Analysis: Israeli domestic intelligence agency in crisis as deputy director steps down

David ZiniIN THE CONCLUDING WEEKS of 2025, the Israel Intelligence Agency (ISA), which serves as its primary internal security and counterintelligence service, experienced two rapturous events that shook the organization to its very foundations. One was the appointment of Major General (retired) David Zini as the organization’s head. The other was the sudden retirement of the its deputy, known as ‘S’ (the first letter of his first name), who had been appointed to that position just two months earlier.

Following the ISA’s failure to warn of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, it was expected that the director’s position would go to someone with extensive intelligence experience to make the necessary changes in the agency. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu preferred personal loyalty over professionalism, as reflected in his personal decision to appoint General Zini as head of the ISA. General Zini’s appointment as head of the ISA drew public criticism for his lack of professional qualifications and his extreme right-wing political views. Several petitions were filed with the Supreme Court of Israel, all of which were rejected. It was also revealed that Zini’s son was a member of an extreme right-wing group that the ISA monitored closely.

The deputy head of the ISA, who resigned late last year, had close to 30 years of experience. He cut his teen in the ISA’s Arab Sector, where he worked in counterterrorism, prior to advancing to senior management positions. He was also involved in non-Arab Sector activities, mainly in counterespionage, and served as head of the ISA’s Research Division and as the organization’s chief of staff. Prior to being appointed as acting head of the ISA (following the resignation of Ronen Bar, who was forced to step down) he was expected to introduce General Zini to the role and brief him on the ISA and intelligence work. But that will no longer happen.

It turned out that serious professional differences of opinion emerged between ‘S’ and the new head of the agency. The root of these differences is to be found in several decisions that General Zini made—reportedly without examining the relevant material and without relying on staff input from within the ISA. One of those decisions was to introduce the ISA to handle crime in the Arab Sector within Israel—and not in the West Bank, where the police are unable to deal with it. There has always been a clear separation between ISA activity in the Arab Sector, which is mainly about thwarting terrorism and subversion, and the thwarting of criminal activity—the latter being the responsibility of the police. Although there was some cooperation, each organization’s boundaries were clear. The possibility of the ISA providing intelligence assistance to counter criminal activity has been raised in the past. Still, the ISA has consistently opposed it because of concerns that it would divert it from its main area of responsibility, which is national security. Additionally, the ISA leadership is concerned that, by involving itself in counter-crime operations the agency would be forced to reveal special clandestine tools originally developed to thwart terrorist organizations.

General Zini also challenged the ISA’s opposition to imposing the death penalty on perpetrators of terrorism—an issue that has been examined repeatedly in the past. The ISA has held a clear policy that imposing the death penalty on the perpetrators of terrorism would not prevent terrorist acts and could even increase terrorism. The rationale behind this view is that, to prevent the execution of perpetrators of terrorism, their comrades might be tempted to kidnap Jewish Israelis for bargaining purposes. This has also been the official position of the Israeli security establishment and the police. A new bill on this issue originated from extreme right-wing elements within the Netanyahu government. The change in position is directly attributed to General Zini, who apparently implemented it without any input from ISA personnel.

It should be noted that, since Zini took office, Jewish violent extremist activity in the West Bank has increased dramatically. At the same time, counter-terrorism operations, which are customarily led by ISA intelligence, have decreased significantly. In practice, complete chaos has been occurring in the West Bank, with Jewish settlers carrying out an average of about 10 violent incidents a day without any actual counter-terrorist operations taking place.

As Israel prepares for the 2026 elections, concerns are mounting that the Israeli government, which is actively pursuing non-democratic legislation, will try to disrupt the normal course of the elections and seek to use the ISA to covertly gather information on opposition individuals and groups. It has been revealed that Prime Minister Netanyahu tried to do this in the past but was firmly rebuffed by the prior ISA chief. There is concern that Netanyahu, to whom the ISA reports directly, will try to do this again with the new ISA head, who is personally indebted to him for his appointment.

Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 11 January 2026 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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3 Responses to Analysis: Israeli domestic intelligence agency in crisis as deputy director steps down

  1. Jimmy Gilbert's avatar Jimmy Gilbert says:

    “But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu preferred personal loyalty over professionalism, as reflected in his personal decision to appoint General Zini as head of the ISA.” That is what we call, a bias statement. Avner Barnea is known for this dislike of Netanyahu, no secret there. Israel took a hard left about 10, 20 years ago, and during that time they were able to change some laws, that Netanyahu attempted to recall, or fix. Created a mess, being the left seem to think its OK to disrupt, then to win in the polls.

