250 ex-Mossad members sign letter criticizing Netanyahu’s stance on hostages

April 14, 2025 by 5 Comments

MossadOVER 250 FORMER MEMBERS of the Mossad, Israel’s external spy agency, have drafted an open letter criticizing the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and warning that they will “not continue to stand by”. The letter campaign is reportedly led by former senior Mossad official Gail Shoresh and renowned hostage negotiator David Meidan. It comes in the heels of similar letters issued last week by Israel Air Force active service personnel and veterans, and by former members of Unit 8200—the cyber and signals intelligence branch of the Israel Defense Forces.

The letter is signed by dozens of former Mossad department heads and deputy department heads, one former deputy director, and three former directors: Tamir Pardo, Efraim Halevy and Danni Yatom. It openly criticizes the administration of Prime Minister Netanyahu for prioritizing the war against Hamas over the lives of 59 Israeli hostages, who are believed to remain captive by the militant Palestinian organization in the Gaza Strip. It also calls on Israeli officials to “make brave decisions and act responsibly for the security of the country and its citizens”.

The letter claims to voice the views of “Mossad and special services veterans, who have dedicated many years to safeguarding the country’s security”. It lambasts the Netanyahu government for refusing to negotiate with Hamas to secure the release of the Israeli hostages, and warns that Mossad and special services veterans “will not continue to stand by” any longer. It also expresses “full support” for an earlier letter written by Israel Air Force pilots, some of whom were subsequently dismissed form the service for criticizing the government.

The letter by the ex-Mossad service members shares the authors’ “deep concern for the future of the country” and calls for Prime Minister Netanyahu “to act immediately to reach an agreement to return all 59 abductees home, without delay, even at the cost of ceasing fighting.” It concludes with a direct message to the embattled Netanyahu: “The sanctity of life, Mr. Prime Minister, takes precedence over ‘God of Revenge’”.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 14 April 2025 | Permalink

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Israeli soldiers working for Iranian intelligence spied on the Iron Dome

February 17, 2025 by 3 Comments

Iron Dome IsraelLAST MONTH, ISRAEL ARRESTED two reservists following an investigation that lasted several months and centered on uncovering espionage for an Iranian state entity during wartime. The two reservists had completed their regular military service before joining the reserves.

The two soldiers, identified as Yuri Eliasfov and Georgi Andreyev, held sensitive positions, and a least one was serving as a member of staff in Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system. The soldier serving in the Iron Dome is accused by the police, the Israel Security Agency (ISA), and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), of aiding the enemy during wartime, for which the penalty is life imprisonment or death without the discretion of the court. A prosecutor’s statement has been filed against the two soldiers.

According to the investigation, the espionage affair began when one of the suspects, who served in a classified security system, sought to make contact with Iranian intelligence on social media. During his search, he contacted an Iranian operator, who asked him to complete various tasks in exchange for payments. The investigation revealed that the two soldiers were recruited by Iranian intelligence through the Internet to carry out missions in exchange for payments.

They two men were initially required to spray anti-government graffiti in Tel Aviv and in Israel’s the northern region. Giorgi Andreyev, fearing the consequences of such actions, withdrew from the operation. “We are working for Iran and doing something dangerous,” he told Eliasfov. Despite this, however, Eliasfov, who is reportedly the main suspect in the case, continued his activities.

The undercover investigation revealed that Eliasfov, who serves in the Iron Dome system, filmed a video while participating in a classified information, which he then sent to his Iranian handler. He received $3,500 from the same Iranian official, while his at-times accomplice received $70. During his interrogation, Eliasfov claimed that he committed the acts due to being in a difficult financial situation and because he sought to obtain money easily.

One of the interesting findings that emerged from the investigation of the suspects was that other soldiers and family members were aware of Eliasfov’s initial actions and warned him that he was connecting himself with Iranian elements. Despite that, Eliasfov continued his espionage activities, which included filming a video from inside an Iron Dome facility. The footage reportedly contained classified material that could significantly endanger the security of the State of Israel. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Assad’s collapse in Syria was a strategic surprise to Israel

December 20, 2024 by 7 Comments

Syria IsraelTHE COLLAPSE OF THE regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on December 8 caught the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s intelligence community —mainly Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Mossad— by surprise. Assad’s collapse occurred much faster than Israel had estimated. Israel did not expect that the Syrian Arab Army would disintegrate so resoundingly, within 48 hours of the attack by the Syrian rebels.

