US is helping Israel detect intelligence blind spots and locate Hamas leaders: report

December 4, 2023 by 4 Comments

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES are actively assisting Israel identify the intelligence blind spots that led to the security failure of October 7, and locate senior Hamas leaders, according to the chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Representative Mike Turner (R-OH) said during an interview on Sunday with CBS’s Face the Nation that American intelligence agencies are “working closely” with the Israeli intelligence community.

The purpose of the collaboration is to find intelligence “gaps” and identify the “institutional bias that resulted in” Israeli intelligence officials dismissing warnings about a potential attack by Hamas in the months leading to October 7. The United States is also providing Israel with “selective […] information” about Hamas targets, including senior Hamas officials. Turner noted that “we are not just providing direct access to our intelligence” and that “caution” is being used in determining the types of intelligence that United States agencies are sharing with Israel.

Turner’s comments come less than a week after The New York Times reported that Israeli intelligence had managed to obtain Hamas’ detailed battle plan for the October 7 attack in 2022. It was a 40-page document, written in Arabic, which allegedly contained the precise details of Hamas’ attack plan, but did not specify a date. Senior intelligence officials dubbed the battle plan “Jericho Wall”, but dismissed it as purely aspirational and thought it too elaborate to be carried out in practice.

On November 27, Israel’s Channel 12 television revealed a series of leaked emails from officers in Israel’s 8200 Intelligence Corps unit of the Israel Defense Forces. The emails reportedly raised concerns about an impending attack by Hamas in southern Israel. According to Channel 12, the Unit 8200 emails provided a “highly detailed warning” about Hamas’ plans to take over Israeli villages near the Gaza Strip and kill hundreds of Israelis. However, senior military officials dismissed the plans as “an imaginary scenario”.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 04 December 2023 | Permalink

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Analysis: Israel’s misjudgment of Hamas caused the October 7 intelligence failure

November 10, 2023 by 6 Comments

Gaza StripSINCE OCTOBER 7, WHEN Hamas launched its surprise attack on Israel, many more details about the intelligence failure have emerged. It appears that Israeli intelligence officials have warned for years about military exercises held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which have included practice raids on cities deep inside Israel. However, the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) did not heed to the warnings, because it considered Hamas operationally incapable of carrying out such raids. Instead, the IMI estimated that the Hamas leadership aimed to arrive at a settlement with Israel. That seems like the result of a highly successful disinformation operation, which added significantly to the effectiveness of the sudden attack on Israel on October 7.

It now appears that several months after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operation Guardian of the Walls, which targeted Hamas in the Gaza Strip in May of 2021, Hamas began to train for a large-scale operation against Israel. However, the IMI estimated that Hamas was not capable of attacking aQ Quote large number of settlements simultaneously. It also believed that such an operation would go against the spirit of Hamas leadership’s spirit intention to settle with Israel.

As early as 2022, the IMI had analyzed videos of Hamas’ military exercises, which Hamas itself had made available on social media networks. Meanwhile, the intelligence information that emerged from the Gaza Strip showed that the professionalization of Hamas’ military arm, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was improving. However, IMI officials rejected the need to build an operative response to the mass-attack scenario that these exercises pointed to, because they saw them simply as exercises.

Israeli intelligence also analyzed the communications discourse between the commanders of Hamas, which it had acquired through intercepts. It purportedly indicated that Hamas intended to carry out raids on Israeli communities located near the fence between Israel and Gaza, but also on targets located deeper inside Israel. The communications discourse also indicated that such attacks could occur, not only using tunnels, but with incursions above ground and even through aerial methods.

One of the methods that Hamas trained on, and one that was known to Israeli intelligence, focused on disabling the highly sophisticated observation posts, sensors and remote-controlled machine guns, which Israel has installed along the border fence with the Gaza Strip. The purpose of these exercises was to enable an attack on the fence and overtake it these sophisticated tools with Hamas operatives, thus effectively blinding the Israeli forces. However, Israeli authorities made no effort to prepare for such a scenario by protecting these installations.

The broad picture that is emerging raises serious questions about why the IDF did not take a reasonable course of action against Hamas’ operational plan —and why it failed to do so despite being aware of the intensity of the Hamas exercises, and despite being aware of the group’s stated intentions. Q QuoteIndeed, a preventive course of action should have been in place even in the absence of specific intelligence warnings —if only to enable the IDF to repel a surprise attack by Hamas. There was no need to estimate what Hamas would do in order to prepare for a surprise attack.

