Canadian NATO intern arrested on suspicion of spying for third country
August 3, 2026 2 Comments
A CANADIAN WOMAN OF Chinese origin was arrested on Friday July 24 on suspicion of spying for a third-party country, whilst serving as an intern at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium.
Belgian authorities stated on July 25 that the woman “is suspected of spying on behalf of a third country and of being a member of a criminal organization”. Security services at SHAPE were reportedly the first to convey concerns to the Belgian Federal Prosecutor’s Office over the woman’s behavior—such as staying at NATO facilities after hours and asking questions of her colleagues. This prompted a raid of the suspect’s residence and workplace inside NATO headquarters, which resulted in an order for her to be held in a one-month pretrial custody.
No official report from Belgian or Canadian authorities has disclosed the third country or criminal organization mentioned in the press release. Moreover, whilst no official authority has disclosed the suspect’s identity, a CBC News investigation reportedly traced her background to the name of Biwei Zhang, a systems engineer with an economics background, who had previously been employed at the Canadian Space Agency and Statistics Canada. The suspect has reportedly used other aliases such as “Claire” and “Catina”.
At a systemic level, this case underscores reservations concerning Canadian national security and the processing of security clearances in Canada. Such lapses can potentially harm the security of Canadian allies; notably, the present suspect allegedly held previous positions at the World Trade Organization and the European Space Agency. This case also flags the role of internships at global security organizations such as NATO. One report described the intern position as an “Achilles’ heel”, as it provides direct insight into the institutions at the core of global security architecture.
► Author: Molly Jones | Date: 03 August 2026 | Permalink







Looks like intern status evades usual security checks. Curiously she has had a veritable career worth of positions across many sensitive Western positions for an “intern”.
It is surprising that even interns potentially have access to the secrets of their host organizations (that even aren’t formally paying employers).
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) would have been insane to presumably rely on vetting cooperation from PRC security. Requesting the PRC to investigate her (and her extended family’s?) background is a self defeating process. CSIS would certainly “communicate” to China’s MSS that the intern would make an ideal natural cover agent for the PRC.
There is only minimal official details about her “Chinese” origins. This opens the possibility that she laundered her origins through time to gain Taiwanese citizenship to make her more qualified to access sensitive Western positions.
Pete of Submarine (and Intelligence) Matters
Congratulations Molly Jones – for your first IntelNews article.
Cheers Pete