Analysis: Israel underestimated Hamas while overestimating its own capabilities
January 10, 2024 10 Comments
THE OCTOBER 7 ATTACK on Israel was a total surprise. There was no warning. There were very few signs of a possible attack. Israeli intelligence evaluated these signs as elements of a routine military exercise by Hamas, and even assessed them as parts of an imaginary scenario. It therefore gave no warning to those Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units that were stationed on the border with Gaza. Meanwhile, what we know about the intelligence failure of October 7 will likely pale before what the commission of inquiry will reveal once it is established. That was precisely what happened in the case of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which made significant revelations while investigating the intelligence failings of the IDF in the run up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
In the eyes of the Israeli generation of the Yom Kippur War, the possibility of such a failure happening again was unthinkable. Yet there is a significant difference between the events of 1973 and the events of last October 7. In 1973 the intelligence failed, but the IDF reacted quickly and acted efficiently. This 
time, in the first two days of the conflict the IDF was confused and acted without direction, in the apparent absence of relevant action plans for what to do in the event of a massive invasion. The IDF was clearly not ready for such a scenario.
Recently, another important piece of information about the intelligence failure of October 7 was revealed. It was reported that, two months before the surprise attack by Hamas, information was received from an agent handled by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) in Gaza, with a “very high” reliability level. The agent allegedly reported that Hamas was planning “a major move in the week after Yom Kippur”. Yet that warning was not marked as significant; the assumption was that, if the warning materialized, it would be corroborated with additional intelligence. It was thus kept from higher levels of command and from Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI). The ISA did not deny the report, saying instead in a statement: “Focusing on one specific piece of news or another does not reflect the intelligence picture at the time”.
Given the high number of casualties and the horrendous destruction that resulted from the October 7 attack, many Israelis, including some in the security establishment, feel that it is far too long to wait until a commission of inquiry is established and publishes its conclusions. It will likely take at least two years 
for those conclusions to become public. What is to be done in the meantime? There is public pressure to launch the inquiry soon.
Recently the State Comptroller of Israel, Matanyahu Engelman, announced that he has begun to investigate the intelligence failure. This is an appropriate move. However, with all due respect to the state comptroller’s inquiries, we know from previous experience that his findings have no teeth. For instance, in the context of Hamas, the state comptroller’s review of Operation TZUK EITAN (the 2014 Gaza War) was published in early 2017. It revealed serious instances of misconduct in the intelligence community dating several years prior to the operation. Yet this severe criticism passed below the public’s radar and was practically ignored, while no actions were taken against IDF and ISA security personnel that were shown to have acted irresponsibly.
I would like to point to a number of stronger factors that led to the tragic complacency of October 7, drawn from the field of psychology. It relates to how a country (mainly through its intelligence analysts) perceives its enemies and how this affects the evaluations of said enemies. We know that there was a conception on the Israeli side that Hamas had no interest in attacking Israel at this stage. It seems that the State of Israel underestimated Hamas and its leader, Yahya Sinwar, based on the available evidence of Hamas and Sinwar.
When one perceives an enemy like Hamas simply as a ‘terrorist’ and refers to its forces as ‘nochva terrorists’, the inference is that the enemy is a low-level actor, acts sporadically and is unable to act in an organized fashion. It follows that the threat posed by this enemy is low-level and can be easily dealt with. If we add to the equation one’s self-perception, we have Israel, which perceives itself as a highly advanced technological power with the best available intelligence and an excellent army. It follows that, due to the overestimation of Israel’s own military power, its intelligence analysts believed there was no possibility that a ‘terrorist’ organization would succeed in surprising its defenses.
At that point it is difficult to imagine that an enemy such as Hamas —as one perceives it, and not as it really is— could carry out an attack of any significant magnitude. However, if one perceives the military wing of Hamas as a sophisticated commando organization that regularly trains for an attack on Israel, and possesses elaborate capabilities for strategic deception, the concluding inference may be completely different. That is perhaps why Israel ignored the warnings 
before it, until it was too late.
The Israeli government expected that its security shield, namely its intelligence community, would provide a timely warning. Even if it did not, the threat from Hamas was rendered insignificant by Israel’s own strength, which was a clear overestimation of its military capabilities. In practice, underestimating one’s enemy combined with overestimating one’s own strength, will almost inevitably lead one to fall victim to a successful strategic surprise. In 1973, Israel misperceived the strength of the Egyptian army, which it had deemed backward since 1967. This perception contrasted with its self-image as an invincible force, and had a predictable outcome. In situations where cognitive biases prevail over rational assessments, the advantage often shifts to the attacker, making it challenging to foresee and prevent surprises, as was the case on October 7.
► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 10 January 2024 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
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A week before Oct. 7 there was an incursion of Israeli’s into Al Aqsa, accompanied by the military. When Ariel Sharon did this in 2000 it kicked of an Intifada. When I saw this latest incursion I knew possibly another Intifada was coming, Israel had to know this as well. Additionally Egypt warned Israel of a possible attack coming as well. So when you say there was no warning of Oct. 7, that is incorrect.