Yet it is now patently obvious that there was ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions. The latter were both apparent and known. Even without the wisdom of hindsight, it is clear there was enough intelligence to enable Israel to act in a timely manner against Hamas’ plan. Yet Israel severely misjudged Hamas’ intentions. In retrospect, it appears that ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions had been gathered, that the IMI and Shin Bet were severely underprepared for a surprise attack, that the precise details of Hamas’ attack were missed, and that Hamas’ intentions were misjudged. These are the reasons why Israel was caught unprepared and suffered a catastrophic surprise on October 7.

► Author: Dr. Avner Barnea | Date: 10 November 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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In entering Gaza, the IDF will be facing not just Hamas, but Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’

October 23, 2023 by 1 Comment

Hamas GazaARGUABLY NO COUNTRY BENEFITED more from the American invasion of Iraq than the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a war that lasted over a decade, Washington spent over $2 trillion of its own funds to eliminate one of Iran’s most powerful regional adversaries. In the process, the invasion facilitated the rise of Iraq’s militant Shia movement, which today forms the core of the Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Although it is technically an auxiliary branch of the Iraqi security forces, the PMF regularly looks to Tehran for guidance.

The PMF belongs to what Iranian leaders refer to as the ‘Axis of Resistance’ (mehvar–e moqâvemat in Farsi), a term that denotes the extraordinary expansion of Iran’s influence in the Middle East and Central Asia in recent years. In addition to the PMF in Iraq, the Axis of Resistance incorporates an international coalition of dozens of armed groups, militant factions, Shia tribes, and political parties. They range from the Houthis in Yemen and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, to entire branches of the Syrian Armed Forces, and even Shia militias in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain. The coalition also includes a complex mosaic of armed Palestinian groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and —increasingly after 2018— Hamas.

These actors are certainly disparate, and often contrast with each other. For instance, relations between Hamas and the Syrians have been strained for years. All of them, however, are united in their common anti-Western stance and contempt for pro-Western states in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. Moreover, their ties under the Axis of Resistance umbrella remain informal and relatively loose. However, they all receive support —including funding and training— from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces that protects and promotes the ideological inheritance of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Since 2011, the IRGC has viewed the Axis of Resistance as a vital element of its asymmetric military strategy. Its purpose is to help Iran successfully confront its much stronger adversaries, two of which —the United States and Israel— are nuclear-armed. That is precisely why Tehran has invested nothing short of a fortune to transform Hezbollah into what experts describe as “a force multiplier” that can give Israel a run for its money. In 2014, Tehran launched a similar effort in the Gaza Strip, initially with Palestinian Islamic Jihad —a group that, very much like Hamas, emerged out of the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood in the 1980s.

The financial arrangement between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iran alarmed Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2008. Over time, however, Hamas too began to flirt with Iran’s Axis of Resistance, enticed by the lucrative funding and training opportunities offered by Tehran. By 2020, Hamas was actively engaging with the IRGC under the Axis of Resistance umbrella. To a significant extent, the operational sophistication of the October 7 attack on Israel, which was jointly led by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, provided clear evidence of Iran’s patronage of these two militant groups. Because of Iran, the Palestinian armed factions in Gaza are today better-armed and better-trained than at any time in the past. They will likely demonstrate that in the coming days or weeks, as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) begin their ground offensive on Gaza.

The big question, however, is how the other components of the Axis of Resistance will respond to the impending IDF attack. Read more of this post

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Analysis: How Israeli Intelligence Failed to Anticipate the Hamas Attack

October 16, 2023 by 1 Comment

Hamas GazaSEVERAL DAYS HAVE PASSED since October 7, the day when Hamas stunned Israel with a surprise attack against several settlements near the Gaza border. It is now clear that Israeli intelligence was in possession of warning indicators about the attack, and that these indicators were misjudged.

The IMI and ISA Assessment

It is important to note that the intelligence division of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), known as Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI), and the  Israel Security Agency (ISA), have been monitoring Hamas for years. These two agencies are believed to have conducted a situation assessment approximately two weeks before the October 7 attack. The assessment concluded that Hamas was deterred and had no interest in changing the status quo by attacking Israel in the short run. This assessment was communicated to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant.

