Austrian intelligence service report draws international attention over Iran nuke claims

Direktion Staatsschutz und NachrichtendienstON MAY 26, THE Austrian domestic intelligence service, Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst (DSN) in Vienna officially presented its annual report: the Verfassungschutzbericht (VSB) [Constitution Protection Report].  The document can be downloaded [PDF] via the official homepage of the DSN.

First published in 1997 by the predecessor of the DSN and then titled Staatsschutzbericht [State Protection Report], these reports offer rare official insights into the work of Austria’s domestic intelligence service. While their form and scope have varied over the nearly 30 years of the service’s existence, their aim and structure have roughly stayed the same: the VSB informs the public about the duties of the service, and about recent developments in the fields it is tasked with, monitoring and policing, during the calendar year prior to its publication.

Featured chapters nearly always include political extremism, terrorism, espionage, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protection of critical infrastructure and, since their emergence, sometimes also cyber threats. Often—thought not always—the reports feature anonymized cases from the year before and specialized essays about certain relevant topics. Traditionally the media and public give most attention to those parts of the report that deal with extremism and terrorism of all kinds inside Austria.

VSB 2024 Receives International Attention

This year, however, several paragraphs in the chapter titled “International Illicit Arms Trade and Proliferation” [“Internationaler Illegaler Waffenhandel und Proliferation”] have drawn international attention. The proliferation section—starting on page 154 of the report—deals with a number of states that can be described as partly or fully antagonistic to “the West”. In addition to Russia, China, Pakistan and North Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its activities are described in the chapter. Regarding the Shia theocracy and its nuclear program, the report states (translated by the author with assistance by DeepL):

In order to assert and enforce its political claims to regional power, the Islamic Republic of Iran is striving for comprehensive armament. Nuclear weapons are intended to make the regime untouchable and to expand and consolidate its dominance in the Middle East and beyond. The Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons is well advanced. An arsenal of ballistic missiles is ready to carry nuclear warheads over long distances. [Emphasis added]

All efforts to prevent Iran’s armament with sanctions and agreements have so far proved ineffective. On the contrary: the Islamic Republic of Iran is producing weapons and weapons delivery systems on a large scale—and not just for its own use. [p.158]

Iranian intelligence services are entrusted with the development and implementation of circumvention structures for the procurement of armaments, proliferation-relevant technologies, and materials for weapons of mass destruction. They use front companies and networks inside and outside the Islamic Republic of Iran for this purpose. In particular, the [Islamic] Revolutionary Guards Corps’ widely ramified and difficult to oversee company empire serves proliferation purposes. [p.159]

The report clearly describes a program by Iran to develop nuclear weapons as a fact. It does not only suggest that it might be well advanced, but states this as a given. The report furthermore establishes that transport systems to deploy nuclear weapons—once finalized—are in place and could reach long-distance targets.

Fox News Picks Up VSB 2024

The VSB was picked up by the American media giant Fox News. The network reported on it under the title “Explosive new intelligence report reveals Iran’s nuclear weapons program still active” on May 28. The Fox News report begins by pointing out that “[t]he startling intelligence gathering of Austrian officials contradicts the assessment of the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)”. It goes on to note that “[t]he Austrian intelligence findings could be an unwanted wrench in President [Donald] Trump’s negotiation process to resolve the atomic crisis with Iran’s rulers because the data outlined in the report suggests the regime will not abandon its drive to secure a nuclear weapon.”

Fox News quotes David Albright, a physicist and founder/president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, DC, as saying: “[t]he ODNI report is stuck in the past, a remnant of the fallacious unclassified 2007 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate]. The Austrian report in general is similar to German and British assessments. Both governments, by the way, made clear to [the] US IC [Intelligence Community] in 2007 that they thought the US assessment was wrong that the Iranian nuclear weapons program ended in 2003.”

The Fox News report also states that “[t]he danger of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism [and its illegal atomic weapons program] was cited 99 times in the 211-page report that covers pressing threats to Austria’s democracy.” All in all, Fox News’ reporting paints a picture that the small European state’s intelligence service has information that contradicts the assessment of the much larger American IC and insinuates that the American assessment—and by implication the political approach to dealing with Iran—is wrong. Read more of this post

Spy’s release by higher court shows Austria is unable to find its intelligence footing

Egisto OttON JUNE 26, THE longwinded case of Austria’s counter intelligence failure regarding a possible inside threat took yet another —quite surprising— turn: the state court of Vienna (Landesgericht Wien) released from pre-trial detention (Untersuchungshaft) Egisto Ott, a former member of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT) —Austria’s now-dissolved domestic intelligence agency. Ott, who was accused of spying against Austria, had been arrested (again) at the end of March on suspicion of obtaining classified information for which he could provide no reason, as well as for presumably selling it. Among the suspected recipients of the classified information were Russian assets and —more or less directly— Russian intelligence.

