German intelligence agencies discuss ongoing espionage and hybrid challenges

Conference AgendaTHE 5TH SYMPOSIUM ON the Law of Intelligence Services (Symposium zum Recht der Nachrichtendienste) took place in Berlin, Germany, on March 21-22. In view of the public criticism that German intelligence agencies have faced in recent times, it was probably a relief for their officials to be able to talk more-or-less among themselves for once.

The event (see agenda in .pdf) was organized by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Chancellery Office. This year’s topic was: “Intelligence Agencies and Armed Conflicts”. It included the tried and tested mix of academics —predominantly legal scholars—, practitioners and heads of various government authorities. The majority of the external experts discussed the complicated and, in Germany, arduous parliamentary procedures that would arise in the event of a war.

In view of the controls increasingly being placed on German intelligence agencies by various bodies and authorities —which were also represented at the symposium— a certain discrepancy became apparent repeatedly in the presentations: How can the German intelligence agencies react adequately and quickly to hybrid threats when these types of threat do not concern themselves with administrative-legal subtleties and parliamentary procedures? Although the concept of hybrid threats was generally taken for granted and therefore hardly discussed in terms of content, those present agreed at a minimum that disinformation is part of it. All the more worrying was the statement by one speaker who explained that there was no official definition of disinformation within the German security authorities’ legal codes.

In the discussion, the panel moderated by Center for Intelligence Service Training and Further Education (ZNAF), the common training and study location of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), clearly stood out and underscored that this relatively new institution has made a name for itself in the academic intelligence landscape since its establishment in 2019.

However, the symposium also showed that the German security bureaucracy tends to reach its limits when it comes to current developments in the unconventional domain. This was demonstrated, for example, by a speaker’s demand that hybrid risks ought to be assigned to a “state area of responsibility”. The problem, however, lies precisely in the statelessness of hybrid risks. The existing regulations are also proving to be counterproductive, in view of the challenges: there would simply be highly heterogeneous participants in the so-called Cyber Defense Centre, which would also include police authorities. However, due to the strict separation in the legal domain, personal data cannot simply be passed on from the BND to the Federal Police, for example. Read more of this post

Germany arrests sixth alleged spy in less than a month

MSS ChinaAUTHORITIES IN GERMANY HAVE arrested a sixth person in less than a month, in connection with three separate cases of espionage orchestrated by Russian or Chinese intelligence. Last Tuesday, police in the east German city of Dresden arrested an assistant to a leading politician of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland party (AfD). The assistant, who is a dual German-Chinese citizen, is accused of spying for Chinese intelligence, while the far-right politician who employed him is also being investigated, according to reports.

German news reports have identified the alleged spy as Jian Guo, 43, who lives in Dresden with his wife and children. Guo reportedly entered Germany as a student and stayed there after completing his studies, eventually becoming a naturalized German citizen. In 2019 he joined the staff of the office of Maximilian Krah, a senior AfD politician, who had recently been elected to the European Parliament.

According to the German prosecutor’s office, Guo had begun working for Chinese intelligence prior to joining Krah’s office as an assistant. At least some of his alleged espionage activities involved posing as a critic of the Chinese government and joining dissident groups of Chinese expatriates in Germany. He would then provide information about the activities of these groups to Chinese intelligence, according to his indictment. The latter described Guo’s intelligence activity as “an especially severe case” of espionage.

Meanwhile, German authorities are also reportedly investigating Krah himself over payments he allegedly received from pro-Chinese and pro-Russian individuals or groups. In a statement issued late last week, the AfD politician said he had been informed about Guo’s arrest from media reports and that he had no information about this case. Shortly after Krah’s statement, the AfD described Guo’s arrest as “highly disturbing” and added that party authorities would do “everything possible to aid the investigation”.