Israeli intelligence assessed that, despite the shocks it had suffered in recent months, the so-called Axis of Resistance against Israel —mainly Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran— was stable. A scenario of rapid collapse of the government in Syria had not been assessed as a possibility, or even given a low probability tag. That was primarily because the Assad family had governed Syria for almost 60 years.

Following the Assad regime’s collapse, the focus of Israel’s intelligence is on analyzing the intentions of the major rebel organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and understanding how —if at all— it will lead the new administration in Syria. Israel is also examining developments in southern Syria, as well as what is happening at the Syrian and Russian military bases in Latakia and Tartus. Moreover, the IDF is monitoring the activities of Iranian elements in Syria, including on the border with Lebanon, to prevent the possibility of military equipment being transferred from Syria to Hezbollah.

It is clear to Israel that Turkey stands behind the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization and that Ankara armed and supported the group for a significant period. What is less clear is whether and how Turkey’s involvement in Syria could threaten Israel’s interests, given that Israel’s relations with Turkey have deteriorated dramatically in recent years.

Assad was a key member of the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance. Following his fall from power, Iran and Hezbollah could lose their main logistical hub for producing, transferring, and storing weapons, as well as training their forces and militias. Additionally, Syria under Assad constantly posed the threat of turning into yet another battlefront against Israel. Without Assad, Russia could lose its grip on Syria —the only country in the Middle East where Russian influence dominates that of the United States. The Russians could also lose access to their military bases in Syria, which offered the Russian Navy access to the waters of the Mediterranean.

Despite the fall of the bitter enemy that was Assad’s Syria, and the deep shock suffered by the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance camp that has been dominant in the Middle East in recent decades, Israeli intelligence is not optimistic about the emerging situation in post-Assad Syria. Syria is a collection of minorities —Druze, Kurds, Alawites, and Christians— that have been artificially joined together despite carrying bitter, bloody scores. The latter may erupt sharply, especially against the Alawites. Concepts such as liberal politics, civil society, or a cohesive nation-state, have never existed inside Syria.

It follows that Israel is very concerned about the emerging uncertainty in Syria. Immediately after the fall of Assad, the IDF strengthened its defenses on the Golan Heights border to ensure that the chaos in Syria did not spill over into Israel. Meanwhile, Israel is in contact —both directly and through intermediaries— with several Syrian rebel groups, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The Israeli message at this stage is a demand that the rebels not approach the border, along with a warning that, if they violate the separation of forces agreement, Israel will respond with force.

And a final note: assessments in relation to the Syrian regime’s collapse continue to emerge in the IDF and the Israeli intelligence community. These assessments concern the extent to which the lessons of October 7 have been sufficiently analyzed and assimilated within Israel. Specifically, there are questions about whether this new intelligence surprise in Syria may stem from the fact that an in-depth investigation into the lessons of October 7 has yet to be carried out during the 14 months of the war with Hamas.

► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 20 December 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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Israel reportedly trying to recover spy’s remains from Syria

December 16, 2024 by 2 Comments

Eli CohenISRAELI OFFICIALS ARE REPORTEDLY trying to recover the remains of Eli Cohen, an Israeli spy who was hanged in Syria in 1965, after his espionage activities were discovered. Born in Alexandria in 1924, Cohen was an Egyptian Jew, whose family immigrated to Israel after 1949. After joining the Mossad, Israel’s primary external intelligence agency, Cohen became a katsa, or case officer.

The spy agency utilized Cohen’s fluency in Arabic and Spanish and sent him to Argentina, where he built his intelligence cover under the name Kamel Amin Thaabet. He pretended to be a Syrian businessman whose family had immigrated to Argentina in the 1920s. While in Argentina, Cohen became an active member of the Arab and Syrian diasporas and joined the Syrian Ba’ath Party.

In 1962, shortly before Ba’athist officers seized power in Syria, the Mossad instructed Cohen to relocate to Damascus. While there, Cohen became a well-known socialite with close connections to the administration of Syrian President Amin al-Hafiz. However, in 1965, Cohen’s espionage was uncovered by Syrian counterintelligence, who utilized technical countermeasures provided by Soviet intelligence. Cohen was convicted of espionage and publicly executed by hanging in Damascus on May 18, 1965.

Since Cohen’s execution, the Syrian state has rejected requests to reveal the location of his tomb and the whereabouts of his remains. On at least two instances, Israel, which views Cohen as a national hero, has offered to exchange Syrian and other Arab prisoners of war in return for the spy’s remains, but Damascus has rebuffed these offers. There are rumors that Syrian authorities regularly relocate Cohen’s remains so as to prevent Israel from covertly retrieving them.

