Dutch spy services have restricted intelligence-sharing with the United States: report
October 20, 2025 15 Comments
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE Netherlands have restricted intelligence-sharing with their United States counterparts due to political developments in Washington, according to two leading Dutch intelligence officials. This development—which may typify Europe’s current approach to transatlantic intelligence-sharing—was confirmed last week by the heads of the Netherlands’ two largest intelligence agencies in a joint interview with De Volkskrant newspaper.
The joint interview was given to De Volkskrant by Erik Akerboom, director of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), and Peter Reesink , director of the General Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)—AIVD’s civilian military counterpart.
Both men stressed that inter-agency relations between Dutch and American intelligence organizations remain “excellent”. However, they added that the Netherlands has grown more selective about what it chooses to share with American intelligence agencies—particularly the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. “That we sometimes don’t share things anymore, that’s true,” Reesink said, referring to sharing information with American intelligence agencies. Akerboom added: “sometimes you have to think case by case.” He went on to say: “We can’t say what we will or won’t share. But we can say that we are more critical.”
According to the two senior officials, Dutch spies have been intensifying intelligence cooperation and sharing with their European counterparts. This is particularly applicable to a collection of central and northern European intelligence services from countries like Scandinavia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland, according to De Volkskrant.
► Author: Ian Allen | Date: 20 October 2025 | Permalink
intelNews.org 
Note: The AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) handles domestic and non-military threats, while the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service) focuses on international and military threats.
The AIVD operates under the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, whereas the MIVD is under the Ministry of Defence.
As if the USA needs them…
ANd exactly what do they have to share? An occasional bit of HUMINT? After being trained by UK SOE in WWII they have really not done much
Hi Ian
It is easy to confuse the two Dutch intelligence and security agencies:
The civilian agency is the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) [1]
and
The military agency is the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD). Most indicative is its name in Dutch: Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst [2]
Any foreign agency (including the US’s Five Eye allies) in liaison with the CIA would be sensitive to Trump’s habit of publicizing or giving to the wrong people what would normally be US Secrets, US Top Secrets and even ally’s secrets for political purposes.
For example during Trump’s first presidency see IntelNews article “Israel revises intel-sharing rules with US, after alleged disclosure to Russians” of May 25, 2017 at https://intelnews.org/2017/05/25/01-2113/ which begins:
“Authorities in Israel have revised their intelligence-sharing protocols with the American government after it became known that United States President Donald Trump inadvertently exposed Israeli secrets to Russia. The alleged exposure of Israeli secrets came earlier this month, during a meeting between Mr. Trump and a delegation of Russian government officials, which included Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Sergey Kislyak, Moscow’s Ambassador to Washington.”
Trump revealed enough for the following to be raised in IntelNews article “Is Trump signaling possible CIA covert operations against [Mexican] drug cartels?” of January 21, 2025 at https://intelnews.org/2025/01/21/01-3382/ . where Mexico is mentioned repeatedly.
Three days ago “President Donald Trump acknowledged authorizing covert CIA operations in [Venezuela].” see CNN article of October 18, 2025 at https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/17/politics/cia-venezuela-trump-castro-noriega-analysis This would normally be a US Eyes Only Top Secret matter.
About the Dutch matter? I suspect that in general NATO members do not trust Trump to withhold NATO secrets from Russia, particularly during Trump’s personal weekly phone calls to Putin.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Intelligence_and_Security_Service
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_Military_Intelligence_and_Security_Service
Translation: they don’t want their intelligence shared with the Russians.
Uh huh. I’m sure this public pronouncement has nothing to do with rising tensions with Venezuela & fears Dutch territory could face blowback. Nope, its just their rhetorical differences with Trump behind this. Give me a break….
Perhaps the Duch worry about their students in the US now, they don’t want their records of someone being seen at some political event or another, being read by current american record readers.
En tant qu’officier sous traitnt Dod-CUI/ Je fournis ci-dessous une analyse approfondie, structurée et opérationnelle (niveau officier, contexte inter-service / DoD-CUI) qui tient compte de votre évaluation antérieure (Russie en Syrie / rôle d’Iran/Hezbollah / position d’Israël) et des informations récentes montrant que les services néerlandais limitent le partage avec les agences américaines/ J’inclus les implications stratégiques, les impacts pratiques sur le partage transatlantique, une liste d’indicateurs à surveiller et des mesures opérationnelles concrètes (politiques, techniques et liaison) que vous pouvez adapter pour un brief DoD-CUI.