During the month of April alone, Germany has arrested no fewer than six individuals in a series of apparently unconnected cases of espionage, connected with Russia or China. Two of these individuals are German citizens of Russian origin, who were allegedly assisting Russian intelligence plan acts of sabotage against military installations located on German soil. Three other German citizens were allegedly planning to provide designs of advanced aircraft engines to Chinese intelligence officials.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 29 April 2024 | Permalink

Poland and Germany charge Russian operatives with assassination, sabotage plots

Rzeszów-Jasionka AirportAUTHORITIES IN GERMANY and Poland have charged three individuals with working on behalf of Russian military intelligence in planning acts of sabotage and assassination on European soil. One of the plots allegedly involved an effort to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Another aimed to sabotage commercial airport facilities that are being managed by the United States military.

Polish and Ukrainian authorities announced last week the arrest of Paweł K., a Polish citizen, who is believed to have been engaged in collecting information about the security of the Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport. Located in southeastern Poland, Rzeszów-Jasionka is a relatively small provincial airport. Its proximity to the Ukrainian border has made it central to efforts by Kyiv’s allies to supply it with war materiel following the expansion of Russia’s occupation of Ukraine in February 2022. Military supplies are transported to Rzeszów-Jasionka from across the world and then transferred across the Ukrainian border with trucks. Additionally, many high-level meetings between Ukrainian and Western officials take place at the airport. The United States military is currently providing security at the Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport.

Polish authorities said last week that Paweł K. was part of a Russian intelligence collection operation that was “intended to assist in the planning of a potential assassination of a foreign state leader”, namely President Zelenskyy. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said it informed its Polish counterpart agency about the assassination plot, which had been foiled “as a result of the close co-operation” between Ukrainian and Polish intelligence. Paweł K. is not a diplomat and thus has no immunity from prosecution in Poland. If convicted, therefore, he could face up to eight years in prison.

In a seemingly unconnected development, police in the southeastern German state of Bavaria arrested two dual German-Russian nationals, who have been charged with planning to sabotage military and industrial facilities on German soil. The plot appears to be part of broader Russian efforts to disrupt the production and delivery of military aid to Ukraine. At least one of the locations that the suspects are accused of targeting is a local military base under the command of the United States. The two suspects have been identified as Dieter S., 39, and Alexander J., 37. Both were arrested in the small city of Bayreuth.

Germany’s Federal Foreign Office, led by Minister Annalena Baerbock, summoned Sergei Nechayev, Russian Ambassador to Berlin, shortly after the arrest of Dieter S. and Alexander J. Some media reports noted the “unusually hasty” way Nechayev was summoned, which may indicate that German authorities have acquired “unequivocal proof of the link between the plot and the Kremlin”. An announcement made by the Russian embassy in Berlin confirmed that Nechayev had been summoned in connection to the arrests, but added that the ambassador had been presented with “no proof” that the two suspects were connected with Russian intelligence or that they had planned acts of sabotage.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 22 April 2024 | Permalink

Interview reveals state of mind of Israeli intelligence prior to October 7 attack

Israeli General Staff MilitaryON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.

But on March 23, after about 5 months, Channel 12 aired the original interview with Elya. The retired official spoke with glee about the advanced technological capabilities developed by the ISA in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. Elya said Israeli intelligence had built a unique system, known as “the Tool”, which allegedly provided intimate knowledge about the life of every Palestinian living in the West Bank and Gaza. This technologically advanced surveillance system allegedly monitored every move of its targets, all for the purpose of preventing potential terrorist attacks against the Jewish state. Elya claimed that, as a result of this advanced technological system, there was no chance that Israel would be surprised by Palestinian militants. This system was so advanced, he said, that intelligence agencies from all over the world were coming to Israel to learn about it.

Thanks to Channel 12, we can now examine Elya’s interview retrospectively, and especially in light of the ISA’s poor performance on October 7, as well as its failure to warn Israeli authorities about Hamas’ preparations for the attack. Notably, Elya was interviewed again for the same television program. Predictably, he admitted that his prior assessment had been wrong and regretted being so overly confident about the technology.