According to reports from Middle Eastern media, since the fall of the administration of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Israeli officials have been in negotiations to gain access to Cohen’s remains. The negotiations are allegedly taking place between Israeli government representatives and former members of the Assad regime, who have knowledge of the whereabouts of the late spy’s remains. In a television interview last week, Eli Cohen’s widow, Nadia, implied that Mossad Director David Barnea is personally involved in the ongoing negotiations.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date:16 December 2024 | Permalink

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Israeli couple who spied for Iran made ample use of digital applications

November 11, 2024 by 3 Comments

Israel and IranTHE ISRAEL SECURITY AGENCY (ISA) recently announced the arrests of an Israeli couple of Azeri origin on suspicion of spying for Iran. The couple, both 32 years old, were allegedly recruited by an Iranian handler of Azeri origin named Elshan Agheev. As part of their activities, and for about two years, the couple gathered intelligence on critical infrastructure and security sites in Israel, and even conducted surveillance on an academic working for the Institute for National Security Studies, allegedly in order to kill her.

The case demonstrates how software that is easily accessible on the Internet makes it possible to encrypt information communicated between a handler and an agent, as well as how money is transferred to the agent. The official indictment reveals details about the couple’s modus operandi, including the identity of the particular software the spies used to communicate with their Iranian handler.

One of the applications the couple used is Zangi, which facilitates the exchange of encrypted instant messages. According to the company’s website, Zangi offers voice and video calling, text messaging, and file transfer services “without registration and without data collection”. In fact, according to Zangi, the data is saved on the user’s device only. In addition to using the Zangi application, the couple also appear to have used the Zolotaya Korona money-transfer platform. The couple allegedly used the platform in order to receive payments by their Iranian handlers, and to transfer funds to other parties involved in Iranian-led espionage activities inside Israel.

Another application allegedly used by the couple is Ecos Dos, a digital wallet for storing and transferring digital currencies. Ecos Dos is a software wallet that can be installed on a computer or mobile phone. It supports a wide variety of crypto-currencies and is used to store and transfer cryptocurrencies. It is known for its simplicity of use and friendly interface. It is popular among users who wish to maintain anonymity when transacting in digital currencies. It does not require identifying a user’s details when operating, so anyone can create an account and receive funds anonymously.

The suspects are also believed to have used a software called Encryptor in order to encrypt information. This software allows files and folders to be encrypted so that only those who have the encryption key can open them. The couple allegedly used Encryptor to encrypt the information they collected before passing it on to their Iranian handlers, thus making it difficult for Israeli authorities to decipher the information.

The use of these applications attests to the sophistication of the Iranian spy network that was recently busted in Israel, and its efforts to hide its activities inside the Jewish state. The recent indictment against the couple details a collection of serious security offenses, including aiding the enemy in war and providing information to the enemy to harm the security of the state. Iran is clearly stepping up its efforts to recruit Israeli citizens for espionage and terrorist activities.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 11 November 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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Israeli citizens arrested on suspicion of working for Iranian intelligence

October 28, 2024 by 2 Comments

Ronen Bar Israeli Security AgencyTHE ISRAELI SECURITY AGENCY (ISA) has announced the arrest of 18 Israeli citizens suspected of working for Iranian Intelligence. Among them are seven Israelis, who immigrated to Israel from Azerbaijan, and are suspected of having been in contact for two years with Iranian intelligence. Some of the seven were caught carrying out surveillance against a senior Israeli Air Force officer, whom they were reportedly planning to assassinate.

Israeli authorities accuse the suspects of photographing and collecting information on military bases and facilities, including Air Force bases, Iron Dome battery sites, a power plant, and other energy infrastructure facilities. The suspects are also accused of having received from their Iranian handlers a set of maps of Israeli strategic sites, including the Golani Brigade’s training base, where four Israeli soldiers were killed by a drone attack last week. In over two years, the suspects allegedly performed approximately 600 missions under the direction of two handlers from Iranian intelligence. They did so in return for hundreds of thousands of shekels, which were paid to them in cash and various crypto-currencies.

Another Israeli citizen, who was arrested on suspicion of spying for Iranian intelligence in return for payments, has been named as Vladimir Varehovsky, 35, from Tel Aviv. Among other tasks, Varehovsky is suspected of gathering information about an Israeli scientist, whom he agreed to murder in exchange for a $100,000 payment. The suspect had reportedly acquired weapons for the assigned task, but the ISA arrested him before he could carry it out.