Les chefs des services néerlandais (AIVD/MIVD) confirment une attitude plus sélective dans le partage d’informations avec les agences américaines (CIA/NSA) — décision motivée par des risques de politisation et de mauvaise utilisation. Cette évolution survient alors que la Russie reconsolide discrètement des leviers en Syrie (maintien de bases/points d’appui) via une approche pragmatique et des coopérations limitées avec l’Iran/acteurs régionaux. La combinaison réduit la fiabilité d’un « écosystème d’échange transatlantique » et augmente les risques d’aveuglement opérationnel si l’OTAN/US ne réagissent pas par des contre-mesures adaptées de ses dernières semaines/ Dans les affaires traitant de corruption pour certains marchés d’armes. CUI/
3) Implications stratégiques (moyen/long terme)
4) Impacts concrets sur le partage d’information DoD-CUI / inter-service
5) Risques opérationnels prioritaires (ordre de priorité)
6) Recommandations opérationnelles — politiques & process (niveau DoD-CUI / officier) A — Politique / diplomatie sécurisée
B — Processus & gouvernance technique
C — Technique / tradecraft
D — Liaison & opérationnel
7) Indicateurs/Watchlist (KPI) à suivre immédiatement (opérationnel — 30/90/180 j.)
8) Scénarios opérationnels et conséquences
9) Modèle de plan d’action immédiat (checklist exécutoire)
10) Contenu recommandé pour un brief DoD-CUI/ De Pascal lembree/ Officier sous-traitant.
Open source/ Dod-cui, Dans le passé, la NSA a intercepté de grandes quantités de données brutes, y compris des appels téléphoniques néerlandais. Akerboom a déclaré qu’il ne pouvait pas préciser ce qui est partagé ou non, « mais nous sommes plus critiques », bien qu’aucun des deux directeurs n’ait pu exclure que des données brutes contenant des informations sur les citoyens néerlandais parviennent toujours aux États-Unis.
Dans le même temps, la coopération au sein de l’Europe s’est intensifiée. Akerboom a déclaré qu’un groupe de premier plan des services de renseignement d’Europe du Nord – comprenant les Pays-Bas, la Grande-Bretagne, l’Allemagne, les services scandinaves, la France et la Pologne – échangeait désormais plus d’informations, y compris des données brutes, en raison de la guerre de la Russie en Ukraine.
https://www.ft.com/content/af8042f0-5de9-4509-bcb2-2d98d26a3d21
https://www.stimson.org/2025/russia-keeps-a-foothold-in-post-assad-syria/
CUI/ important/ Liban Cessez-le-feu : attention à ne pas faire confiance à la Russie pour contenir le Hezbollah. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2024/11/14/lebanon-ceasefire-talks-beware-of-trusting-russia-to-restrain-hezbollah/
CUI/ important La fenêtre pour contrer la Russie en Syrie se referme | L’Institut Washington
Dod-CUI/ Otan, Est ils en suivant le constat de corruption devenue un risque d’ingérence étrangère liant la vente d’arme ?
CUI/ Regarder sur ma page facebook- une open source conjointe aux réalités du renseignement/ Dod-Cui/
Here’s a good video commentary on the US’s European allies growing distrust of the Trump administration’s political use and abuse of ally’s intelligence. Uses that might benefit Russia.
It highlights the Netherland’s and others’ rejection of the US’s declining trustworthiness when it comes to intelligence sharing.
https://youtu.be/eLCV-MZtpKo?si=JsRw293YUN2zqjc4&t=2m13s
No great loss.
Here’s the latest on the Putin-Trump-Zelensky negotiations:
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/Iy4VWxfo2ik
It worries me as an European how incompitent the US president seems to be. China appears to be poised to become the next leader of Earth and while there are many things good about China one thing they are not is democratic. They seem to believe in top down governance and that is not good for the individualist. I just hope America get’s its act together and continues as the leader of the free world for at least the rest of my lifetime. It is the better or two devils.
I think it would be best is all armed conflict be taken into space. That’s where the real profit is to be found. In the astroid belt and beyond. It would be great if earth could become a natural reserve.
Anonymous October 27, 2025 at 14:39 I agree.