This case demonstrates the overestimation by Israeli intelligence of its own capabilities, because of arrogance and over-confidence. This approach refutes the basic premise of intelligence work: be skeptical and be modest. Furthermore, this case highlights that Israeli intelligence agencies overly relied on technology (SIGINT) in the lead-up to October 7, while seemingly neglecting the low-tech activity of gathering information through human intelligence (HUMINT).

The system that Elya described in his initial interview as the ultimate counterintelligence tool was reportedly criticized internally by some in the ISA for gathering huge amounts of information without offering sufficient analytical capability. This imbalance between collection and analysis can render an entire surveillance system practically useless. The bottom line is that, almost by accident, we are now aware of the state of mind that the ISA was in before the sudden attack by Hamas on October 7, which cost so many lives as a result of the ISA’s complacency.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 01 April 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

United States consistently underestimates Cuban intelligence, sources say

AGENTS OF THE CUBAN government have “penetrated virtually every segment of the United States national security structure,” enabling Havana to share actionable intelligence with Russia and China, according to a new report. Citing former United States and Cuban intelligence officers, The Wall Street Journal said on Saturday that Washington’s counter- intelligence efforts are no match for Cuba and its intelligence service, the Dirección de Inteligencia (DI). The DI is “the best damn intelligence service in the world” for cultivating agents, according to Brian Latell, a retired CIA analyst who served as the U.S. Intelligence Community’s National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. Latell told The Wall Street Journal that the Dirección de Inteligencia bears the imprint of Fidel Castro himself, who took a personal interest in running the service during his reign.

Among the strengths of the Cuban intelligence service is its ability to recruit Americans who are motivated by ideological reasons, rather than by financial gain. The Cubans have historically approached Americans at a young age, usually at universities in the United States or other countries in the Americas. They cultivate those relationships by employing strategic patience that pays off many years —even decades— later. By recruiting ideological sympathizers, the Cubans rarely need to pay their agents large amounts of money, as the cases of Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ana Belén Montes and State Department diplomat Manuel Rocha suggest. Many Cuban agents enter military service in the United States, which means they acquire Secret or Top-Secret clearances. Others are instructed to penetrate anti-communist groups of Cuban-Americans in southern Florida, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The U.S. counterintelligence strategy prioritizes Russia and China, which means that Cuban intelligence operations are treated as “an afterthought,” claims the paper. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), America’s primary counterintelligence agency, dedicates relatively few resources to investigating Cuban intelligence. Its efforts are chronically “understaffed and outmatched” by Havana, according to former counterintelligence officers who spoke to The Wall Street Journal. The paper notes that the FBI is often aware of several dozen cases of “actual or potential” Cuban agents operating in the U.S. However, it routinely lacks the requisite resources to investigate them.

► Author: Ian Allen | Date: 18 March 2024 | Permalink

Russian intelligence services intensify efforts to ‘liquidate’ defectors: report

Maksim KuzminovTHE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES have been “bolstering the[ir] architecture” aimed at stopping potential defectors and “liquidating” those who have already defected and are living in exile, according to a new report. In a leading article published on Sunday, The Wall Street Journal said that the list of “unsolved deaths” of the Kremlin’s Russian critics is “lengthening” and may have surpassed 50, according to some accounts.

Since the current phase of the invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, Russian defectors and other critics of Russia’s ongoing war have “died in unusual circumstances on three continents”, according to the New York-based newspaper. Most deaths have occurred inside Russia, but several have occurred in countries such as India, France, and Spain. In the most recent case, Maksim Kuzminov, a Russian helicopter pilot, who defected to Ukraine in August 2023, was gunned down in Villajoyosa, Spain, last month, in what The Journal described as a “mafia-style assassination”.

The paper notes that very few of these killings or suspicious deaths can be directly attributed to the Kremlin. It adds, however, that the Russian government has ordered a redoubling of coordinated anti-defector operations by the country’s three main intelligence agencies —the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU). In their effort to prevent defections and punish defectors, these agencies have blurred their operational boundaries,  “making it more difficult to know which is responsible” for anti-defector operations, says The Journal.