In another counterintelligence operation, the ISA arrested seven young Palestinians from the east of Jerusalem, who have been charged with working for Iranian Intelligence. The main suspect recruited the other six to carry out tasks for a fee. Tasks included setting cars on fire, gathering information about a city mayor in Israel, and plotting to assassinate one of the country’s top scientists. The suspects used social media for recruitment purposes. They were reportedly arrested before they were able to execute their missions. Read more of this post

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Leaked documents reveal plans for extensive Russian influence campaign in Israel

September 30, 2024 by 4 Comments

2023 Israeli judicial reform protestsLEAKED INFORMATION PUBLISHED BY leading German media outlets has revealed Russia’s plans for an influence campaign targeting Israel. The information was leaked earlier this month by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and German television stations Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) and Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), as well as by Israeli news outlets. It allegedly came from Social Design Agency (SDA), a Moscow-based firm hired by the Kremlin, which operates in Israel and several countries in the West.

Founded in 2017, the SDA is reportedly one of a host of firms and organizations that are collaborating with Russian intelligence in its efforts to influence public opinion worldwide. Earlier this year, the United States imposed sanctions on SDA, “for providing services to the government of Russia in connection with a foreign malign influence campaign”. The SDA’s founder is Ilya Gambashidze, who is said to be in direct contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials.

Israel has been a central target of SDA’s Russian influence campaign. The country’s internal situation, with mass demonstrations against the legal reform is “perfect for launching a campaign to influence public opinion”, an SDA document from 2023 reads. The document accurately describes the political and social situation in Israel and names a number of influential Russian expatriates whose activities should be monitored.

According to the leaked documents, the purpose of the planned campaign was to raise support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, and strengthen the proportion of Israelis who espouse anti-Ukrainian sentiments. Another central goal was to ensure that no party in the Knesset —the IsraeliQ Quote parliament— would support a possible transfer of military aid to Ukraine.

From the documents, it appears that the conclusions formulated by the SDA were infused into around 50 cartoons distributed every month on social networks, around 20 fictitious articles appearing on websites pretending to be legitimate, and many reactions on various social networks. Among other things, the company distributed through paid ads on Facebook cartoons showing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky burning the Israeli flag, as well as cartoons accusing Israeli leftists of supporting Hamas.

One of the main revelations of the recent leaks is that the Arab community in Israel constitutes a target of the Russian influence campaign. For example, a fake Arabic-language article that was circulated online claimed that Israel did not have in its possession enough precision weapons, because it had given them to Ukraine. The article went on to claim that the lack of such weapons would lead to failures on the battlefield. “The good news should be heard by all believers living under occupation”, the article states. “The policy of the occupation government will soon lead to its defeat. We will wait for a spark to ignite our war of liberation, in which the entire Muslim world will support us”. The purpose of the article appears to be to prompt the Israeli-Arab population to turn against the Israeli government based on Israel’s alleged weakness, and to support Israel’s enemies. Read more of this post

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Is Israel preparing to carry out intelligence operations on US soil?

August 26, 2024 by 2 Comments

Amichai ChikliSEVERAL WEEKS AGO, ISRAEL’S Minister of Diaspora Affairs, Amichai Chikli, reportedly met with the chief executive officer (CEO) of Israeli private intelligence company Black Cube. According to Israeli newspaper The Marker, the purpose of the alleged meeting was to propose an intelligence operation to be carried out on American soil by Black Cube, on behalf of the Israeli government. The intelligence operation would allegedly target a United States-based organization that stands at the forefront of demonstrations against Israel on university campuses in the United States —demonstrations that the state of Israel views as anti-Semitic.

According to The Marker report, the alleged meeting between Minister Chikli and the CEO of Black Cube, Dan Zorla, took place in a private residence in Herzliya near Tel Aviv. Minister Chikli was personally involved in the discussions with Black Cube, with the understanding that intelligence operations carried out by the firm on American soil would not be officially attributed to the State of Israel. However, it is unclear whether such intelligence operations were indeed authorized to proceed.

The organization against which Chikli reportedly asked Black Cube to target is “Students for Justice in Palestine”. The group has staged numerous demonstrations on university campuses across the United States since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war last October.