Translation: Intelligence Analysis (DoD-CUI)
As a Subcontracting Officer (DoD-CUI), I provide below an in-depth, structured, and operational analysis (Officer level, inter-service / DoD-CUI context) that takes into account your previous assessment (Russia in Syria / role of Iran/Hezbollah / Israel’s position) and recent information showing that Dutch services are limiting sharing with US agencies. I include strategic implications, practical impacts on transatlantic sharing, a watchlist of indicators, and concrete operational measures (policy, technical, and liaison) that you can adapt for a DoD-CUI brief.
Dutch service chiefs (AIVD/MIVD) confirm a more selective attitude in sharing information with US agencies (CIA/NSA)—a decision motivated by risks of politicization and misuse. This shift comes as Russia is discreetly consolidating leverage in Syria (maintaining bases/support points) via a pragmatic approach and limited cooperation with Iran/regional actors. This combination reduces the reliability of a “transatlantic exchange ecosystem” and increases the risk of operational blindness if NATO/US do not react with tailored countermeasures following recent weeks’ developments/ concerning corruption in certain arms deals. CUI/1) Selective Reduction in NL→US Sharing
Akerboom (AIVD) and Reesink (MIVD) have stated that certain information is no longer automatically shared with US agencies, and a “case-by-case” arbitration is now the rule. This does not signify a total rupture but an increase in the granularity and filter applied to the flows/ from the Dutch agency. Financial Times
Motivations: Fear of politicization of US services, legal/human-rights risks, change in leadership and directives in Washington, budget constraints, and political priorities. These motivations imply that the restriction is as much procedural as political/ potentially creating internal inter-service interference. CUI/2) Strategic Parallel
While allies are making the exchange more selective, Russia is maintaining/re-establishing a minimal but strategic presence in Syria (air/naval bases, Mediterranean access) and adjusting its posture towards opportunistic diplomacy to retain regional leverage. Stimson Center3) Strategic Implications (Medium/Long Term)
Fragmentation of Allied Intelligence—”Case-by-case” decisions increase the risk of blindness on critical issues (weapon transfers, Russian-Iranian logistics networks, cyber operations) because multi-source correlations are harder to establish.
Russian Window of Influence—If Russia preserves Tartus/Hmeimim (even in reduced mode) and restores political ties, it can project diplomatic/military influence at lower cost and limit Western maneuver space in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Domino Effect on European Cooperation—The Netherlands is partially refocusing on European partnerships; other states could follow, causing a realignment of transatlantic sharing (more intra-EU exchanges, less raw flow to the US).
Complication of Israel’s Operational Choices—Israel will continue to pragmatically manage its relationship with Russia (aerial deconfliction in Syria); but a more influential Russia + active Iran reduces Israel’s long-term latitude and increases the risk of regional escalation.
4) Concrete Impacts on DoD-CUI / Inter-Service Information Sharing
Less Direct Access to certain Dutch human/technical sensors on Russian/Iranian flows (e.g., deliveries, logistics networks, aerial support points).
Increased Authorization Delays (case-by-case review → bureaucratic processes) which reduce operational speed.
Risk of Intelligence Fragment Breakup: sensitive information temporarily held by a partner, preventing the necessary correlation for a pattern of life/indicator.
Constraint on CUI Exchange Agreements: labels, caveats, and “originator control” become essential and more numerous—to be integrated into MOU/ICP SOPs.
5) Priority Operational Risks (Order of Priority)
Blindness on weapon/munition movements from Iran / via Syria (impacts Israeli posture and maritime security). The Washington Institute
Politico-opportunistic use of shared information (Dutch fears → concern that data may be used for non-operational purposes).
Russian cyber / influence attacks exploiting allied disunity.
Loss of operational deconfliction in Syria leading to air or maritime incidents between Israeli, Russian, and Iranian forces.
6) Operational Recommendations — Policy & Process (DoD-CUI / Officer Level)A — Policy / Secured Diplomacy
Reactivate/Renegotiate Reinforced CUI Caveats: Propose an improved CUI framework to the NL (e.g., “shared-mission caveat”) that guarantees limited and legally framed operational use. Goal: Reduce the fear of “politicization.”
Create Alternative European Channels (EU-INT task forces) to share first via the EU, then towards the US when the legal/political framework allows—this addresses Europe’s desire for “self-sufficiency” in sharing.