Russian anti-defector operations are also increasingly involving third-country nationals —operatives who have no official connection with Russia, or with the country in which they are operating on behalf of Russian intelligence. In one recent example from last August, authorities in Britain arrested three Bulgarian citizens with spying for Russia. According to British government prosecutors, the suspects possessed forged passports and identity cards for Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Croatia, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 04 March 2024 | Permalink

Netanyahu ignored calls to disrupt Hamas finances, claims ex-Mossad official

Udi LevyA RETIRED SENIOR MOSSAD official has alleged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly ignored, and even frustrated, efforts to stop the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas. This inaction may have enabled the Palestinian militant group to plan, organize and execute Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which killed over 1400 Israelis on October 7, 2023, and sparked the current war between Israel and Hamas.

The allegation was made by Udi Levy, a 30-year veteran of the Israeli intelligence community, who served as an intelligence officer in the Israel Defense Forces before being appointed to head the Economic Warfare Division of the Mossad, Israel’s external intelligence agency. During his tenure in the Mossad, which ended with his retirement in 2016, Levy was a member of Task Force Harpoon, which aimed to disrupt the flow of funds to militant Palestinian groups, including Hamas.

Last week, Levy told the BBC’s flagship investigative television program Panorama that Task Force Harpoon had identified around 40 companies in the Middle East and North Africa, which were part of Hamas’ investment portfolio. These companies, based in countries such as Sudan, Algeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, were active in the areas of real estate, mining, construction, and tourism, among others. Some of the companies were even directly controlled by Hamas, said Levy.

The income from these financial investments allowed Hamas to use “billions, not millions” of dollars to build its military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, according to the former Mossad official. That investment income was supplemented with direct cash infusions from Iran and Qatar, which in some cases arrived monthly through special envoys, according to Levy. He added that Turkey was “a critical focal point” in Hamas’ money network, as it served as a financial hub for the militant group’s holdings.

Levy told the BBC that he personally advised Netanyahu to “target Hamas’ finances” and explained to him that “Israel had the means to crush Hamas by using only financial tools”. However, Levy claims that, not only did the Israeli prime minister ignore Levy’s advice, but he proceeded to shut down the Mossad’s Task Force Harpoon. This is not the first time that Levy has made these claims. In December 2023, he told The New York Times that Task Force Harpoon analysts were so frustrated with the Israeli government’s inertia, that they resorted to “uploading some documents to Facebook” in hopes that the Israeli authorities would be forced to take action once details about Hamas’ finances were disclosed.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 26 February 2024 | Permalink

Ireland halts issuances of Russian diplomatic visas due to espionage concerns

Russian embassy IrelandAUTHORITIES IN IRELAND ARE systematically “freezing” applications for Russian diplomatic visas from Moscow over concerns that the Kremlin is using its embassy in Dublin as a base for espionage activities. In 2018, the Irish government introduced emergency legislation that canceled a previously approved expansion of the Russian diplomatic compound in the Irish capital, allegedly due to concerns about espionage activities by Russian diplomats. Three years later, reports emerged that Irish government officials were concerned about the expanding size of Russia’s diplomatic presence in Dublin.

In April 2022, Ireland expelled four Russian diplomats, which it claimed were undercover intelligence officers. A subsequent report by the London-based Times newspaper alleged that a major reason Dublin had expelled the diplomats was their “efforts to cultivate contacts with dissident republicans and loyalist paramilitaries” in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland, which is British soil. The report added that at least one of the four expelled Russian diplomats was believed to be an intelligence officer for the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces —widely known by its Cold War-era initials, GRU.