The alleged use of a private intelligence company against an American-based organization, whose leaders are primarily American citizens, may be perceived as a violation of American sovereignty. Such an activity could further-damage the relationship between Israel and the American government and stigmatize Israel’s image among the American public.

Following the publication of The Marker report, the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs claimed the proposal for the intelligence operation had been initiated by Black Cube and that Ministry officials ultimately rejected it. Still, at least three different sources appear to confirm the exact opposite —namely, that the spying initiative was prompted by the Ministry. Black Cube reportedly rejected it based on concerns that such a high-risk operation could damage the company’s standing with the United States government and harm its ability to do business on American soil in the future.

An official statement issued by the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs said: “Since the beginning of the war, the ministry has held meetings with dozens of organizations seeking to assist the efforts of the State of Israel in various fields. At the company’s [Black Cube’s] request, a meeting was held with the ministry’s professional echelon, and at the end of it, it was decided not to proceed with any engagement”. Read more of this post

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Israel releases findings of internal probe into October 7 intelligence disaster

August 12, 2024 by 17 Comments

Hamas GazaTHE OFFICIAL INTERNAL INVESTIGATION into the performance of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) during the run-up to the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, has been released. Known as The Road to War, the report addresses the central question of: how did the MID –the main military intelligence body of the Israel Defense Forces, or IDF– miss all the signs of the pending Hamas attack, and how did all the available warnings go unheeded?

To compline the report, the Intelligence Directorate of the IDF investigated how the most significant intelligence failure in the history of the State of Israel occurred, as well as how the MID analysts and other members of the intelligence community failed to notice the attack that Hamas had been planning.

According to the findings of the investigation, Hamas began planning its attack between seven and eight years ago, which means that Israeli intelligence should have been able to observe the relevant warnings as early as 2016. However, the IDF’s intelligence division missed the early signs.

It appears that the MID assumed Hamas had been deterred by Israel. There was also a prevailing assumption that the group’s military wing, led by Yahya Sinwar, had settled on improving the economic situation of Gaza Strip residents while securing its internal sovereign status in the Gaza Strip. The MID intelligence analysts were uniformly immersed in the concept that Hamas “did not want to and could not” go to war against Israel.

The main findings of the investigation are as follows: Read more of this post

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Notes on the assassination of Iranian IRGC Commander Hassan Mahdawi

April 26, 2024 by 2 Comments

IRGC - ABTHE TARGETED KILLING OF Hassan Mahdawi, a high-ranking member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, was carried out by Israel on April 1, 2024. The actual assassination was based on precise operational intelligence, while Israel’s assessment of Iran’s response was wrong.

On the day of the attack, a building adjacent to the Iranian Embassy in the Syrian capital of Damascus was attacked with rockets. The attack killed seven IRGC members: General Muhammad Reza Zahedi, also known as Hassan Mahdawi, his deputy, and five additional officers. Mahdawi is the most senior Iranian commander to be killed since the assassination of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani by the United States in 2020.

Mahdawi had close ties with Hezbollah. He maintained a close relationship with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and was perceived by Israel to be directly coordinating the military attacks on Israel from Lebanon and Syria. In Tehran’s collective memory, Israel’s history of attacks against it includes numerous strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, assassinations of scientists within Iran, and actions against Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Traditionally, these attacks have been invariably met with attacks by Iran’s proxies in the region.

This time, it was different. Iran recognized Mahdawi’s assassination as a direct attack on Iran that it could not tolerate, and had to respond to differently. Just days following Mahdawi’s assassination, Iran attacked Israel. According to the Israel Defense Forces, 99 percent of the more than 330 weapons fired at Israel (including at least 185 drones and 110 surface-to-surface missiles) were intercepted, mostly over the territory of countries adjacent to Israel. Iran’s attack on Israel was unprecedented. It was launched directly from Iranian territory in contrast to prior cases, when Iran has used its proxies, supposedly leaving its hands clean.

Israel could not tolerate such a blatant infringement on its sovereignty. After Israeli officials vowed a response to the Iranian attack, the Jewish State counter-attacked, causing minor damage to the Eighth Shekari Air Base in northwest Esfahan, a dozen kilometers from the Natanz nuclear facility. It was a calculated response designed to deliver a message to Iran that Israel could and would respond to an attack. Following Israel’s counterattack, the tensions between Iran and Israel have subsided for the time being.

