Russia using nontraditional means to gather intelligence, Finland warns
November 18, 2024 3 Comments
RUSSIA’S NEED TO GATHER intelligence from Scandinavian targets has increased considerably since Finland and Sweden joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), prompting Moscow to seek nontraditional means of collecting intelligence, according to Finland’s spy agency. A new report by the Finnish Broadcasting Company (Yle) relays a warning by the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) that Russian spies are increasingly operating in Scandinavia without relying on diplomatic protection.
Human intelligence (HUMINT) operations are typically carried out of diplomatic facilities by intelligence officers who enjoy various degrees of diplomatic immunity. Such protections are seen as crucial for the safety of intelligence personnel, who tend to engage in illegal activities while stationed abroad. However, the number of Russian intelligence officers who are based in diplomatic facilities in Finland and elsewhere in Scandinavia has “significantly decreased” in recent years, according to the Yle report.
The reason for the decline in numbers rests with the numerous expulsions of Russian diplomatic personnel —which include intelligence officers— that took place throughout Europe in the months following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Finland is one of dozens of European countries that have repeatedly denied Russia’s requests for the issuance of diplomatic visas. As a result, Russian embassies and consulates in Finland remain understaffed and mostly devoid of intelligence personnel.
In response to this new reality, the Kremlin has been experimenting with using nontraditional HUMINT collectors. The latter are not based in diplomatic facilities and are not protected by diplomatic immunity. Such nontraditional intelligence collectors operate as “journalists or researchers”, according to SUPO. At the same time, Russian intelligence agencies increasingly target for recruitment Finns who life in Russia, or try to recruit them while they are traveling elsewhere in Europe.
Lastly, Russian intelligence agencies are systematically hiring criminals to carry out specific tasks on behalf of the Kremlin, in return for money. Such criminals include computer hackers, who are attracted by the Russian state. Indeed, the Russian government is systematically “providing favorable conditions” for computer hackers to operate out of Russian territory. They receive money and protection in return for letting the Russian state use them as a cover for cyber espionage, sabotage, and influence operations.
► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 18 November 2024 | Permalink
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An interesting article.
Russia’s tradition of using non-diplomatic intelligence officers, known as illegals or non-official cover (NOCs) [1] goes back centuries. Finland would have suffered a Russian illegal plague since the years Finland was allied to the Nazis [2].
With varying degrees of success probably every advanced country has experimented by rebadging “black hat” criminal hackers into “blue hat” state sanctioned hackers. Blue hats may include some NSA contractors, who differ from “white hat” hackers [3]. A persistent problem is blue hats returning, part-time, to their black hat ways, for cash on the side or for the sheer fun of it, until they get caught again.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cover_(intelligence_gathering)#Non-official_cover
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuation_War
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacker#Definitions
their is no such thing as “non traditional” collection. HUMINT w/o diplomatic cover is the oldest form of collection. Do you really think CCCP/RU has not been running agents and NOC officers way before NATO? NKVD, KGB and GRU et al have been ops world wide since…..
As has EVERY other nation.
“In response to this new reality, the Kremlin has been experimenting with using nontraditional HUMINT collectors.”
The 525th MI Group ran traditional and non-traditional agent networks throughout Vietnam and, in I Corps where the 571st MI Det of the 525th was the ONLY intelligence unit still active, were responsible for the only intel information for the first couple of weeks of the Easter Offensive of 1972. The problem with HUMINT was (and is) that no one believes the info unless it is/becomes verified. When you have the I Corps commander, General Abrams, his J-2, the US ambassador and others taking R&R out of country and the Sec Def headed out to play golf in Puerto Rico when the offensive began and they had the intel beforehand, it shows how convincing HUMINT was. (This from the book “Break in the Chain Intelligence Ignored”)