Ex-head of Israeli Military Intelligence discusses October 7 attack in leaked recordings

August 25, 2025 by 6 Comments

Aharon HalivaIN A SERIES OF leaked recordings, the former head of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate, Major General Aharon Haliva, has expressed strong views about Israel’s war in Gaza. General Haliva headed Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (known as Aman) on October 7, 2023, when Palestinian militants took Israel by surprise in a combined arms attack, killing over 1,200 and kidnapping 250. Since resigning a year ago, Haliva has not made any public statements.

It is unclear who Haliva was speaking to when he was recorded, or by whom he was recorded. Nor is it clear when or where the recordings occurred. They were leaked last week by Israeli television station Channel 12. There follows a summary of Haliva’s comments in the leaked recordings.

Personal Responsibility. Haliva admits that the disaster occurred during his watch; therefore, he bears ultimate responsibility. At the same time, he emphasizes that responsibility is systemic and broad—not only his, but also that of the entire Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Israel Security Agency (ISA), and the country’s senior political leadership. He states: “Anyone who voluntarily assumes a leadership position knows that his decisions will bring both great successes and great failures”.

Systemic and Cultural Failures. Haliva argues that the failure originates from a long-standing organizational culture within the Aman, rooted in arrogance, overconfidence, and the belief that “the enemy is deterred”, as well as the idea that Israel’s intelligence is all-powerful. This mindset led to operational stand-downs during Sabbaths, holidays, and in the month of August, reflecting overconfidence. He warns: “This was not a one-time accident, but something that requires dismantling and rebuilding the system”.

Responsibility of Other Bodies. Haliva points to the ISA as the agency that should have provided human intelligence alerts on the evening of October 6 and the early hours of October 7, 2023, but did not. He criticizes the government and the cabinet for not holding serious, in-depth discussions on Gaza, while for years allowing Hamas to grow stronger with the help of Qatari money and by dividing Gaza from the West Bank.

The Political Leadership and Benjamin Netanyahu. Haliva describes Netanyahu as “a very attentive man, who reads, but is very cowardly—and in the test of results, he failed”. He emphasizes that Israel’s political leadership made decisions that strengthened Hamas and hindered proper preparedness. His conclusion: “In such a biblical-scale disaster, responsibility lies with everyone—they should all step down”. Read more of this post

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Israeli intelligence using Microsoft servers to store intercepted phone call data

August 11, 2025 by 2 Comments

Microsoft ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE IS USING Microsoft’s cloud service to store recordings and metadata from millions of intercepted telephone conversations placed by residents of Gaza and the West Bank, according to a new investigation. The investigation was jointly conducted by British newspaper The Guardian and Israeli weekly magazine Sikha Mekomit (Local Call), which published it last week.

Citing conversation with 11 sources from Microsoft and within Israel, the investigation reveals that Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Unit 8200 is the primary force behind the interception and data storage project. Operating under Aman, Israel’s military intelligence directorate, Unit 8200 is responsible for collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT), cyber warfare, and code decryption, among other tasks.

Israeli security sources cited in the report explain that the commander of Unit 8200, Brigadier General Yossi Sriel, approached Microsoft because the Israeli intelligence unit lacked enough storage space and processing power to store “billions of files”. General Sriel has led a large-budget project that has significantly expanded the scope of information-gathering on Palestinians and has integrated various databases.

In November 2021, an meeting, described in the report as “extraordinary”, took place at Microsoft’s headquarters in Seattle, Washington. On one side were Microsoft Chief Operating Officer, Satya Nadella, and other company executives, while on the other side were General Sriel and other senior officials of Unit 8200. The agenda centered on a plan, promoted by Sriel, to transfer intelligence information held by the Unit to the computing giant’s servers. According to an internal Microsoft document, which was leaked by The Guardian, Sriel requested the transfer to Microsoft’s cloud of 70% of the unit’s data, including “secret and top secret” data.

The meeting allegedly led to the development of one of the world’s most invasive surveillance systems, which has been employed by Israel to monitor Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. According to documents cited by The Guardian, as of July this year, 11,500 terabytes of Israeli military data—equivalent to 862 billion documents or 195 million hours of audio—were stored on Microsoft Azure public cloud servers in the Netherlands. A smaller portion of the data was stored in Ireland and Israel. Read more of this post

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Israel releases findings of internal probe into October 7 intelligence disaster

August 12, 2024 by 17 Comments

Hamas GazaTHE OFFICIAL INTERNAL INVESTIGATION into the performance of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) during the run-up to the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, has been released. Known as The Road to War, the report addresses the central question of: how did the MID –the main military intelligence body of the Israel Defense Forces, or IDF– miss all the signs of the pending Hamas attack, and how did all the available warnings go unheeded?

To compline the report, the Intelligence Directorate of the IDF investigated how the most significant intelligence failure in the history of the State of Israel occurred, as well as how the MID analysts and other members of the intelligence community failed to notice the attack that Hamas had been planning.

According to the findings of the investigation, Hamas began planning its attack between seven and eight years ago, which means that Israeli intelligence should have been able to observe the relevant warnings as early as 2016. However, the IDF’s intelligence division missed the early signs.

It appears that the MID assumed Hamas had been deterred by Israel. There was also a prevailing assumption that the group’s military wing, led by Yahya Sinwar, had settled on improving the economic situation of Gaza Strip residents while securing its internal sovereign status in the Gaza Strip. The MID intelligence analysts were uniformly immersed in the concept that Hamas “did not want to and could not” go to war against Israel.