It appears that this assessment was not supported by concrete intelligence. The agencies that produced it relied primarily on monitoring the recent behavior of Hamas, including the fact that it was allowing Palestinians living in Gaza to work inside Israel. Additionally, the assessment noted the fact that Hamas was receiving funds from Qatar to help the poverty-stricken residents of Gaza. In retrospect, this assessment appears to have been based on wishful thinking.

The Egyptian Warning

It is now known that Abbas Kamel, Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, sent a warning to Israel a few days before Hamas’ attack. Kamel allegedly warned of “something unusual, a terrible operation”, which was about to take place from the direction of Gaza. The warning was forwarded to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office. The Israeli newspaper that published this report, Yedioth Ahronot, is known for its serious reputation and quality sources inside the Egyptian establishment. According to the report, Kamel was told by the Israelis that they were focused on preventing terrorist attacks in the West Bank.

Yet, in a speech that Netanyahu delivered immediately after the October 7 attack broke out, he denied claims about the Egyptian warning and claimed that they were fake news. However, American Congressman Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said on October 11: “We know that Egypt […] warned the Israelis three days prior that an event like this could happen”. Speaking to reporters following a closed-door intelligence briefing on the crisis for American lawmakers, McCaul added: “I don’t want to get too much into classified [details], but a warning was given”. An Egyptian government source also asserted that Egyptian intelligence officials warned their Israeli counterparts that Hamas was planning “something big” ahead of the October 7 surprise onslaught. But this intelligence appears to have been ignored. Read more of this post

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Analysis : Attack on Israel Points to Systemic Failure at All Levels

October 11, 2023 by 4 Comments

Hamas Israel - BarneaTHE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE October 2023 attack on Israel and the Yom Kippur War is reasonable. We still have an obscured perspective on what happened on October 7. But even this partial picture makes it possible to draw a preliminary comparison. Undoubtedly, there is no precedent for such a monumental failure in the history of Israeli intelligence.

The most striking difference between the two case studies is that in 1973 the system as a whole did not fail. The failure was personal, on the part of several key people, who did not perform according to expectations. The events of 2023 point to a systemic failure at all levels, not personal mistakes. The failure is at the level of intelligence warning, the military response to the attack, and even the actions of Israel’s political leadership.

An Intelligence and Military Failure

In 1973, the intelligence-gathering system was working well, and Egypt’s war intentions were known. Thousands of reports from observations along the Suez Canal spoke of the Egyptian preparations. The wireless transmissions that were issued testified to preparation for war in the Egyptian army. All this did not translate into a warning of war, due to the failed performance of some senior officers in the Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI), who stuck to their preconceived notions until the last moment.

In 2023, the failure is systemic. It involves both the level of collection and at the level of assessment. It relates both to the IMI and the Israel Security Agency (ISA). It has already become clear that the intelligence collection mechanisms failed to detect large-scale preparations for an all-out attack from the Gaza Strip. A massive intelligence system failed to detect the preparatory actions of the assailing forces.

When the perceived enemy is Palestinian civilians and when Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers spend their time guarding settlements and worshipers, instead of engaging in hard training, the result is catastrophic. On October 7, we witnessed the operations of an army whose main mission is occupation. Given what we saw on that day, namely more than 1,000 civilian and military casualties and approximately 150 kidnapped Israelis, it is not clear how this army will be able to face the upcoming challenges in this war. The need for the professionalism and resilience of the IDF, which was there in 1973, continues to exist.

A Political Failure

The comparison between the political leadership of 1973 and 2023 is also discouraging. Back then, the root of the failure was that the intelligence information the leadership received from Eli Zeira, the director of IMI, who was the nation’s most senior intelligence officer, was distorted and false. It is now understood that the IMI’s assessments were based on the concept of reassuring the political leadership. Yet, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan were challenged after the war, and were eventually removed from their positions. However, they acted responsibly.

In contrast, there is not much to say about Israel’s current political leadership. It suffices to look at the composition of the Security Cabinet and the first leaks that have already begun to emanate from it, or at the surge of slander that members of the governing coalition have begun to heap on the finest of the IDF’s officers. It is nothing short of a disgrace and a disaster.

