Analysis: Assad’s collapse in Syria was a strategic surprise to Israel
December 20, 2024 7 Comments
THE COLLAPSE OF THE regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on December 8 caught the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s intelligence community —mainly Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Mossad— by surprise. Assad’s collapse occurred much faster than Israel had estimated. Israel did not expect that the Syrian Arab Army would disintegrate so resoundingly, within 48 hours of the attack by the Syrian rebels.
Israeli intelligence assessed that, despite the shocks it had suffered in recent months, the so-called Axis of Resistance against Israel —mainly Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran— was stable. A scenario of rapid collapse of the government in Syria had not been assessed as a possibility, or even given a low probability tag. That was primarily because the Assad family had governed Syria for almost 60 years.
Following the Assad regime’s collapse, the focus of Israel’s intelligence is on analyzing the intentions of the major rebel organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and understanding how —if at all— it will lead the new administration in Syria. Israel is also examining developments in 
southern Syria, as well as what is happening at the Syrian and Russian military bases in Latakia and Tartus. Moreover, the IDF is monitoring the activities of Iranian elements in Syria, including on the border with Lebanon, to prevent the possibility of military equipment being transferred from Syria to Hezbollah.
It is clear to Israel that Turkey stands behind the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization and that Ankara armed and supported the group for a significant period. What is less clear is whether and how Turkey’s involvement in Syria could threaten Israel’s interests, given that Israel’s relations with Turkey have deteriorated dramatically in recent years.
Assad was a key member of the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance. Following his fall from power, Iran and Hezbollah could lose their main logistical hub for producing, transferring, and storing weapons, as well as training their forces and militias. Additionally, Syria under Assad constantly posed the threat of turning into yet another battlefront against Israel. Without Assad, Russia could lose its grip on Syria —the only country in the Middle East where Russian influence dominates that of the United States. The Russians could also lose access to their military bases in Syria, which offered the Russian Navy access to the waters of the Mediterranean.
Despite the fall of the bitter enemy that was Assad’s Syria, and the deep shock suffered by the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance camp that has been dominant in the Middle East in recent decades, Israeli intelligence is not optimistic about the emerging situation in post-Assad Syria. Syria is a collection of minorities —Druze, Kurds, Alawites, and Christians— that have been artificially joined together despite carrying bitter, bloody scores. The latter may erupt sharply, especially against the Alawites. Concepts such as liberal politics, civil society, or a cohesive nation-state, have never existed inside Syria.
It follows that Israel is very concerned about the emerging uncertainty in Syria. Immediately after the fall of Assad, the IDF strengthened its defenses on the Golan Heights border to ensure that the chaos in Syria did not spill over into Israel. Meanwhile, Israel is in contact —both directly and through intermediaries— with several Syrian rebel groups, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The Israeli message at this stage is a demand that the rebels not approach the border, along with a warning that, if they violate the separation of forces agreement, Israel will respond with force.
And a final note: assessments in relation to the Syrian regime’s collapse continue to emerge in the IDF and the Israeli intelligence community. These assessments concern the extent to which the lessons of October 7 have been sufficiently analyzed and assimilated within Israel. Specifically, there are questions about whether this new intelligence surprise in Syria may stem from the fact that an in-depth investigation into the lessons of October 7 has yet to be carried out during the 14 months of the war with Hamas.
► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 20 December 2024 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
ISRAELI OFFICIALS ARE REPORTEDLY trying to recover the remains of Eli Cohen, an Israeli spy who was hanged in Syria in 1965, after his espionage activities were discovered. Born in Alexandria in 1924, Cohen was an Egyptian Jew, whose family immigrated to Israel after 1949. After joining the Mossad, Israel’s primary external intelligence agency, Cohen became a katsa, or case officer.
THE ISRAEL SECURITY AGENCY (ISA) recently 
THE ISRAELI SECURITY AGENCY (ISA) has announced the 
LEAKED INFORMATION PUBLISHED BY leading German media outlets has revealed Russia’s plans for an influence campaign targeting Israel. The information was leaked earlier this month by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and German television stations Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) and Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), as well as by 
parliament— would support a possible transfer of military aid to Ukraine.
SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, ISRAEL’S Minister of Diaspora Affairs, Amichai Chikli, reportedly met with the chief executive officer (CEO) of Israeli private intelligence company Black Cube. 
THE OFFICIAL INTERNAL INVESTIGATION into the performance of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) during the run-up to the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, has been released. Known as The Road to War, the report addresses the central question of: how did the MID –the main military intelligence body of the Israel Defense Forces, or IDF– miss all the signs of the pending Hamas attack, and how did all the available warnings go unheeded?
