Ashraf Marwan: Israel’s ‘Angel’ or Egypt’s Double Agent?

ASHRAF MARWAN, POPULARLY KNOWN “the Angel,” is regarded as one of the greatest spies in Israeli intelligence history—the man on whom the entire Israeli government relied, and the informant who warned of the Yom Kippur War. Long-standing suspicions that he was actually a double agent have been strongly dismissed.

However, a comprehensive investigation by two Israeli journalists, Ronen Bergman and Yuval Robovitz, published in the popular Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth under the title “The Angel of Lies”, presents a different picture. Based on thousands of secret documents not yet revealed and rare conversations with people involved in the operation, their report claims that ‘the Angel’ was actually the spearhead of Egypt’s deception plan before and during the war—and that he succeeded beyond all expectations.

A Spy or Double Agent?

Bergman and Robovitz examined whether Ashraf Marwan—advisor to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and a Mossad agent who died in 2007—was truly the best agent Israel had before the Yom Kippur War. Their findings indicate that a series of serious operational failures, combined with arrogance within the Israeli intelligence community, made Marwan one of the most dangerous spies ever to act against Israel.

They also investigated whether he was genuinely an Israeli agent who contributed meaningfully to Israel’s national security, as claimed by Mossad and by scholar Professor Uri Bar-Joseph, who wrote extensively about the Yom Kippur War intelligence failure and authored the well-known book The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel. Netflix later produced a film, The Angel, based on Bar-Joseph’s book.

Or, was Marwan, as the journalists argue, a double agent working for Egypt from the beginning—since volunteering for Israeli intelligence in 1970—and who managed to deceive Israel for years, particularly by delaying his warning about Egypt’s impending attack until roughly 12 hours before it began? According to Bergman and Robovitz, Marwan knew about Egypt’s plans weeks earlier but withheld that information, allowing Egypt to launch a surprise attack.

A Public Debate

Following the article’s publication, a public debate erupted between Bergman and Robovitz on one side and Professor Uri Bar-Joseph on the other, over Marwan’s true motives. Whether he was a double agent or a loyal Israeli operative, all agree he played a key role in the intelligence drama preceding the Yom Kippur War.

Bergman and Robovitz’s stance is that Marwan was a double agent—according to them, the intelligence he provided to Mossad was designed to mislead. Acting on behalf of Egypt, he reinforced Israeli intelligence’s belief that war was not imminent, helping enable the October 1973 surprise attack. Much circumstantial evidence supports this—they cite patterns where Marwan gave accurate information on minor issues but lied about the timing and intent of war. They also argue that the Israeli intelligence establishment ignored warning signs—largely because it was convenient to believe Marwan was the “most reliable source.” This overreliance made him the “king of agents,” while fostering institutional blindness. Their claim is institutional, not personal—the responsibility lies not only with Mossad operatives but also with an organizational culture that closes ranks even after the truth emerges.

Uri Bar-Joseph’s stance is that Marwan was a reliable Israeli agent. As he maintains in his book and other writings, Marwan provided crucial intelligence that enhanced Israel’s security and clarified Egyptian intentions. There is no conclusive evidence that he served Egypt, says Bar-Joseph; all claims that he was a ‘double’ are circumstantial and fail to prove intent to deceive. He posits that the 1973 surprise attack stemmed from human and interpretive error, not deliberate deception. The problem lay not with Marwan but with how intelligence officers interpreted his information. Bergman and Robovitz take a conspiratorial stance—according to Bar-Joseph, they rely on unsubstantiated hypotheses and craft a narrative that unjustly undermines public confidence in Israeli intelligence.

Responses to the Latest Findings

The two journalists argue that, although they are only now formally asserting that Marwan was an Egyptian double agent, such suspicions are not new. They point out that for years, some within Mossad had doubts about Marwan, but their concerns were dismissed.

In response to the new article, Professor Uri Bar-Joseph emphasized the complexity of the operational and intelligence context, arguing that failures like those of October 1973 stemmed from information limitations and circumstances, not from a flawed organizational culture. He also expressed concern over public criticism, cautioning that broad attacks on Israel’s security establishment could erode public trust and lead to a “dangerous delegitimization” of Israel’s defense institutions. Instead, he expressed preference for internal critique, claiming that lessons should be learned within professional frameworks, not through the media or public discourse.

The Mossad’s official response to the new allegations is that ‘the Angel’ was “a reliable source whose contribution at the moment of truth was expressed most professionally. The problem was not with the source of his reports, but with the decisions taken afterward. In this case, reliable and accurate information was given to decision-makers, who chose to wait. The rest is history.”

Fifty years after the Yom Kippur War, during a special ceremony at Mossad headquarters, Mossad Director David Barnea referred to Marwan as a “fantastic agent.” Barnea added, “We had excellent [human intelligence, or] HUMINT sources, and the most significant and senior of them all was ‘the Angel.’” He explicitly dismissed claims made over the years that “the Angel” was a double agent. According to Barnea, the matter was thoroughly investigated by both the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Mossad, and they all reached the same conclusion: “The Angel was a strategic agent.”

► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 13 October 2025 | Permalink

* Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).