This is what we used to call a “no shitter”. All very obvious.
Thanks. Regarding the warning from Egypt, the Prime Minster publicly said it is not true. I’m sure it will be checked by the Inquiry Commision in the future. Regarding Al Aksa – I have never heard about it. Avner Barnea
How Hamas is perceived by Israel’s intelligence community is indeed part of the problem. The term “terrorist” has highly political connotations, both for public consumption and to garner US support as part of a continued “War on Terror”.
Even before October 7, Hamas was well known as an organization able to launch 100s if not 1,000s of missiles per day. This requires a large military organization with complex logistics.
In saying that military organizations often serve political purposes. Hamas wants to paint itself as the leader of Palestinians, even of Palestinians in the West Bank (currently presided over by the discredited Palestinian Authority).
In launching October 7 Hamas expected the type of severe Israeli reaction Gaza is now receiving. It is as if leadership of that struggle justifies martyrdom with Hamas prepared to martyr the Palestinians of Gaza.
I’m trying to understand what exactly you mean. I propose you will refer to what I have written. I do not like to react to Anonymous. What do you have to hide?
Hello,
Pour réondre a votre information ; En source ouverte, celle-ci relève du cadre Proches de la direction de l’aile militaire du Hamas, qui ont révélé de nouvelles informations sur l’attaque de l’opération al-Aqsa Flood le 7 octobre 2023.
Le 7 octobre, marquant la première utilisation connue de cette tactique.
Les membres du Hamas ont piloté des parapentes à deux et à un seul occupant pour insérer des chasseurs et attaquer l’appareil de sécurité israélien dans le cadre de l’attaque plus large du groupe le long de la région frontalière.
Des vidéos postées en ligne ont montré l’utilisation de plusieurs parapentes motorisés dans l’attaque, ce qui n’était pas seulement une première pour le Hamas et le mouvement palestinien au sens large, mais aussi la première utilisation militaire connue de tels avions dans le monde.
Les parapentes biplaces étaient d’une configuration de tricycle assis, l’occupant arrière pilotant l’avion et le passager avant armé positionné pour débarquer rapidement et prendre d’assaut la zone d’atterrissage. Les parapentes monoplaces étaient du type où le moteur et l’hélice sont montés directement sur le dos du pilote.
Bien que lents et bruyants, ces parapentes avaient une distance relativement courte à parcourir et n’auraient donc pas été exposés aux défenses frontalières israéliennes assez longtemps pour que des contre-mesures efficaces puissent être utilisées je pense, de plus, comme il s’agissait de la première opération de ce type impliquant des parapentes, il est probable que le personnel frontalier israélien n’aurait pas apprécié la nature de leur utilisation à temps pour intervenir ? D’où la question fermer entre officier-sous-traitant, qui pourquoi le renseignement israélien at-il agit en fil conducteur de l’attaque menant à l’opération du Hamas !! De plus, d’après des vidéos en ligne, il est apparu qu’au moins certains des parapentistes ont traversé la frontière sous le couvert de barrages de roquettes tirés sur Israël ? Et donc nous revenons encore une fois sur la communication interne du renseignement israélien.
Hier, Le centre de la bande de Gaza : Les forces ont opéré dans la zone du camp de réfugiés d’al-Maghazi, où elles ont découvert plus de 15 puits de tunnels souterrains.
Lors d’un raid sur plusieurs bâtiments militaires de la région, des lance-roquettes, des missiles, des drones et des explosifs ont été trouvés.
Un tour de fabrication de roquettes situé dans la zone a également été détruit information requise du (Porte-parole de Tsahal, 10 janvier 2024) Le Hamas, a encore utilisé des habitations civiles pour créer leur base de tir…
Aujourd’hui, nos résultats réduisent le Hamas à 5 passé d’une moyenne de 75 par jour début décembre à 14 par jour à la fin du mois….
Nous devons systématiquement ciblé la chaîne de production d’armes organisée que le Hamas a développée au cours des quinze dernières années et au cours de laquelle il a bénéficié d’un refuge sûr dans la bande de Gaza, la chaine de distribution est connue de nos services de renseignements de la Cia, s’appuyant aussi sur le co-financement au Hamas.
J’accorde mon soutien aux efforts israéliens pour détruire le système de tunnels du Hamas, les bases de tir au départ des populations civiles, ou le métro de Gaza comme l’appel l’armée israélienne, nous devons encore conduire la perte du complexe militaro-industriel restant aussi importante afin de de porter un coup de grâce au groupe du Hamas, qui a juré de mener d’autres attaques similaires à celles lancées le 7 octobre jusqu’à ce qu’Israël soit détruit..
Bonne soirée.
Pascal lembree, officier-sous-traitant
Anonymous’ main meaning Avner is Hamas, in deciding to launch October 7, was and is prepared to martyr Gaza Palestinian civilians in pursuit of Hamas’ political objective of becoming the supreme leader of all Palestinians in the region.