This war has just begun. It is still too early to draw conclusions. But we can examine the conclusions from the Yom Kippur War and assess their relevance to today. When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu talks about revenge, it is advisable to remember those lessons. The conflict with the Palestinians is long and bitter. They will not give up their ambition for their state. It is now time to comprehend the full cost of the continuation of the conflict.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 11 October 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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How Did Israel Miss This Attack? Some Likely Explanations

October 9, 2023 by 7 Comments

Gaza HamasTHE HAMAS-LED OPERATION al-Aqsa Flood, which began on October 7, marked the first large-scale conflict within the borders of Israel since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. However, unlike the coalition of Arab armies it faced in 1948, Israel now confronts an alliance of sub-state groups. Led by Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, this alliance includes the Syrian- and Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad and a number of secular groups, such as the Fatah-aligned al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

Such groups are lesser-known than Hamas; however, they often bring with them expertise in niche areas, such as handling networks of informants inside Israel, building sophisticated explosives, employing unmanned combat drones, or procuring specialized weaponry. They are therefore likely to have contributed greatly to the outcome of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Their participation also enabled Hamas to launch what essentially amounted to a combined arms assault on Israel. The latter included coordinated land, sea and air elements, which were purposefully low-tech. That may explain why the assailants were able to short-circuit and overwhelm the purportedly impregnable security perimeter that Israel maintains around the Gaza Strip.

Iranian and Lebanese Coaching

Putting aside the individual low-tech elements of the operation, its overall level of tactical organization almost certainly points to considerable support from actors beyond the Gaza Strip. Such actors likely include networks of informants within Israel, as well as possibly Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Both are well-versed in hybrid warfare and have studied Israeli defense systems more extensively than any other regional actor. Additionally, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah’s Lebanese Resistance Brigades are seasoned practitioners of deception operations. They likely coached Hamas, not only on how to carry out Operation al-Aqsa Flood, but more importantly on how to prevent Israel and its allies from gathering intelligence about it.

There is no question that an operation of such a magnitude must have taken months —possibly even years— to conceive, develop and organize. Such a complex process would have taken place under the watchful eyes and ears of Israeli and Egyptian intelligence agencies, who have historically faced little resistance in penetrating Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas. Yet none seem to have collected enough intelligence to anticipate the attack. It is equally stunning that the meticulous planning of Operation al-Aqsa Flood appears to have escaped the attention of American intelligence agencies, whose presence in the Middle East is significant. How was that even possible? Read more of this post

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Alleged Israeli spies with Russian citizenship arrested in Lebanon

September 4, 2023 by Leave a comment

Rafic Hariri International Airport Beirut LebanonLAST WEEK, LEBANON’S GENERAL Security Directorate charged two Russian citizens with spying for Israel. The two Russians, who appear to be legally married to each other, were detained by authorities at Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport as they were attempting to leave the country. The detentions were reported by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, which is affiliated with the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.

According to the Al-Akhbar report, one of the suspects admitted that he had been recently recruited into Israeli intelligence. He also reportedly admitted that, as part of his espionage activities, he received maps of sites and instructions about gatherings at facilities in Lebanon belonging to the Hezbollah organization. He added that he had been instructed to access, inspect and, if possible, photograph these facilities. He also reportedly admitted that he had visited southern Lebanon and entered Hamas-controlled areas of southern Beirut, where he had collected data and verified it against the information available to his handlers.

The report added that the suspect’s wife, who was also arrested, admitted under interrogation that she was aware of her husband’s work and that she had assisted him in his tasks. According to the report the General Security Directorate had suspected the Russian citizen, because he had traveled in southern Lebanon several times. Lebanese authorities were able to track his movements and connections, eventually tracing his place of residence. He was arrested along with his wife soon after being notified by his handlers that he should leave the country immediately.

Al-Akhbar added that, prior to the arrest, the General Security Directorate had informed the Russian Embassy in Beirut of its intention to arrest the Russian citizens. The agency’s Director, Elias Elbisri, said following the arrest: “A spy ring for the benefit of the Israeli enemy was foiled at the Beirut airport, consisting of two people who tried to leave Lebanon”. According to Elbisri, “we carried out the necessary investigations; this cell posed a threat to Lebanon”.

Israeli authorities did not respond to news about the incident. It should be noted that, if Russian citizens were indeed recruited and employed by Israeli intelligence, this development could further-damage the relationship between Israel and Russia, which is already fragile due to ongoing developments in Syria and Ukraine. Israel regularly launches attacks on Iranian facilities and equipment in Syria —a Russian ally. Israel is also believed to provide security assistance to Ukraine, which is engaged in a bloody war over territory with Russia.

