Analysis: Israeli domestic intelligence agency in crisis as deputy director steps down

IN THE CONCLUDING WEEKS of 2025, the Israel Intelligence Agency (ISA), which serves as its primary internal security and counterintelligence service, experienced two rapturous events that shook the organization to its very foundations. One was the appointment of Major General (retired) David Zini as the organization’s head. The other was the sudden retirement of the its deputy, known as ‘S’ (the first letter of his first name), who had been appointed to that position just two months earlier.

Following the ISA’s failure to warn of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, it was expected that the director’s position would go to someone with extensive intelligence experience to make the necessary changes in the agency. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu preferred personal loyalty over professionalism, as reflected in his personal decision to appoint General Zini as head of the ISA. General Zini’s appointment as head of the ISA drew public criticism for his lack of professional qualifications and his extreme right-wing political views. Several petitions were filed with the Supreme Court of Israel, all of which were rejected. It was also revealed that Zini’s son was a member of an extreme right-wing group that the ISA monitored closely.

The deputy head of the ISA, who resigned late last year, had close to 30 years of experience. He cut his teen in the ISA’s Arab Sector, where he worked in counterterrorism, prior to advancing to senior management positions. He was also involved in non-Arab Sector activities, mainly in counterespionage, and served as head of the ISA’s Research Division and as the organization’s chief of staff. Prior to being appointed as acting head of the ISA (following the resignation of Ronen Bar, who was forced to step down) he was expected to introduce General Zini to the role and brief him on the ISA and intelligence work. But that will no longer happen.

It turned out that serious professional differences of opinion emerged between ‘S’ and the new head of the agency. The root of these differences is to be found in several decisions that General Zini made—reportedly without examining the relevant material and without relying on staff input from within the ISA. One of those decisions was to introduce the ISA to handle crime in the Arab Sector within Israel—and not in the West Bank, where the police are unable to deal with it. There has always been a clear separation between ISA activity in the Arab Sector, which is mainly about thwarting terrorism and subversion, and the thwarting of criminal activity—the latter being the responsibility of the police. Although there was some cooperation, each organization’s boundaries were clear. The possibility of the ISA providing intelligence assistance to counter criminal activity has been raised in the past. Still, the ISA has consistently opposed it because of concerns that it would divert it from its main area of responsibility, which is national security. Additionally, the ISA leadership is concerned that, by involving itself in counter-crime operations the agency would be forced to reveal special clandestine tools originally developed to thwart terrorist organizations.

General Zini also challenged the ISA’s opposition to imposing the death penalty on perpetrators of terrorism—an issue that has been examined repeatedly in the past. The ISA has held a clear policy that imposing the death penalty on the perpetrators of terrorism would not prevent terrorist acts and could even increase terrorism. The rationale behind this view is that, to prevent the execution of perpetrators of terrorism, their comrades might be tempted to kidnap Jewish Israelis for bargaining purposes. This has also been the official position of the Israeli security establishment and the police. A new bill on this issue originated from extreme right-wing elements within the Netanyahu government. The change in position is directly attributed to General Zini, who apparently implemented it without any input from ISA personnel.

It should be noted that, since Zini took office, Jewish violent extremist activity in the West Bank has increased dramatically. At the same time, counter-terrorism operations, which are customarily led by ISA intelligence, have decreased significantly. In practice, complete chaos has been occurring in the West Bank, with Jewish settlers carrying out an average of about 10 violent incidents a day without any actual counter-terrorist operations taking place.

As Israel prepares for the 2026 elections, concerns are mounting that the Israeli government, which is actively pursuing non-democratic legislation, will try to disrupt the normal course of the elections and seek to use the ISA to covertly gather information on opposition individuals and groups. It has been revealed that President Netanyahu tried to do this in the past but was firmly rebuffed by the prior ISA chief. There is concern that Netanyahu, to whom the ISA reports directly, will try to do this again with the new ISA head, who is personally indebted to him for his appointment.

► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 11 January 2026 | Permalink

* Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).