THE TARGETED KILLING OF Hassan Mahdawi, a high-ranking member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, was carried out by Israel on April 1, 2024. The actual assassination was based on precise operational intelligence, while Israel’s assessment of Iran’s response was wrong.
ON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.
SINCE OCTOBER 7, 2024, when Israel was caught off guard by a sudden and highly damaging attack from Hamas, more information has surfaced regarding why there was no prior warning about the attack and the failures of Israeli intelligence in this regard.
capabilities. Another important insight is that the counterintelligence structures inside Hamas were successful in preventing Israeli intelligence from recruiting agents who were close enough to Sinwar to be able to alert Israel about the impending attack. Furthermore, Israel’s collection and analysis of signals intelligence was unproductive, possibly because Hamas was successful in countering Israel’s ability to produce effective intelligence from signals intercepts.
A RETIRED SENIOR MOSSAD official has alleged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly ignored, and even frustrated, efforts to stop the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas. This inaction may have enabled the Palestinian militant group to plan, organize and execute Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which killed over 1400 Israelis on October 7, 2023, and sparked the current war between Israel and Hamas.
THE OCTOBER 7 ATTACK on Israel was a total surprise. There was no warning. There were very few signs of a possible attack. Israeli intelligence evaluated these signs as elements of a routine military exercise by Hamas, and even assessed them as parts of an imaginary scenario. It therefore gave no warning to those Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units that were stationed on the border with Gaza. Meanwhile, what we know about the intelligence failure of October 7 will likely pale before what the commission of inquiry will reveal once it is established. That was precisely what happened in the case of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which made significant revelations while investigating the intelligence failings of the IDF in the run up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
time, in the first two days of the conflict the IDF was confused and acted without direction, in the apparent absence of relevant action plans for what to do in the event of a massive invasion. The IDF was clearly not ready for such a scenario.
for those conclusions to become public. What is to be done in the meantime? There is public pressure to launch the inquiry soon.
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Yesterday’s assassination at the very heart of Hezbollah’s lair was nothing short of a demonstration of the Mossad’s competency in special operations.
IT HAS BECOME CLEAR that Hamas had up-to-date intelligence on Israeli targets prior to the attack on October 7, 2023, the largest and most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history. Hamas did not have access to clandestine information sources but rather relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) to understand the structure and weaknesses of Israel’s defense system along the border fence. In addition to publicly available maps, Hamas meticulously gathered online intelligence about specific sites within the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip.
interests of national security, the public’s ‘right to know’ purview is substantial. Thus, significant amounts of information are available online.
the Israeli Military Intelligence was dissolved, for reasons that remain to be investigated. CNN was among many news outlets that have 
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Israeli soldiers working for Iranian intelligence spied on the Iron Dome
February 17, 2025 by intelNews 3 Comments
The two soldiers, identified as Yuri Eliasfov and Georgi Andreyev, held sensitive positions, and a least one was serving as a member of staff in Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system. The soldier serving in the Iron Dome is accused by the police, the Israel Security Agency (ISA), and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), of aiding the enemy during wartime, for which the penalty is life imprisonment or death without the discretion of the court. A prosecutor’s statement has been filed against the two soldiers.
According to the investigation, the espionage affair began when one of the suspects, who served in a classified security system, sought to make contact with Iranian intelligence on social media. During his search, he contacted an Iranian operator, who asked him to complete various tasks in exchange for payments. The investigation revealed that the two soldiers were recruited by Iranian intelligence through the Internet to carry out missions in exchange for payments.
They two men were initially required to spray anti-government graffiti in Tel Aviv and in Israel’s the northern region. Giorgi Andreyev, fearing the consequences of such actions, withdrew from the operation. “We are working for Iran and doing something dangerous,” he told Eliasfov. Despite this, however, Eliasfov, who is reportedly the main suspect in the case, continued his activities.
The undercover investigation revealed that Eliasfov, who serves in the Iron Dome system, filmed a video while participating in a classified information, which he then sent to his Iranian handler. He received $3,500 from the same Iranian official, while his at-times accomplice received $70. During his interrogation, Eliasfov claimed that he committed the acts due to being in a difficult financial situation and because he sought to obtain money easily.
One of the interesting findings that emerged from the investigation of the suspects was that other soldiers and family members were aware of Eliasfov’s initial actions and warned him that he was connecting himself with Iranian elements. Despite that, Eliasfov continued his espionage activities, which included filming a video from inside an Iron Dome facility. The footage reportedly contained classified material that could significantly endanger the security of the State of Israel. Read more of this post
Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with Avner Barnea, espionage, Georgi Andreyev, Iran, Iron Dome, Israel, Yuri Eliasfov