In recent days, there have been leaks in Israel that an intense debate took place in the Israeli Security Cabinet, following the rise in Palestinian acts of terrorism in Israel, which, according to Israeli security agencies, are guided by Hezbollah and Hamas. As a result, Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip are taking protective actions, fearing the renewal of targeted killings by Israeli forces. Salah al-Aruri, commander of Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, who is directing his forces against Israel from abroad, could also be a target for the Israeli intelligence community.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 04 September 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

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Israeli, Italian intelligence officers drown as boat capsizes in Lake Maggiore

May 31, 2023 by 1 Comment

ONE ISRAELI AND TWO Italian intelligence officers are among the victims of a boating accident in northern Italy. Local reports indicate that the incident occurred last Sunday evening, when a passenger boat named the Gooduria capsized and sank rapidly in Italian territorial waters. The boat was on a sightseeing trip near the Italian shoreline of Lake Maggiore, a popular destination situated on the southern side of the Alps between Italy and Switzerland.

It has been reported that nearly all of the approximately two dozen passengers aboard the Gooduria were current or former members of the Italian and Israeli intelligence services. These individuals were believed to have collaborated professionally as intelligence officers and had gathered for “a convivial meeting to celebrate the birthday of one of the group”, according to a statement issued by the Italian government.

It is worth noting that some Italian news outlets have expressed skepticism about the precise nature of the gathering. An article in the Italian daily Corriere della Sera suggested that “the gathering was a working meeting of intelligence agents”. Another Italian daily, La Stampa, said that the gathering was “an opportunity to exchange information between agents of the two countries”. These claims have not been confirmed by the Italian and Israeli governments.

Italian authorities have stated that no foul play is suspected in the accident. Instead, it is believed that inclement weather, possibly coupled with overcrowding onboard the Gooduria, contributed to the incident. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel released a brief statement on Sunday acknowledging the death of a retired member of the Israeli intelligence services, without identifying the victim by name or professional title. However, local media reports have identified the deceased as Shimoni Erez, 50, a recent retiree from the Mossad, Israel’s external intelligence agency.

The two Italian victims of the accident have been identified as Claudio Alonzi, 62, and Tiziana Barnobi, 53, both of whom were intelligence officers. Additionally, among the casualties was a Russian national named Anna Bozhkova, 50, who was reportedly the wife of the captain of the Gooduria. Following the capsizing of the boat, Israeli diplomats promptly arranged for the immediate evacuation of ten active Israeli intelligence officers from Italy. They were swiftly removed from regional hospitals and transported back to Israel via a military flight.

► Author: Ian Allen | Date: 31 May 2023 | Permalink

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Turkey claims it uncovered Israeli spy cell that targeted Iran

May 24, 2023 by 1 Comment

Israeli consulate Istanbul TurkeyON MONDYA, TURKEY’S NATIONAL intelligence organization (MİT) announced the arrest of several members of an alleged spy network, who were reportedly recruited, trained and handled by Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad. Two members of the alleged spy ring were arrested two months ago, according to the Office of the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor and Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT).

The arrests reportedly came as a result of an investigation into a threatening package sent that was sent in the mail by one of the spy suspects. The investigation was initiated by the Istanbul branch of the General Directorate of Security (Turkish police), which later revealed a connection with a separate 18-month long counterintelligence investigation by the MİT. It eventually led to the arrest of  Selçuk Küçükkaya, a Turkish national, who is accused of operating as the head of the alleged spy ring.

On Monday, Istanbul police arrested 11 associates of Küçükkaya, who the MİT believes to be members of the alleged spy cell. Some reports indicate that Turkish authorities are still searching for two additional suspects who are believed to be part of the alleged spy ring. The MİT states that the spy ring had established a front company through which its members conducted business activities in Iran, with the assistance of intermediaries operating abroad.

The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s office alleges that Küçükkaya made contact with Israeli intelligence through a member of the so-called Gülen movement. The Gülen movement consists of supporters of Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who runs a global network of schools, charities and businesses from his home-in-exile in the United States. The Turkish government has designated Gülen’s group a terrorist organization and claims it was behind the failed 2016 coup against Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Küçükkaya is further-accused of having had several in-person meetings with Mossad officers in various locations around Europe. During those meetings, Küçükkaya allegedly received assignments designed to test his intelligence-gathering abilities. It is alleged that Küçükkaya was eventually hired as a spy by the Mossad, who also provided him with instructions on how to use a clandestine communication system to contact his Israeli handlers.