On February 10, The Irish Times alleged that the Irish government was “refusing to allow Russia to replace diplomats assigned to its Dublin embassy […] due to concerns over espionage”. The article went on to claim that Russia’s diplomatic presence in Ireland had “dropped by half” and was causing a “tense standoff” between Ireland and Russia. It also quoted a spokesman from the Russian embassy in Dublin, who decried Ireland’s “unacceptable visa and accreditation policy”. The Russians told the paper that their embassy was staffed by just eight administrative staff and six diplomats.

On February 17, The Irish Times said it had corroborated the Russian officials’ claims by speaking with Micheál Martin, Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Martin was approached by the newspaper’s reporters in Germany, where he attended the Minich Security Conference. Martin told The Irish Times that the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs was  carefully “scrutinizing” every new application for a diplomatic visa by the Russian government. The reason for the careful scrutiny, said Martin, was a number of advisories issued by Ireland’s intelligence services, suggesting “that other activities were underway” at the Russian embassy and that some embassy staff “were not actually diplomats but were performing intelligence functions”. Martin added that the Irish government had determined “15 diplomats should be adequate for [Russia’s] needs” in Ireland.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 18 February 2024 | Permalink

Alleged Afghan-born Russian spy tries to regain revoked British citizenship

GCHQAN AFGHAN-BORN MAN, who became a naturalized British citizen and worked for British intelligence for over a decade, is attempting to regain his British citizenship, which was revoked after he was accused of being a Russian spy. The man, who is identified in court documents only as “C2”, was born in Afghanistan and grew up under the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan he left the country alongside the Russian forces and resettled in Russia, where he attended university and married a Russian woman.

By 2000, when he entered the United Kingdom as an Afghan asylum seeker, he was in possession of Russian citizenship due to his marriage to a Russian citizen. He was eventually granted asylum in Britain and began to work as an interpreter for the Foreign Office and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Britain’s signals intelligence agency. His fluency in Russian, Dari, and Pashto, made him invaluable to British intelligence as the United States-led ‘war on terrorism’ escalated in Afghanistan. In the late 2000s, the British Foreign Office sent C2 to Afghanistan, where he worked to build ties between the nascent post-Taliban Afghan government and the British diplomatic corps stationed in the country.

It was in Afghanistan, according to Britain’s Security Service (MI5), that C2 began to develop contacts with Russian intelligence officials. The agency claims that two Russian military attaches stationed in the Afghan capital Kabul, identified in court documents as “Boris” and “Dimitri”, recruited C2 on behalf of the Main Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces’ General Staff, which is commonly known as GRU. The British government claims that, following his recruitment by GRU, C2 traveled to Russia at least six times and once to Cyprus, where he continued to hold regular meetings with his Russian handlers.

On 2019, after he had left government service, MI5 began to question C2 about his alleged connection to Russian military intelligence. He consistently denied that he was a Russian spy. Eventually, MI5 took him “to the roof of a hotel” in London, where he was administered a polygraph examination. A few weeks later, by which time he had returned to his base in Kabul, C2 was informed that his British citizenship would be revoked due to his espionage work for the Russians.

Ironically, the British government evacuated C2 from Afghanistan in 2021 as part of Operation PITTING, during which 15,000 Afghan nationals were transported to the United Kingdom as the Taliban descended on Kabul. Upon arriving in the United Kingdom, C2 was arrested and eventually released on bail. Last week he formally appealed against the British government’s decision to strip him of his citizenship. His case was heard in secrecy at a special hearing of the United Kingdom’s Special Immigration Appeal Commission (SIAC). The SIAC is expected to rule in March or April.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 12 February 2024 | Permalink

India arrests Moscow embassy security employee for spying for Pakistan

Embassy of India in RussiaAUTHORITIES IN INDIA HAVE arrested a security employee at the Indian High Commission in Russia, accusing him of spying for Pakistani intelligence. The embassy of India in Moscow is one of its largest in the world and is viewed as critical to New Delhi’s strategic relations with Russia. Employees that staff the Moscow embassy are highly vetted and typically represent the cream of the crop of India’s Ministry of External Affairs. It follows that news of the arrest of a Moscow embassy security employee on espionage charges must have raised eyebrows in India.