The main findings of the investigation are as follows: Read more of this post

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Analysis: Israel’s misjudgment of Hamas caused the October 7 intelligence failure

November 10, 2023 by 6 Comments

Gaza StripSINCE OCTOBER 7, WHEN Hamas launched its surprise attack on Israel, many more details about the intelligence failure have emerged. It appears that Israeli intelligence officials have warned for years about military exercises held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which have included practice raids on cities deep inside Israel. However, the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) did not heed to the warnings, because it considered Hamas operationally incapable of carrying out such raids. Instead, the IMI estimated that the Hamas leadership aimed to arrive at a settlement with Israel. That seems like the result of a highly successful disinformation operation, which added significantly to the effectiveness of the sudden attack on Israel on October 7.

It now appears that several months after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operation Guardian of the Walls, which targeted Hamas in the Gaza Strip in May of 2021, Hamas began to train for a large-scale operation against Israel. However, the IMI estimated that Hamas was not capable of attacking aQ Quote large number of settlements simultaneously. It also believed that such an operation would go against the spirit of Hamas leadership’s spirit intention to settle with Israel.

As early as 2022, the IMI had analyzed videos of Hamas’ military exercises, which Hamas itself had made available on social media networks. Meanwhile, the intelligence information that emerged from the Gaza Strip showed that the professionalization of Hamas’ military arm, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was improving. However, IMI officials rejected the need to build an operative response to the mass-attack scenario that these exercises pointed to, because they saw them simply as exercises.

Israeli intelligence also analyzed the communications discourse between the commanders of Hamas, which it had acquired through intercepts. It purportedly indicated that Hamas intended to carry out raids on Israeli communities located near the fence between Israel and Gaza, but also on targets located deeper inside Israel. The communications discourse also indicated that such attacks could occur, not only using tunnels, but with incursions above ground and even through aerial methods.

One of the methods that Hamas trained on, and one that was known to Israeli intelligence, focused on disabling the highly sophisticated observation posts, sensors and remote-controlled machine guns, which Israel has installed along the border fence with the Gaza Strip. The purpose of these exercises was to enable an attack on the fence and overtake it these sophisticated tools with Hamas operatives, thus effectively blinding the Israeli forces. However, Israeli authorities made no effort to prepare for such a scenario by protecting these installations.

The broad picture that is emerging raises serious questions about why the IDF did not take a reasonable course of action against Hamas’ operational plan —and why it failed to do so despite being aware of the intensity of the Hamas exercises, and despite being aware of the group’s stated intentions. Q QuoteIndeed, a preventive course of action should have been in place even in the absence of specific intelligence warnings —if only to enable the IDF to repel a surprise attack by Hamas. There was no need to estimate what Hamas would do in order to prepare for a surprise attack.

Yet it is now patently obvious that there was ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions. The latter were both apparent and known. Even without the wisdom of hindsight, it is clear there was enough intelligence to enable Israel to act in a timely manner against Hamas’ plan. Yet Israel severely misjudged Hamas’ intentions. In retrospect, it appears that ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions had been gathered, that the IMI and Shin Bet were severely underprepared for a surprise attack, that the precise details of Hamas’ attack were missed, and that Hamas’ intentions were misjudged. These are the reasons why Israel was caught unprepared and suffered a catastrophic surprise on October 7.

► Author: Dr. Avner Barnea | Date: 10 November 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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Analysis: The mysterious case of IDF ‘Officer X’ who died in an Israeli prison

June 18, 2021 by 2 Comments

Aviv Kochavi

The State of Israel has been in turmoil for several weeks, after it became known that an outstanding officer in one of the elite technological units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Intelligence Division (Israel Military Intelligence, or IMI) was found dead while in custody in a military prison. He had been serving an eight-month sentence on suspicion of causing serious security damage to a critical intelligence technological system. The IDF’s chief of staff, Major General Aviv Kochavi (pictured), said in relation to the case: “The officer from the IMI committed very serious offenses. He committed them on purpose, for reasons I cannot describe. He almost [revealed] a big secret and we stopped it in the [last] minute”.

After the officer’s death, it was revealed by the IDF that his arrest was not a case of treason, or espionage and that he acted for personal, rather than for ideological, nationalistic or financial motives. Following public pressure about IDF’s handling of the matter and the unclear circumstances of the officer’s death, the IDF has provided some more details.

Officer X, who, according to an American website was named Tomer Aiges, was a 25-year-old captain with three honorary awards by the IMI. He had graduated from high school while simultaneously receiving a BSc in computer sciences at the age of 18. Before enlisting in the IDF, he worked in several hi-tech companies in Israel. People who worked with him there testified that he was a young man with extraordinary technical abilities, which is why he was recruited to the technology unit of the IMI.

There are two main issues of concern among the Israeli public. One is how the officer was held in custody for a long time without being brought to trial, even though a serious indictment —the details of which are not known— was filed against him, and when no one except his parents knew about it. To the young man’s acquaintances it seemed that he had mysteriously disappeared. What is more, much of his page on Facebook was deleted and no further updates appeared following his arrest. It was reported that during his arrest, there was a process of criminal mediation, in which the State of Israel sought to sentence him to ten years in prison.

The second problematic issue concerns the circumstances of his death. There are many questions about to how he could have died when his detention cell was under non-stop surveillance by closed-circuit cameras. Further questions remain as to why the investigation into the circumstances of his death has yet to be completed. There have been demands by Israeli former intelligence officers to hand over the investigation to a civilian inquiry committee headed by a Supreme Court judge, as there is grave concern that the IDF could be hiding information that could demonstrate it was negligent in protecting the officer’s life.

The publication of additional details about this case is subject to a strict ban by the Israeli military censorship —it should be noted that Israel is the only Western country that exercises security censorship. The Israeli public is eagerly awaiting the publication of further details about the circumstances of the death of the intelligence officer, Officer X.

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA).

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 18 June 2021 | Permalink

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