While the attack on General Mahdawi was based on excellent operational intelligence, it became evident that the Israeli assessment regarding a possible Iranian response was erroneous. The Israeli assessment was that the Iranian response would be similar to what occurred in the past —namely limited attacks by Hezbollah on northern Israel and attacks on the Golan heights by Iranian proxies in Syria. Israel simply did not anticipate a direct Iranian attack on Israel from Iranian territory.

It seems that Israeli senior analysts were entangled in a conception of Iran’s past behavior and anticipated that Tehran’s response would be similar to prior cases, namely utilizing Iran’s proxies. Israel did not pay enough attention to the difference between Mahdawi’s assassination and previous attacks against Iran. This time, the attack targeted the Iranian embassy in Damascus and the target was a very senior official, who was close to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

It appears that Israel’s assessment of the Iranian response to Mahdawi’s assassination was a strategic failure. It appears more likely that the Israeli War Cabinet was provided with an incorrect assessment by the nation’s intelligence community, and less likely that it was provided with an incorrect assessment, which it then decided to ignore. There is concern in Israel that the intelligence assessment was once again wrong, after the colossal failure to anticipate the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 26 April 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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Interview reveals state of mind of Israeli intelligence prior to October 7 attack

April 1, 2024 by 4 Comments

Israeli General Staff MilitaryON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.

But on March 23, after about 5 months, Channel 12 aired the original interview with Elya. The retired official spoke with glee about the advanced technological capabilities developed by the ISA in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. Elya said Israeli intelligence had built a unique system, known as “the Tool”, which allegedly provided intimate knowledge about the life of every Palestinian living in the West Bank and Gaza. This technologically advanced surveillance system allegedly monitored every move of its targets, all for the purpose of preventing potential terrorist attacks against the Jewish state. Elya claimed that, as a result of this advanced technological system, there was no chance that Israel would be surprised by Palestinian militants. This system was so advanced, he said, that intelligence agencies from all over the world were coming to Israel to learn about it.

Thanks to Channel 12, we can now examine Elya’s interview retrospectively, and especially in light of the ISA’s poor performance on October 7, as well as its failure to warn Israeli authorities about Hamas’ preparations for the attack. Notably, Elya was interviewed again for the same television program. Predictably, he admitted that his prior assessment had been wrong and regretted being so overly confident about the technology.

This case demonstrates the overestimation by Israeli intelligence of its own capabilities, because of arrogance and over-confidence. This approach refutes the basic premise of intelligence work: be skeptical and be modest. Furthermore, this case highlights that Israeli intelligence agencies overly relied on technology (SIGINT) in the lead-up to October 7, while seemingly neglecting the low-tech activity of gathering information through human intelligence (HUMINT).

The system that Elya described in his initial interview as the ultimate counterintelligence tool was reportedly criticized internally by some in the ISA for gathering huge amounts of information without offering sufficient analytical capability. This imbalance between collection and analysis can render an entire surveillance system practically useless. The bottom line is that, almost by accident, we are now aware of the state of mind that the ISA was in before the sudden attack by Hamas on October 7, which cost so many lives as a result of the ISA’s complacency.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 01 April 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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Opinion: Five months into the war, Israeli intelligence failure looks even worse

March 11, 2024 by 4 Comments

Israel Hamas warSINCE OCTOBER 7, 2024, when Israel was caught off guard by a sudden and highly damaging attack from Hamas, more information has surfaced regarding why there was no prior warning about the attack and the failures of Israeli intelligence in this regard.

It has become clear that Israeli intelligence miscalculated Hamas’s intentions. The Israeli security concept, spearheaded by the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Israel Security Agency (ISA), was that: (a) Hamas had been deterred from launching large-scale attacks; and (b) Hamas was focused on carrying out terrorist attacks against Israelis in the West Bank and not on Israel proper. This flawed security concept, which had been fully adopted by the Israeli cabinet and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was proven to be groundless. In fact, Hamas successfully exploited it in order to develop and accelerate its attack strategy.

One significant reason for the failure of the IDF, both in the area of intelligence collection and operationally, was its underestimation of the capabilities of Hamas and the intentions of its leader, Yahya Sinwar. There was also an overestimation by many in Israel, including the security establishment, of Israel’s own intelligence Q Quotecapabilities. Another important insight is that the counterintelligence structures inside Hamas were successful in preventing Israeli intelligence from recruiting agents who were close enough to Sinwar to be able to alert Israel about the impending attack. Furthermore, Israel’s collection and analysis of signals intelligence was unproductive, possibly because Hamas was successful in countering Israel’s ability to produce effective intelligence from signals intercepts.