    Because of Oct. 7th, Netanyahu has had some success, but not enough. He has had a target on his back from way back, and the people, most, have seen through the left lies, and the reason Netanyahu is where he is, is because of a lot of that. Regardless of who he picked, it will not matter… Remember, the ones who have left, were sitting there on that very day, Oct. 7th…

    Now, being that there are those still wanting to arm chair quarterback Netanyahu, how about after Oct 7th, to today! Bashar al-Assad is gone, Iran is on fire, and Hamas is nearly gone… Even Lebanon is beginning to act like a free society once again… Seems what ever the case, the situation is much better for not just Israel’s future, but the world…

  2. There is argument that after ISA’s existing leadership (including “S”) failed to anticipate October 7, 2023 there was a need for an out of ISA Director (a “new broom”) to be appointed.

    Israel has such a small pool of leaders, almost all with military connections and Netanyahu has been in power (on an off) for so long, that it almost guaranteed former soldier Netanyahu will have personal links with everyone Brigadier on up.

    Such is the politically charged nature of security and intelligence functions the appointment of politicians and defence officials to head security and intelligence agencies is not unusual.

  3. Unknown's avatar Anonymous says:

    DoD-CUI /

    Salut Pete,

    Dans un environnement stratégique de plus en plus fragmenté, une gouvernance audacieuse et anticipative devient essentielle. Les services de sécurité et de renseignement n’intègrent pas seulement des valeurs : ils développent surtout une capacité de prévoyance supérieure, fondée sur l’analyse, l’anticipation et la coopération inter-agences.

    Comparativement à d’autres modèles, les services de renseignement — notamment américains et britanniques — ont su engager la société et le politique pour adapter les cadres réglementaires, afin de garantir que l’innovation demeure sûre, contrôlée et bénéfique pour la sécurité collective. Cette approche inclusive permet de concilier innovation technologique, sécurité nationale et intérêt général, au bénéfice du long terme.

    DoD-CUI /

    Israël constitue, à cet égard, un cas d’étude singulier. Le pays dispose d’un vivier de dirigeants restreint, où une large majorité entretient des connexions militaires et sécuritaires directes. Le fait que Benjamin Netanyahu ait exercé le pouvoir de manière intermittente sur une longue période garantit presque mécaniquement l’existence de liens personnels et professionnels étroits avec les échelons supérieurs des forces armées et des services — Shin Bet, Mossad, et structures associées — dans un contexte marqué par la diversité des nationalités et des profils opérationnels.

    Compte tenu de la nature politiquement sensible des fonctions de sécurité et de renseignement, la nomination de responsables politiques ou de figures issues de la défense à la tête des agences n’est ni exceptionnelle ni illégitime. En Israël, cette articulation entre politique et renseignement relève presque d’un réflexe structurel, que l’on pourrait qualifier d’élément constitutif de l’« ADN » sécuritaire national.

    C’est précisément pour cette raison que les nominations soutenues par des interfaces du renseignement y sont assumées et stabilisées. Une réflexion similaire pourrait utilement être menée en Europe, notamment en Belgique et en France, même si cette dynamique y demeure plus prudente, voire timide.

    CUI /

    Il convient toutefois de reconnaître que la France a engagé des efforts notables en ce sens. Sous la présidence d’Emmanuel Macron, le renseignement français a été identifié comme l’un des piliers structurants de l’action présidentielle, avec une amélioration tangible des conditions opérationnelles, qu’elles soient traitées ou sous-traitées. Ces avancées restent néanmoins perfectibles, notamment en matière d’intégration stratégique avec le politique.

    Dans la même logique, des évolutions structurelles devraient permettre d’intégrer plus sereinement les doubles casquettes politique–sécurité, plutôt que de confier des responsabilités sensibles à des profils dépourvus de compétences réelles dans les domaines concernés. Dans certains cas, il en va directement de la sécurité intérieure ou de la sécurité nationale.

    CUI /

    Qu’en penses-tu, Pete ?
    Comment perçois-tu aujourd’hui la trajectoire de la Belgique et de la France dans ce domaine, au regard des enjeux actuels ? Excellent jeudi Pete, Pascal lembree Cui

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