However, the three-judge panel called to decide on the detention complaint came to the conclusion that, while there remains a strong suspicion (dringender Tatverdacht) against Ott, the reasons for his further detention were not sufficiently given. In the judges’ view, all activities that could carry a pre-trial detention were committed before Ott was arrested and released for the first time in 2021. Back then, Ott had also been released after a short detention, following a decision by the same court. Briefly summarized, in 2021 the Landesgericht concluded that Ott could no longer spy against Austria as he did not have access to classified information, having been removed from the domestic intelligence agency years earlier. Additionally, since the BVT was in the process of reorganization and reformation at that point, the judges deemed the possibility of further criminal behavior by Ott to be unrealistic.

The recent assessment that Ott did not conduct additional punishable offences following his first release is surprising, since the prosecutor alleged —with a certain undertone directed against the initial decision to release Ott, which can be noted in the arrest warrant— that Ott had resumed his information-gathering and handling activities immediately upon being set free in 2021. Specifically, Ott is accused of having unlawfully retrieved data from the Central Register of Residents (Zentrales Melderegister) on March 24 of that year and then passing it on. The information accessed by Ott concerned the Bulgarian investigative journalist Christo Grozev, who was living in Austria at the time. Consequently, Grozev had to leave Vienna, since his life was deemed to be in severe danger. Today, whenever Grozev returns to Austria to visit members of his family who remain there, he has to do so under heavy protection by the Austrian authorities.

Between June and November 2022, when Ott had been released from his first pre-trial detention, there was also an alleged transfer to Russia of three mobile phones, or their data, as well as a highly-encrypted SINA-workstation laptop. However, the judges of the Landesgericht concluded that, while information or intelligence provided to foreign services does not have to be secret to constitute criminal espionage against Austria, “concrete and vital interests of Austria” have to be violated by such a transfer. The judges did not deem that the evidence furnished by the prosecutor met their criteria. Die Presse, Austria’s ‘newspaper of record’, published a detailed explanation of the court decision. Read more of this post

Austria: Arrest raises broader questions about counterintelligence capabilities

BVT AustriaON GOOD FRIDAY, MARCH 29, Egisto Ott, a former member of Austria’s now-dissolved domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT), was arrested in his house in Carinthia, Austria’s southernmost state. Ott had frequently been at the center of media attention in the past year, in connection with the network surrounding the fugitive financier and alleged spy Jan Maršálek, as well as alleged misconduct relating to carrying out illegal investigations of persons. Ott also seems to have been involved in an alleged attempt to create an intelligence unit, or even an entire shadow intelligence service, embedded inside Austria’s foreign ministry. Now the veteran police and intelligence officer stands accused by the state attorney of abusing his authority and of being part of an “intelligence activity to the disadvantage of Austria” —the only form of spying that is illegal under § 256 of the Austrian criminal code.

Ott’s arrest came several years after intelligence was first shared with Austria by Western partner services —allegedly the Central Intelligence Agency— that reportedly date from as early as November 2017. Back then, Ott allegedly received classified material from his service’s email address to his personal Gmail account. However, Peter Gridling, director of the BVT from 2008 until its dissolution in 2021, stated in a recent interview that the ensuing investigations did not yield actionable results that could be used in criminal proceedings. This statement is highly interesting, as Gridling filed accusations about Ott with the State Prosecutor’s Office himself, and would hardly have done unless he had access to hard evidence. Ott was consequently removed from the BVT and placed in Police Academy Austria (SIAK), which is responsible for training police officers and conducts research related to police and domestic security.

Nevertheless, according to media reporting, Ott seems to have kept and illegally used certain forms of identification that presented him as a police officer. He is also alleged to have maintained access to several police databases and to have retained his network of trusted informants that provided him with intelligence. These included contacts in friendly foreign police services, whom Ott knew from his time as a liaison officer in Italy and Turkey. According to Gridling, these contacts were unaware that Ott had been removed from the BVT under suspicion of being unreliable and potentially even working for Russia. They therefore continued to help him when asked. Ott allegedly deceived his contacts by claiming that he needed information on cases relating to different kinds of extremism. As it turned out, according to the leaked arrest warrant, several of the individuals referred to by Ott as “suspects” in terrorism investigations were in fact Russian dissidents or intelligence defectors who were living as protected persons in Austria and elsewhere outside Russia.

It appears highly probable that Ott also had people inside the Austrian bureaucracy, including former colleagues in the BVT, who continued to provide him with information and assistance, even after the first allegations against him arose in 2017. As of now, at least one other officer from LVT Vienna (the state unit of the BVT) has been found to have illegally provided Ott with Information. It is likely, given the publicly available descriptions of Ott’s activities, that other individuals may be implicated. It also remains to be seen whether individuals involved in this case were able to join the BVT’s successor agency, the new Directorate of State Protection and Intelligence (DSN). Read more of this post