The claim by the Turkish government that it has busted a Mossad spy cell operating in its territory is not unprecedented. In October 2021, the MİT disclosed the arrests of 15 members of an alleged Mossad spy ring following a series of raids across four Turkish provinces. Last December, Turkish media reported that 44 individuals had been detained and interrogated for allegedly spying on Palestinian exiles living in Turkey on behalf of the Mossad. What is new about this latest claim is the alleged connection between the Mossad and the Gülen movement, which the administration of Turkish President Erdoğan views as an existential domestic security threat.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 24 May 2023 | Permalink

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Social unrest threatens Israel’s intelligence relationship with West, officials warn

March 13, 2023 by 1 Comment

Mark MilleyTHE SPIRALING SOCIAL UNREST in Israel and the Palestinian Territories may harm longstanding intelligence-sharing agreements between Israel and its Western allies, including the United States, according to reports. Historically, intelligence-sharing partnerships between Israel and its closest ally, the United States, have tended to remain largely unaffected by regional upheavals. This time, however, some Israeli officials are concerned that the Israeli-American intelligence relationship is “under a question mark and under great tension”.

According to several reports from the Middle East, Washington was greatly disturbed last month, when leading hardliners in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government attempted to boycott negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian officials in Jordan. The negotiations, which were sponsored by the United States, were an attempt by Washington to de-escalate the spiraling violence between Palestinian factions and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories.

Security observers registered surprise on Friday, March 3, when it was announced that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley (pictured) had arrived in Israel for a previously unannounced visit. The official purpose of General Milley’s visit was to discuss “security cooperation” between Israel and the United States. The American military official made no public remarks while in Israel, where he reportedly met with Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant and Lieutenant General Herzl Halevi, Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces.

But, according to Al-Monitor, General Milley’s remarks to his Israeli counterparts were “unprecedented” in nature. The news outlet quoted an anonymous top Israeli security official, who said he could “not remember when our American allies spoke to us in such a way”. According to the anonymous official, General Milley’s remarks included the phrase “you have to decide which side you are on”. The American military official also told the Israelis that “if you want to continue to talking to us, you need to calm the [Palestinian] territories”. Read more of this post

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Israel beefs up protection of its senior spies, as proxy war with Iran intensifies

November 28, 2022 by 2 Comments

Iran UAV droneISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE STEPPED up measures to protect its senior intelligence and security figures, over concerns they may be targeted by agents of the Iranian state, according to news reports. The news comes amidst widespread concerns that the ongoing shadow conflict between Israel and Iran is escalating in the shadow of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

On Thursday, Israel’s state-owned broadcaster and news agency, Kan, reported that  the government of Israel had implemented additional security measures to protect current and former members of its security and intelligence agencies. The report added that the measures are focused largely on current and former members of Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad, as well as those associated with Israel’s intelligence and security apparatus that are living abroad.

The report comes amidst concerns among security observers that a clandestine war between Israel and Iran is growing in intensity. To a notable extent, this growth is being fueled by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Iran’s supply of cheap and reliable attack drones appears to be enabling Moscow to subvert and outright destroy Ukraine’s national infrastructure. In what seems like a direct response to Iran’s actions, Israel war materiel is now flowing into Ukraine, reportedly through a NATO country.

There are indications that this proxy conflict between Israel and Iran is spreading in Europe and the Middle East. Seeing the success of the use of Iranian drones, some European countries with limited airstrike capabilities, like Serbia and Armenia, are reportedly considering purchasing drone attack systems from Tehran. Meanwhile, Israeli weapons exports to Arab states have skyrocketed since the normalization of Israel’s relations with a number Arab countries in recent years. According to a recent report, last year marked a historic record for the volume of Israeli military and security exports, which increased by 30 percent from 2020. Much of that increase is due to Israeli weapons exports to Arab states, such as Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 28 November 2022 | Permalink

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Probing the intelligence failure behind the assassination of Israeli PM Yitzchak Rabin

November 23, 2022 by 3 Comments

Rabin ArafatLAST WEEK, THE CHAIRMAN of the Israeli Religious Zionist Party, Bezalel Smotrich, who will soon be appointed as a cabinet minister, alleged that the Israel Security Agency (ISA) encouraged the killer of the late Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Smotrich’s allegation shocked many Israelis, because of the unfortunate timing —it was uttered close to the annual Remembrance Day for Prime Minister Rabin, who was assassinated by radical rightwing activist Yigal Amir 27 years ago. But also because of the unacceptable content, which echoes conspiracy theories that have accompanied Rabin’s assassination for many years. To counter these conspiracy theories, it is fitting to discuss the failure to defend Rabin that did occur under the responsibility of the ISA.