B — Process & Technical Governance
Establish an Inter-Agency “Gatekeeper” (permanent AIVD/MIVD ↔ US liaison post) with audit powers and joint responsibility for the use of shared data (DoD-CUI marking + audit trail).
Standardization of CUI Metadata and addition of “purpose-limited, end-use attestation” markings to allow the provider (e.g., NL) to clearly indicate authorized usage.
Minimalist Flows: Adopt a “share the derivative, not raw source” principle—transmit derivative products (analyses, fused indicators) rather than raw HUMINT/SIGINT if the partner requests restraint.
C — Technical / Tradecraft
Technical Partitioning: Separate encrypted channels, limited-use keys, logging for traceability (useful for alleviating legal concerns).
Data-Provenance & Watermarking of shared items (allows tracking if data has been re-exploited outside of scope).
Periodic Audit Agreements (third-party compliance checks) to demonstrate the non-politicization of processing once the data is received.
D — Liaison & Operational
Strengthen European Liaisons: Hire/assign more EU/Benelux liaison officers within US-NATO fusion centers.
Joint Exercises Focused on Sharing: Monthly table-tops (Syria/Russia/Iran scenario simulations) to test “case-by-case” filters and evaluate the impact on decision tempo.
“Trusted Derivative Exchange” Policy: Formulation of a standard information product (one-page) that the NL more readily accepts to share (contains impacts, recommendations, FI, source caveats).
7) Indicators/Watchlist (KPI) to Monitor Immediately (Operational — 30/90/180 days)
Volume & Latency of NL→US Sharing: % of blocked items / average decision time for “case-by-case.”
Signs of Russian Reconsolidation in Syria: Logistics movements towards Tartus/Hmeimim; air rotations; bilateral contractual signings (bases, access agreements).
RU-ISR Politico-Diplomatic Exchanges (visits, calls, public mediations)—indicate Russia’s willingness to maintain a channel with Israel.
IRAN→SYR→LEBANON Activity (weapons transfer indicators): Maritime cargo, transferred ballistic missiles, presence of advisors.
Public Reports from NL (AIVD/MIVD) on caveats and sharing—any change in doctrine is a strong signal.
8) Operational Scenarios and Consequences
Scenario A — Continued NL Retreat towards Europe: Gradual decrease in direct flows to US → necessity for DoD to consolidate European collection networks and increase NATO-EU liaisons.
Scenario B — Short-Term Reconciliation (Legal Guarantees): Implementation of reinforced CUI agreements → partial re-establishment of valuable info flow but with heavier procedures.
Scenario C — Russia Exploits the Void: Strengthening of its presence in Syria + regional bilateral agreements → necessary politico-military deterrence actions to preserve Israel’s freedom of action and maritime security.
9) Immediate Action Plan Template (Executable Checklist)
Issue a DoD-CUI 1-page brief addressed to J2/combined HQ: Summary of the NL→US reduction + immediate risks. (Deliverable: 24–48 hrs).
Initiate bilateral contact via diplomatic channels to propose a “pilot CUI caveat” (3 months).
Implement KPI monitoring volume/latency of NL→US sharing (shared dashboard).
Reinforce the EU-fusion center liaison team (+1 senior Benelux liaison).
Deploy a fusion TTP exercise (Syria/Russia/Iran table-top) within 30 days to test leaks & filters.
Technical Package: Propose a CUI metadata template and an audit protocol to the NL partner to address their concerns about improper use.
10) Recommended Content for a DoD-CUI Brief / By Pascal Lembree / Subcontracting Officer
Open source/Dod-cui: In the past, the NSA intercepted large amounts of raw data, including Dutch phone calls. Akerboom stated that he could not specify what is or is not shared, “but we are more critical,” although neither director could rule out that raw data containing information about Dutch citizens still reaches the US.
At the same time, cooperation within Europe has intensified. Akerboom stated that a leading group of Northern European intelligence services—including the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, the Scandinavian services, France, and Poland—is now exchanging more information, including raw data, due to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
link removed, see commetn above
link removed, see commetn above
CUI/ Important/ Lebanon Ceasefire: Beware of trusting Russia to restrain Hezbollah. link removed, see commetn above
CUI/ Important: The window to counter Russia in Syria is closing. The Washington Institute
DoD-CUI/ NATO: Are they tracking the finding of corruption becoming a foreign interference risk linked to arms sales?
CUI: Check my Facebook page—a joint open source on intelligence realities / DoD-CUI/