Israeli expert warned of aviation security breach risk prior to Flydubai hijack attempt

FlydubaiAN ARTICLE PUBLISHED LAST summer in Mabat Malam, the journal of the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, identified “insider threats”, ranging from aircrew members to airport employees, as major dangers to civil aviation. The article, “Terrorist Attacks on Civil Aviation: A Threat That Must Not Be Ignored”, was authored by Danny Shenar, former Director of the Security, Emergency and Cyber Division at Israel’s Ministry of Transport. It was published in July 2026, ahead of the summer vacation season and the expected increase in the number of Israelis traveling abroad.

In his article, Shenar highlights a recognized vulnerability in aviation security: the insider threat. This refers to the danger that someone within the aviation system, with authorization and access to sensitive systems or restricted areas, could exploit authorized access to circumvent security measures. In light of this week’s serious incident on a Flydubai flight to Israel, Shenar’s warnings highlight the need for Israeli professionals responsible for civil aviation security to remain alert to vulnerabilities in the security system. The similarity between the incident and the scenario identified by Shenar does not necessarily mean that the event was a terrorist attack—something that has not yet been established. Rather, the similarity lies in the possibility that the risk may have originated within the system itself, from an individual on the aircraft’s crew with direct access to the cockpit and the aircraft’s systems.

Shenar’s article addresses what he calls “the reliability of personnel authorized to access restricted areas, the ‘Trojan horse'”. While an ordinary passenger undergoes security screening before boarding an aircraft, an airport employee or another person authorized to enter restricted areas may already be on the other side of the security perimeter. If such a person becomes hostile, they may exploit their authorized access to circumvent protective mechanisms. “The insider threat is a significant vulnerability”, Shenar wrote. “A single radical employee is enough to circumvent the entire security system and assist in introducing prohibited materials into restricted areas”.

Shenar provides several examples of this type of threat in his article. Among them, he refers to a security employee at Heathrow Airport who was suspected of assisting a terrorist plot in 2006; a British Airways employee convicted in 2011 of planning terrorist activity; and the 2016 attack on a Daallo Airlines aircraft, in which an explosive device was brought aboard a plane departing from Mogadishu, Somalia.

According to Shenar, the insider-threat problem does not end with the background check conducted before an employee is hired. He notes that people may change during their employment and that repeated vetting of employees faces legal, ethical, and practical limitations. He further argues that, in practice, no uniform standard defines the criteria, quality, and frequency of background checks for employees working in sterile areas of airports. In fact, the article focuses primarily on the potential for aviation terrorism at small and peripheral airports abroad, where, according to the author, technological and organizational gaps sometimes exist in comparison with major international airports.

In his article, Shenar emphasizes that he does not have concrete intelligence or other specific information indicating a particularly high risk to foreign civil aviation operating flights to Israel. Rather, his assessment constitutes a risk evaluation, based on—among other factors—the availability of explosives, the accumulated knowledge of terrorist organizations, and awareness of the limitations of existing screening methods.

At the conclusion of the article, Shenar calls on Israeli security authorities to actively assess security levels at foreign airports from which flights depart for Israel, identify security gaps, and demand that those gaps be corrected. His main takeaway is clear: treat the threat seriously and review security measures before flights depart. Shenar’s call was ignored.

► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 05 October 2026 | Permalink

* Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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