The failure that caused Rabin’s assassination was investigated by a National Inquiry Commission (known as the Shamgar Commission), which found the ISA responsible. In fact, it was deemed a double failure: the first by the personnel of the VIP Security Unit of the ISA, and the second by the intelligence personnel of the ISA, whose job it was to thwart in advance murderous intentions by extreme rightwing elements in Israel. The intelligence failure was not investigated in depth by the Shamgar Committee. It dealt mainly with the security failure and only partially with the intelligence failure. Its investigation focused on the activities of ISA agent Avishi Raviv (code name CHAMPAGNE) who was tasked by the ISA to infiltrate extreme rightwing groups. The Committee did not ask: could the ISA’s intelligence have prevented the murder?

It is also possible to ask: why was the mandate of the Shamgar Committee limited to investigating the area of security, and not intelligence? And why did its members refrain from extending their investigation to the issue of the intelligence failure? There are no answers to this question, even in the autobiographical book of the Committee’s chairman, the late Supreme Court Chief Justice Meir Shamgar.

A Key Piece of Intelligence

Smotrich referred to agent Raviv, who was indeed run in a deficient and unprofessional manner. Yet no malicious intentions can be attributed to the ISA. In any case, Raviv’s defense attorney convinced the court that Raviv did not know about the assassin’s intentions before the murder. The key piece of intelligence, which the ISA had received six months before Rabin’s murder, regarding Amir’s intentions, was handled extremely poorly: an asset of the IDF Central Command’s intelligence department told his commander that he had heard “a small, rotund and armed Yemeni” speaking at a bus stop about his intention to assassinate Rabin. The intelligence was immediately passed on to the head of the appropriate department in the ISA. Unfortunately, however, instead of the source being interrogated by trained ISA personnel, a police investigation was conducted that did not reveal any significant additional information. Read more of this post

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A dramatic kidnap case in Malaysia may point to changes in Mossad’s tactics

October 24, 2022 by 2 Comments

Kuala Lumpur MalaysiaREPORTS FROM KUALA LUMPUR SUGGEST that Malaysian agents operating in the service of Israeli intelligence carried out the kidnapping of a Palestinian engineer, Omar al-Balbaisi, on September 28. According to the Malaysian newspaper The Straits Times, the kidnap operation was orchestrated by the Israeli external intelligence agency, the Mossad.

Omar al-Balbaisi completed a bachelor’s degree in computer science at the Islamic University in Gaza, where he allegedly joined the Izz-ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, specializing in hacking mobile phones. In or around 2020, al-Balbaisi left the Gaza Strip for Istanbul, where, according to reports, a Hamas secret intelligence and cyber unit was established in 2020. The unit allegedly operated on instructions from the Hamas leadership in Gaza, without the knowledge of the Turkish authorities.

When al-Balbaisi was kidnapped, he was reportedly returning from lunch with another Palestinian expatriate. According to the report, a white van drove toward the two men. Four people emerged from the van, grabbed al-Balbaisi and dragged him into the vehicle, while yelling at him: “our boss wants to talk to you”. The other Palestinian tried to help al-Balbaisi, but was warned to stay away from the scene. He subsequently filed a report at a police station, reportedly about 40 minutes after his friend was kidnapped.

According to the reports, the kidnapped Palestinian was taken bound and blindfolded to a safe house, where his Malaysian captors tied him to a chair. They then called two men, allegedly Israelis, who told the abductee: “you know why you are here”. According to another report, al-Balbaisi was interrogated, allegedly by two Israelis, believed to be Mossad agents, via a video call. However, the video call was disconnected when Malaysian police officers broke into the safe house.