Hey Avner I wrote just the first post. But I am wondering a) why you are here telling us “you don’t understand or heard things” b) people care about information not somebody saying “this is not true”. Bibi is up on charges for corruption, this involves lying, so not taking his word for anything, sorry you got a criminal PM. The Gaza fence has sensors, Israel has satellites, Mossad is said to have sources in Gaza and be a good intel org. Your own citizens called the military on Oct. 7 and took many hours to respond, what is up? Do you have a good military, surveillance, intel agency or? Cars of people at the rave that got killed, all burnt up. Like a hellfire missile strike. Did Hamas bring cans of gas and poor them on dozens of cars to burn people or? Seems time consuming. My country tried 3 wars, Vietnam, Afghan, Iraq against lightly armed insurgents. We won militarily but lost the public relations battle. Seems your country is going this route. Hans Stead
re: Hans Stead AKA: Anonymous
“sorry you got a criminal PM” he was cleared, and the political judicial system seems to have re-upped. One of the reasons it even happen in the first place, the laws were changed to allow the judges more power than originally envisioned. When Bibi attempt to reverse the laws back, the protests began, and here we are with such a mess. Seem the liberals are taking notes from the DNC or versa-versa… For whatever the case, the political system is broken in Israel. History is full of good examples… There is clearly a power vacuum with in Israel & US, and only time, will fix it. Arm-Chairing isn’t going to help in the immediate aftermath, just more division the once without power seem all to happy to give…
No matter who’s to blame, Israel will do as needs to be done. History is ready for another good lesson, and Israel has been a very good history teacher…
Remember when British propaganda rag Guardian & BBC continuously referred to Gaza, prior to the Oct 7th Abomination war, as an “open-air prison”. Now during the siege of Rafah these worthless rags depict the contrast between Gaza before and after Oct 7th. Only problem, the pictures of Gaza prior to the current war hardly depict an open-air prison!!! Or to quote the kapo Mondoweiss: “16 year siege and blockade of Gaza”.
This modern day ”Tokyo Rose” rag refers to post Oct 7th, according to what the Arab contributor to this bloody rag wrote on November 18th, 2023: Rashid Khalidi – “” It is apparent that the Israeli leadership has no clear political objective in waging this war, beyond revenge for the civilian casualty toll and the humiliating military defeat of October 7, which is presented as restoring ‘deterrence’.”” This same opinion piece refers to the Jewish state as: “a settler colonial (as well as a national) project.” This psycho mentality goes hand in glove with “From the River to the Sea Balestine will be free”.
This Jew-hating Mondoweiss rag sports the political-porn which depicts Hamas terrorism to “Irish, Algerian, Vietnamese, and South African liberation movements”. Less than a month following the Oct 7th abomination by Hamas, the Mondoweiss kapo rag referred to the war as a “genocide” war-crime. Before the month of October ended, New York CUNY ‘Not in our Name’ Jews protested for a ‘cease-fire’. 11 days after the attack, Mondoweiss propaganda decried a famine in Gaza!
Only a week after Oct 7th, this same rag described the Israel response as: “A war of extermination”, even before Israel began its ground invasion! Its slander referred to Gaza, described as a “Ghetto”. It already condemns Israel for “ethnic cleansing” & “genocide”. Four days after the Oct 7th abomination, Mondoweiss described Gaza as a “Human Catastrophe”.
Only 3 days after the slaughter carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Rev Graylan Scott Hagler puked his condemnation for this massacre preaching from his moral soap box: “The blame rests with organizations and Zionist groups that have manipulated tax-exempt laws to fund ethnic cleansing initiatives.
Mahmood Mamdani, an Indian-born Ugandan academic, author, and political commentator. In 1996 he published: Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism. Mamdani contributes to the Mondoweiss propaganda rag. Mamdani embraces the Arab propaganda rhetoric which refers to Israel as a Crusader State. He states: “Israeli settlement organizations…use that funding to continue the history of expulsion and dispossession of Palestinians in the occupied territories…”
This kapo bloody rag abhors the current Israeli government. It slanders Bibi as readily as does post Israeli Independence Arab leaders despised Ben Gurion. But these “Liberal American Jews” likewise express their contempt for the pre-Oct 7th anti-government protestors as equally guilty for forcing Hamas to commit the Oct 7th atrocities.
Rev. Graylan Hagler writes: “Also, every Israeli who stood out and marched against Netanyahu and his ultra-racist right-wing coalition’s initiatives to weaken the judiciary in Israel and didn’t connect it to Israel’s war on Palestinians is to blame. They marched, rallied, and spoke out against Netanyahu’s move towards fascist authoritarianism in relationship to Israeli civil society but did not equate the ongoing occupation of Palestinian lands with fascist authoritarianism. They are to blame for failing to open the discussion and protest wide enough to include and demand a resolution for Palestinian grievances.”
A Mondoweiss Head Line of Oct 9th: “Support BDS to stop Israeli war crimes in Gaza”.