December 20, 2024
by intelNews
THE COLLAPSE OF THE regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on December 8 caught the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s intelligence community —mainly Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Mossad— by surprise. Assad’s collapse occurred much faster than Israel had estimated. Israel did not expect that the Syrian Arab Army would disintegrate so resoundingly, within 48 hours of the attack by the Syrian rebels.
Israeli intelligence assessed that, despite the shocks it had suffered in recent months, the so-called Axis of Resistance against Israel —mainly Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran— was stable. A scenario of rapid collapse of the government in Syria had not been assessed as a possibility, or even given a low probability tag. That was primarily because the Assad family had governed Syria for almost 60 years.
Following the Assad regime’s collapse, the focus of Israel’s intelligence is on analyzing the intentions of the major rebel organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and understanding how —if at all— it will lead the new administration in Syria. Israel is also examining developments in
southern Syria, as well as what is happening at the Syrian and Russian military bases in Latakia and Tartus. Moreover, the IDF is monitoring the activities of Iranian elements in Syria, including on the border with Lebanon, to prevent the possibility of military equipment being transferred from Syria to Hezbollah.
It is clear to Israel that Turkey stands behind the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization and that Ankara armed and supported the group for a significant period. What is less clear is whether and how Turkey’s involvement in Syria could threaten Israel’s interests, given that Israel’s relations with Turkey have deteriorated dramatically in recent years.
Assad was a key member of the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance. Following his fall from power, Iran and Hezbollah could lose their main logistical hub for producing, transferring, and storing weapons, as well as training their forces and militias. Additionally, Syria under Assad constantly posed the threat of turning into yet another battlefront against Israel. Without Assad, Russia could lose its grip on Syria —the only country in the Middle East where Russian influence dominates that of the United States. The Russians could also lose access to their military bases in Syria, which offered the Russian Navy access to the waters of the Mediterranean.
Despite the fall of the bitter enemy that was Assad’s Syria, and the deep shock suffered by the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance camp that has been dominant in the Middle East in recent decades, Israeli intelligence is not optimistic about the emerging situation in post-Assad Syria. Syria is a collection of minorities —Druze, Kurds, Alawites, and Christians— that have been artificially joined together despite carrying bitter, bloody scores. The latter may erupt sharply, especially against the Alawites. Concepts such as liberal politics, civil society, or a cohesive nation-state, have never existed inside Syria.
It follows that Israel is very concerned about the emerging uncertainty in Syria. Immediately after the fall of Assad, the IDF strengthened its defenses on the Golan Heights border to ensure that the chaos in Syria did not spill over into Israel. Meanwhile, Israel is in contact —both directly and through intermediaries— with several Syrian rebel groups, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The Israeli message at this stage is a demand that the rebels not approach the border, along with a warning that, if they violate the separation of forces agreement, Israel will respond with force.
And a final note: assessments in relation to the Syrian regime’s collapse continue to emerge in the IDF and the Israeli intelligence community. These assessments concern the extent to which the lessons of October 7 have been sufficiently analyzed and assimilated within Israel. Specifically, there are questions about whether this new intelligence surprise in Syria may stem from the fact that an in-depth investigation into the lessons of October 7 has yet to be carried out during the 14 months of the war with Hamas.
► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 20 December 2024 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
Ashraf Marwan: Israel’s ‘Angel’ or Egypt’s Double Agent?
October 13, 2025 by intelNews 3 Comments
However, a comprehensive investigation by two Israeli journalists, Ronen Bergman and Yuval Robovitz, published in the popular Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth under the title “The Angel of Lies”, presents a different picture. Based on thousands of secret documents not yet revealed and rare conversations with people involved in the operation, their report claims that ‘the Angel’ was actually the spearhead of Egypt’s deception plan before and during the war—and that he succeeded beyond all expectations.
A Spy or Double Agent?
Bergman and Robovitz examined whether Ashraf Marwan—advisor to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and a Mossad agent who died in 2007—was truly the best agent Israel had before the Yom Kippur War. Their findings indicate that a series of serious operational failures, combined with arrogance within the Israeli intelligence community, made Marwan one of the most dangerous spies ever to act against Israel.
They also investigated whether he was genuinely an Israeli agent who contributed meaningfully to Israel’s national security, as claimed by Mossad and by scholar Professor Uri Bar-Joseph, who wrote extensively about the Yom Kippur War intelligence failure and authored the well-known book The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel. Netflix later produced a film, The Angel, based on Bar-Joseph’s book.
Or, was Marwan, as the journalists argue, a double agent working for Egypt from the beginning—since volunteering for Israeli intelligence in 1970—and who managed to deceive Israel for years, particularly by delaying his warning about Egypt’s impending attack until roughly 12 hours before it began? According to Bergman and Robovitz, Marwan knew about Egypt’s plans weeks earlier but withheld that information, allowing Egypt to launch a surprise attack.
A Public Debate
Following the article’s publication, a public debate erupted between Bergman and Robovitz on one side and Professor Uri Bar-Joseph on the other, over Marwan’s true motives. Whether he was a double agent or a loyal Israeli operative, all agree he played a key role in the intelligence drama preceding the Yom Kippur War. Read more of this post
Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with 1973 Yom Kippur War, Ashraf Marwan, Avner Barnea, double agents, Egypt, espionage, HUMINT, Israel, Mossad