Upon receiving the information about the kidnapping, Malaysian police immediately sought to locate al-Balbaisi. They subsequently managed to raid the house where the Palestinian was being held, while his interrogation was underway. A source told the Malaysian newspaper that “the Israelis wanted to know about [al-Balbaisi’s] experience in the field of software, about the strengths of Hamas in this field, and the members of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades that he knew”. Read more of this post

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Study assesses Hamas’ double-agent operations against Israeli intelligence

August 22, 2022 by Leave a comment

HamasA NEW STUDY SHEDS light on the little-studied topic of counterintelligence operations launched against Israel by the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas. Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist and nationalist organization with a 35-year history, which has controlled the Gaza Strip since 2007. As is typically the case with Middle Eastern non-state actors, Hamas is a complex umbrella organization that combines social-service and administrative functions with armed elements. The latter include internal policing components and a full-time military wing, as well as reserve armed forces.

Although much research has focused on Hamas’ military and non-military components, the organization’s intelligence functions remain under-studied. For this reason, a new article that assesses Hamas’ double-agent operations against Israeli intelligence deserves attention. The article is titled “An Asymmetric Doubling”: A Nonstate Actor Using the Method of Doubling Sources —Hamas against Israeli Intelligence”, and was authored by Netanel Flamer, a lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University and postdoctoral fellow at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. It was published last week by the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence.

In his article, Flamer explains the usefulness of double-agent operations for non-state actors engaged in asymmetric conflicts against opponents with superior resources. Non-state actors tend to place tremendous value in double-agent operations, because they offer them the opportunity to “generate achievements of the greatest impact using the most efficient means”. They can do so despite the relative poverty of their resources, as compared to their adversaries. These types of operations employ human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, who work with two opposing intelligence services, only one of which is privy to their dual role. Such sources are known in intelligence parlance as “double agents”.

Hamas’ Early Counterintelligence Efforts

Interestingly, Hamas’ first counterintelligence outfit preceded its own establishment. Upon its founding in 1987, at the peak of the First Intifada, Hamas was immediately able to rely on al-Majd, a counterintelligence apparatus that had been established a year earlier by Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. The mission of al-Majd was to uncover suspected Israeli collaborators among Palestinian communities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The organization was also known for deploying varying levels of torture against suspected collaborators, or against their relatives.

By the early 1990s, al-Majd was in a position to launch a number of confirmed counterintelligence operations. A notable early case is that of Maher Abu Srur, a Hamas member who had been recruited by the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service. At the culmination of this double-agent operation, Srur actually murdered his Israeli handler at a Shin Bet safe house in Jerusalem. According to Flamer, al-Majd is known to have launched several other double-agent operations against the Shin Bet, with varying levels of success. Importantly, it often is difficult to determine whether al-Majd double agents were deployed after they were first recruited by the Shin Bet, or whether they were originally deployed by al-Majd as “dangles”. Read more of this post

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Many see Israel behind May 22 killing of Iranian paramilitary leader in Tehran

May 25, 2022 by 2 Comments

IRGC IranA GROWING NUMBER OF security observers point to Israel as the most likely culprit behind the assassination of a leading member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s powerful paramilitary force. Brigadier General Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, who was killed in broad daylight in Tehran on May 22, served as deputy director of the Quds Force, a major branch of the IRGC. The mission of the Quds Force is to carry out unconventional warfare, especially in support of IRGC operations against adversaries abroad.

Observers regularly describe the IRGC as a ‘praetorian guard’ that operates inside Iran’s governing apparatus. Today the IRGC is a military force with a command structure that is distinct from Iran’s regular Armed Forces. It maintains its own army, navy and air force, has its own paramilitary and political protection units, and oversees Iran’s nuclear program. The IRGC’s weapons development falls under the duties of the Quds Force, in which Khodaei was a leading figure. He was also known to have been closely mentored by IRGC Commander Qasem Soleimani, who was assassinated by the United States in 2020.

Kodaei was assassinated in broad daylight on May 22, as he was heading home from his office in downtown Tehran, located a few blocks from the main building of Iran’s Consultative Assembly. According to eyewitness reports, Kodaei’s vehicle was rapidly approached by two individuals riding on a motorbike. They sped away seconds after shooting Kodaei five times, killing him almost instantly. The entrance to the street where Kodaei was attacked was allegedly blocked by a white van, which also sped away following the shooting.

Israel is known for carrying out assassinations of Iranian officials using motorbikes, which can move with relative ease in the congested streets of Tehran. IntelNews regulars will recall that Israeli intelligence claimed last month to have detained and interrogated an alleged Iranian assassin named Mansour Rasouli. A video of his alleged testimony emerged, which was reportedly filmed at a Mossad safehouse somewhere in Iran. Meanwhile, Kodaei’s assassins remain at large.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 25 May 2022 | Permalink

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