As the IDF moved deeper into Gaza, and as more information was collected from Hamas facilities, it became clear that there were significant gaps in information regarding the preparations for the attack by Hamas inside Gaza. These preparations lasted for a long time and involved numerous operatives who remained undetected by Israeli intelligence. It looks like the compartmentation system inside Hamas, based on a need-to-know only model, was highly effective.

The IDF attacked the Gaza Strip in 2014 in Operation Protective Edge. Its mission was to destroy Hamas’s ability to carry out assaults against Israel through tunnels dug deep inside Gaza and crossing the border into Israel. Indeed, about 20 such tunnels were destroyed during that operation. Later, Hamas built 250 miles of new tunnels in Gaza that were aimed at defense and to hide combatants when Israel attacked. It has been suggested that this construction project was funded by cash sent to Gaza by Qatar, with Israel’s approval —though Qatar denies this claim. Read more of this post

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Netanyahu ignored calls to disrupt Hamas finances, claims ex-Mossad official

February 26, 2024 by 8 Comments

Udi LevyA RETIRED SENIOR MOSSAD official has alleged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly ignored, and even frustrated, efforts to stop the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas. This inaction may have enabled the Palestinian militant group to plan, organize and execute Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which killed over 1400 Israelis on October 7, 2023, and sparked the current war between Israel and Hamas.

The allegation was made by Udi Levy, a 30-year veteran of the Israeli intelligence community, who served as an intelligence officer in the Israel Defense Forces before being appointed to head the Economic Warfare Division of the Mossad, Israel’s external intelligence agency. During his tenure in the Mossad, which ended with his retirement in 2016, Levy was a member of Task Force Harpoon, which aimed to disrupt the flow of funds to militant Palestinian groups, including Hamas.

Last week, Levy told the BBC’s flagship investigative television program Panorama that Task Force Harpoon had identified around 40 companies in the Middle East and North Africa, which were part of Hamas’ investment portfolio. These companies, based in countries such as Sudan, Algeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, were active in the areas of real estate, mining, construction, and tourism, among others. Some of the companies were even directly controlled by Hamas, said Levy.

The income from these financial investments allowed Hamas to use “billions, not millions” of dollars to build its military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, according to the former Mossad official. That investment income was supplemented with direct cash infusions from Iran and Qatar, which in some cases arrived monthly through special envoys, according to Levy. He added that Turkey was “a critical focal point” in Hamas’ money network, as it served as a financial hub for the militant group’s holdings.

Levy told the BBC that he personally advised Netanyahu to “target Hamas’ finances” and explained to him that “Israel had the means to crush Hamas by using only financial tools”. However, Levy claims that, not only did the Israeli prime minister ignore Levy’s advice, but he proceeded to shut down the Mossad’s Task Force Harpoon. This is not the first time that Levy has made these claims. In December 2023, he told The New York Times that Task Force Harpoon analysts were so frustrated with the Israeli government’s inertia, that they resorted to “uploading some documents to Facebook” in hopes that the Israeli authorities would be forced to take action once details about Hamas’ finances were disclosed.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 26 February 2024 | Permalink

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Analysis: Israel underestimated Hamas while overestimating its own capabilities

January 10, 2024 by 10 Comments

IDF IsraelTHE OCTOBER 7 ATTACK on Israel was a total surprise. There was no warning. There were very few signs of a possible attack. Israeli intelligence evaluated these signs as elements of a routine military exercise by Hamas, and even assessed them as parts of an imaginary scenario. It therefore gave no warning to those Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units that were stationed on the border with Gaza. Meanwhile, what we know about the intelligence failure of October 7 will likely pale before what the commission of inquiry will reveal once it is established. That was precisely what happened in the case of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which made significant revelations while investigating the intelligence failings of the IDF in the run up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In the eyes of the Israeli generation of the Yom Kippur War, the possibility of such a failure happening again was unthinkable. Yet there is a significant difference between the events of 1973 and the events of last October 7. In 1973 the intelligence failed, but the IDF reacted quickly and acted efficiently. This Q Quotetime, in the first two days of the conflict the IDF was confused and acted without direction, in the apparent absence of relevant action plans for what to do in the event of a massive invasion. The IDF was clearly not ready for such a scenario.

