance includes the Syrian- and Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad and a number of secular groups, such as the Fatah-aligned al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
IN THE EARLY HOURS of June 23, PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin declared the launch of an armed campaign against the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Within hours, several thousand soldiers belonging to Wagner, one of the world’s largest private military companies, had abandoned their positions in eastern Ukraine and were en route to Moscow. Their mission, according to Prigozhin, was to arrest Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, and try them for mismanagement and corruption.
Wagner leader has repeatedly expressed his dismay at being viewed as an outsider by the Ministry of Defense, which it views as an elitist and incompetent bureaucracy. His experience in Ukraine, where Wagner’s forces faced stiff resistance from the local population and the Ukrainian military alike, added fuel to his rage against a host of Russian defense officials. Prigozhin has been voicing his denunciations of the way these officials have managed the war since March of 2022, just two weeks into the invasion of Ukraine.
THE 49-PAGE GRAND JURY indictment, filed last week in Florida by the United States Department of Justice, contains 37 criminal charges against former president Donald Trump. The charges can be summarized into a two-fold accusation: Trump is alleged to have stolen more than 300 classified documents upon leaving the White House in January 2021. Moreover, he allegedly schemed with a group of advisors and aides in order to obstruct efforts by the government to retrieve the stolen documents. Both accusations are spelled out in stark detail in 
does it need to. Establishing a motive is not required in order to demonstrate the need for a trial, or indeed a conviction. Given the high stakes of this case, however, establishing a motive can provide much-needed clarity in the public sphere.
his determination to keep them in close proximity to his office and sleeping quarters.
more pugilistic desires”, according to the paper. His attitude was not a show. It was sincere. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that it has subsided since his indictment.
RUSSIA’S ABILITY TO CONDUCT human intelligence operations in Europe has suffered greater damage in recent years than at any time since 1991, according to some experts. These setbacks have partly been caused by what The Washington Post refers to in a 
A BOOK BY A former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer, which alleges that a senior Agency official sabotaged American counterintelligence efforts on orders from Moscow, has prompted a series of fiery exchanges by retired CIA personnel. The primary figures in the dispute are the book’s author, Robert Baer, and Paul J. Redmond, who served as the CIA’s Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Counterintelligence.
Notes on the assassination of Iranian IRGC Commander Hassan Mahdawi
April 26, 2024 by intelNews 2 Comments
On the day of the attack, a building adjacent to the Iranian Embassy in the Syrian capital of Damascus was attacked with rockets. The attack killed seven IRGC members: General Muhammad Reza Zahedi, also known as Hassan Mahdawi, his deputy, and five additional officers. Mahdawi is the most senior Iranian commander to be killed since the assassination of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani by the United States in 2020.
Mahdawi had close ties with Hezbollah. He maintained a close relationship with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and was perceived by Israel to be directly coordinating the military attacks on Israel from Lebanon and Syria. In Tehran’s collective memory, Israel’s history of attacks against it includes numerous strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, assassinations of scientists within Iran, and actions against Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Traditionally, these attacks have been invariably met with attacks by Iran’s proxies in the region.
This time, it was different. Iran recognized Mahdawi’s assassination as a direct attack on Iran that it could not tolerate, and had to respond to differently. Just days following Mahdawi’s assassination, Iran attacked Israel. According to the Israel Defense Forces, 99 percent of the more than 330 weapons fired at Israel (including at least 185 drones and 110 surface-to-surface missiles) were intercepted, mostly over the territory of countries adjacent to Israel. Iran’s attack on Israel was unprecedented. It was launched directly from Iranian territory in contrast to prior cases, when Iran has used its proxies, supposedly leaving its hands clean.
Israel could not tolerate such a blatant infringement on its sovereignty. After Israeli officials vowed a response to the Iranian attack, the Jewish State counter-attacked, causing minor damage to the Eighth Shekari Air Base in northwest Esfahan, a dozen kilometers from the Natanz nuclear facility. It was a calculated response designed to deliver a message to Iran that Israel could and would respond to an attack. Following Israel’s counterattack, the tensions between Iran and Israel have subsided for the time being.
While the attack on General Mahdawi was based on excellent operational intelligence, it became evident that the Israeli assessment regarding a possible Iranian response was erroneous. The Israeli assessment was that the Iranian response would be similar to what occurred in the past —namely limited attacks by Hezbollah on northern Israel and attacks on the Golan heights by Iranian proxies in Syria. Israel simply did not anticipate a direct Iranian attack on Israel from Iranian territory.
It seems that Israeli senior analysts were entangled in a conception of Iran’s past behavior and anticipated that Tehran’s response would be similar to prior cases, namely utilizing Iran’s proxies. Israel did not pay enough attention to the difference between Mahdawi’s assassination and previous attacks against Iran. This time, the attack targeted the Iranian embassy in Damascus and the target was a very senior official, who was close to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
It appears that Israel’s assessment of the Iranian response to Mahdawi’s assassination was a strategic failure. It appears more likely that the Israeli War Cabinet was provided with an incorrect assessment by the nation’s intelligence community, and less likely that it was provided with an incorrect assessment, which it then decided to ignore. There is concern in Israel that the intelligence assessment was once again wrong, after the colossal failure to anticipate the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas.
► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 26 April 2024 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with Analysis, assassinations, Avner Barnea, Hassan Mahdawi, Iran, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Israel, Quds Force