US spy agencies resisting White House plan to create master list of espionage threats
July 1, 2026 9 Comments
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES are reportedly refusing to abide by a White House directive that requires them to turn over the names of all individuals who are believed to be spying on the United States. The directive aims to build a master list of all known foreign intelligence actors with the goal of streamlining American counterintelligence efforts against them. However, according to a New York Times report, senior counterintelligence officials are concerned that such a centralized master list could leak and result in a catastrophic compromise of national security information.
Citing “people familiar with the matter”, the Times said on Monday that the effort to create a master list of foreign spies and Americans who are spying on behalf of foreign intelligence services is being led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The agency has asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI to provide the names of all individuals who have been found to engage in espionage and are being watched by the Bureau. Likewise, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been asked to provide names of foreign espionage operatives that populate its lists of potential assets—foreign spies who may in time be turned by the CIA.
The master list of spies would potentially allow the entirety of the United States Intelligence Community (IC) to monitor the global activities of these espionage operatives and share information about them in real time. Additionally, the existence of such a list would in theory prevent operational duplication and help deconfliction within the IC when it comes to counterintelligence efforts. The central idea behind the master list dates to National Security Presidential Memorandum – 7, a directive issued by President Donald Trump in October 2017, during his first term in office.
However, senior counterintelligence officials are reportedly concerned that giving the ODNI full access to such a comprehensive master list of espionage threat actors could potentially compromise the integrity of counterintelligence operations. Information about espionage operatives and assets—both current and prospective—is usually protected behind several layers of classification and compartmentalization that shield it even within individual intelligence agencies. Additionally, some of the information relating to these individuals is acquired through counterintelligence activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and is thus subject to tight restrictions.
At a deeper level, the resistance of senior counterintelligence officials to surrender sensitive information about espionage to the ODNI reflects years of mutual suspicion and turf wars within the IC. According to the Times, these officials have yet to agree about how such a master list would be constructed, what information it would contain, who should have access to it, and how it should be maintained and updated.
► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 1 July 2026 | Permalink
intelNews.org 
The NOC List.
Didn’t this happen last time Trump was in office he got a list of intelligence assets and shortly thereafter the agents started disappearing? And we had to pull several assets out of areas including one that was able to send photo’s of what was on Putin’s desk, sounds like more treason to me. And what about the large packet of something from Trump that was supposed to have been hand delivered to Russian Intelligence in Moscow by a U.S. Senator?
Jack Smith has all the receipts. A compromised politician is a threat to national security, let alone a president who’s a convicted felon for that matter. Espionage operatives and shared information form a highly connected, fluid mechanism. Like the legal concept of communicating vessels, where liquid levels equalize across connected containers, intelligence flowing through one asset naturally and immediately impacts the threat landscape or defensive posture across the entire network. The intelligence lifecycle—tasking, collection, evaluation, and dissemination—relies entirely on this deeply intertwined string of assets. Operating much like a hub-and-spoke model, modern spy rings require careful management to ensure intelligence is safely processed. The entire chain depends on several core principles which I am sure you’re aware. https://www.cornellpolicyreview.com/the-executive-records-recovered-from-mar-a-lago-and-the-c-i-a-s-missing-informants/?pdf=6365
Interesting and some valid points. However, we can not ignore the serious fact that a compromised politician is a threat to national security (and allies), especially one that is a convicted felon. Worth reading https://www.justice.gov/storage/US-v-Trump-Nauta-De-Oliveira-23-80101.pdf Espionage operatives and shared information form a highly connected fluid mechanism. Like the legal concept of communicating vessels, where liquid levels equalize across connected containers, intelligence flowing through one asset naturally and immediately impacts the threat landscape or defensive posture across the entire network. The intelligence lifecycle—tasking, collection, evaluation, and dissemination—relies entirely on this deeply intertwined string of assets. Operating much like a hub-and-spoke model, modern spy rings require careful management to ensure intelligence is safely processed. The entire chain depends on several core principles which I am sure you’re very familiar with. Also see – https://www.cornellpolicyreview.com/the-executive-records-recovered-from-mar-a-lago-and-the-c-i-a-s-missing-informants/?pdf=6365
Back in my day I quickly learned to avoid writing anything down. Verbal was king. BUT, as a historian I am now on the other side of the situation and always looking for records, letters, etc.
I agree with the folks wanting to avoid the President’s list. It sounds amateurish at best and a real security risk at worst. Knowing the list exists will put a damper on anyone’s inclination to be a source. The list would become widely known in short order as secrets are never kept secret for very long. The other side will love knowing what we are aiming at.
From a CI stand point, considering the LEAKS FROM all levels, the bickering between agencies, Yes it is a nightmare. From a CI view, the duplication of CI efforts against targets, wasted time of agencies creating a separate track for a target is also a problem. The ONLY WAY to be effective is to have a NOC level control system for NTK. AND get rid of all the agencies with their own rice bowl jobs. The oldest Fed LEA, USMS needs to take over ALL fed LEAs work. it will take 20 years for the angry sister agencies to age out and the time spent on CI aganist pissed off , adopted 1811s will be massive. USI has a terrible insider track record. SO a master list is needed but BAD. It must be run like HUMINT source control, via ONE agency.
Storm in a tea cup. The more eyes that see the list the less a secret it is obviously.
Trump’s favorable attitude Putin underlines why centralised access to the names of foreign spies, and Americans they have recruited, should be avoided. A list of names would find its way through Trump, his staff or his golfing buddies to Moscow.
Many Russians or their American agents (including some in Trump’s circle) would be on the list. Once those Russians or agents found out they could flee to Russia.
We ran agents in Vietnam and never identified them by name. Each had a numeric designation which wasn’t further identified by region or locale. Don’t see why this couldn’t be something to explore.