Recently, another important piece of information about the intelligence failure of October 7 was revealed. It was reported that, two months before the surprise attack by Hamas, information was received from an agent handled by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) in Gaza, with a “very high” reliability level. The agent allegedly reported that Hamas was planning “a major move in the week after Yom Kippur”. Yet that warning was not marked as significant; the assumption was that, if the warning materialized, it would be corroborated with additional intelligence. It was thus kept from higher levels of command and from Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI). The ISA did not deny the report, saying instead in a statement: “Focusing on one specific piece of news or another does not reflect the intelligence picture at the time”.

Given the high number of casualties and the horrendous destruction that resulted from the October 7 attack, many Israelis, including some in the security establishment, feel that it is far too long to wait until a commission of inquiry is established and publishes its conclusions. It will likely take at least two years Q Quotefor those conclusions to become public. What is to be done in the meantime? There is public pressure to launch the inquiry soon.

Recently the State Comptroller of Israel, Matanyahu Engelman, announced that he has begun to investigate the intelligence failure. This is an appropriate move. However, with all due respect to the state comptroller’s inquiries, we know from previous experience that his findings have no teeth. For instance, in the context of Hamas, the state comptroller’s review of Operation TZUK EITAN (the 2014 Gaza War) was published in early 2017. It revealed serious instances of misconduct in the intelligence community dating several years prior to the operation. Yet this severe criticism passed below the public’s radar and was practically ignored, while no actions were taken against IDF and ISA security personnel that were shown to have acted irresponsibly.

I would like to point to a number of stronger factors that led to the tragic complacency of October 7, drawn from the field of psychology. It relates to how a country (mainly through its intelligence analysts) perceives its enemies and how this affects the evaluations of said enemies. We know that there was a conception on the Israeli side that Hamas had no interest in attacking Israel at this stage. It seems that the State of Israel underestimated Hamas and its leader, Yahya Sinwar, based on the available evidence of Hamas and Sinwar. Read more of this post

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Analysis: Killing of Hamas leader in Lebanon marks a new phase in Israel’s war

January 3, 2024 by 2 Comments

Dahiyeh BeirutMIDDLE EAST OBSERVERS WERE hardly surprised by yesterday’s news of the apparent assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Lebanon. Not only was al-Arouri a senior Hamas official, but he also headed the militant group’s contact team with Lebanese Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons. He was likely at the top of Israel’s permanent assassination list even prior to Hamas’ bloody assault on Israel last October 7. Yet, within the explosive content of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, Tuesday’s assassination signals the opening of a new and highly unpredictable phase in an already uncertain conflict.

The vague statements issued by Israeli officials in response to the news of al-Arouri’s assassination did little to dispel the broadly accepted view that Israel’s intelligence services were behind the killing. Headed by its external intelligence agency, the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence services have a long history of extrajudicial assassinations. In his seminal book Rise and Kill First, the Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman discusses in detail the history of these assassinations, which predate the postwar establishment of the state of Israel. Bergman’s data-rich research reveals that the Israeli intelligence services have performed approximately 2,700 extrajudicial assassinations in their history —more than any Western state.

Given such a prolific history of targeted killings, al-Arouri’s assassination in Beirut can be described as both expected and unremarkable. Indeed, Israeli officials have stated repeatedly since October 7 that Hamas’ senior leadership will be targeted worldwide. In a leaked recording that emerged last month, Ronen Bar, director of the Israeli Security Agency, was heard announcing to members of Israel’s Knesset that Hamas’ senior leadership would be targeted “in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Lebanon, in Turkey, in Qatar, everywhere”.

At the time the recorded conversation leaked, nobody thought that Bar, a seasoned intelligence officer, was bluffing. Indeed, the operational capabilities and reach of the Mossad are well understood by everyone in the Middle East. That al-Arouri was assassinated in southern Beirut’s Dahiyeh suburb is significant. An undisputed Hezbollah stronghold, Dahiyeh is tightly controlled by the Shiite militant group, which prides itself on ensuring the safety of its residents. Yesterday’s assassination at the very heart of Hezbollah’s lair was nothing short of a demonstration of the Mossad’s competency in special operations.

If Israel is truly intent on neutralizing the leadership of Hamas, Mossad’s competency will be increasingly tested in the coming months, as the Jewish state will have to strike repeatedly beyond its borders. This is because, unlike the beleaguered Gazans, who are currently experiencing the most destructive bombing campaign of the 21st century, most leaders of Hamas live in relative luxury in Doha, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, and other Middle Eastern metropolitan centers. It is there, and not in the razed neighborhoods of Khan Yunis and Jabalia, that Israeli assassination teams will need to operate with increasing dexterity. Read more of this post

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