The employee in question has been identified in news reports as Satendra Siwal, a resident of the village of Shahmahiuddinpur, located in the Hapur district of Uttar Pradesh. He is believed to have been employed as an India-Based Security Assistant (IBSA) at the Indian embassy in Moscow since 2021. Siwal reportedly belongs to the embassy’s Multi-Tasking Staff (MTS), a broad job title that encompasses a variety technical support specialists working at India’s diplomatic facilities worldwide.

According to reports, Siwal was arrested by members of the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) in the northern Indian city of Meerut, 250 miles northeast of New Delhi. He was charged with participating in “anti-India activities”, which included providing government secrets to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. According to the ATS, the secrets given to the ISI by Siwal included information about strategic planning by the Indian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of External Affairs (Siwal’s direct employer), and the Indian military. Siwal allegedly spied for the ISI in exchange for financial compensation.

Indian authorities said the case against Siwal was built with the help of “electronic surveillance” and other “evidence collection”, but did not provide details. In a statement issued on Monday, the ATS said Siwal had allegedly “confessed to his crime” during questioning. The espionage suspect is now facing charges under India’s Official Secrets Act.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 5 February 2024 | Permalink

CIA director secretly visits Somalia and Kenya amidst rising tensions in East Africa

Al-Shabaab - IAWILLIAM BURNS, DIRECTOR OF the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reportedly visited in secret at least two East African nations last week, amidst growing tensions and instability in the region. The trip was confirmed by both the Kenyan and Somali governments after Burns had already returned to the United States.

Reports indicate that Burns held a high-level meeting on Monday in Nairobi with Kenyan President William Ruto and Noordin Haji, the director of Kenya’s National Intelligence Service. The United States Ambassador to Kenya, Margaret Whitman, was also reportedly present at the meeting. Later in the week, on Thursday, the CIA director met with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Mogadishu before departing for the United States.

The specific details of the discussions during Burns’ visit remain undisclosed, leading to considerable speculation. Notably, it is highly unusual for senior American intelligence officials to personally visit sub-Saharan Africa, as the CIA typically communicates with the local governments through station chiefs or American ambassadors. Burns’ in-person visit suggests compelling reasons for the direct engagement.

According to some Kenyan news outlets, discussions encompassed the escalating instability in sub-Saharan Africa, which are stemming from various sources. These include the ongoing conflict in Sudan between government-aligned forces and militias loyal to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Additionally, there is growing turmoil in the Democratic Republic of Congo after last month’s elections, resulting in the re-election of President Félix Tshisekedi. Disputes over the election’s fairness have led to military deployments to maintain peace amid rising tensions throughout the country.

Washington’s concerns also revolve around the continuing presence of al-Shabaab in East Africa. Operating in Somalia, al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-linked armed group, engages in conflict with the Somali government and is responsible for several terrorist attacks in Kenya. The United States currently has around 500 military advisors in Somalia, supporting the Somali government in its efforts against al-Shabaab.

Notably, the CIA has not issued an official statement regarding Burns’ visit to East Africa.

► Author: Ian Allen | Date: 22 January 2024 | Permalink

North Korean radio station known for sending coded messages to spies goes silent

North South KoreaNORTH KOREA APPEARS TO have suspended a long-standing radio station, known for broadcasting content targeted at South Koreans, which also aired encrypted messages intended for North Korean spies abroad. Radio Pyongyang was founded by Korean communist forces in the 1940s. In 1950 it formed part of the North Korean state’s official media propaganda arm.

Throughout the Cold War, Radio Pyongyang aired hundreds of hours of news and cultural content every week. The broadcasts were in various languages and were exclusively aimed at international listeners. However, most of the station’s output was targeted at South Koreans. In 2002, the station was renamed Voice of Korea. Around that time, possibly owing to a temporary rapprochement between North and South Korea, the station curtailed much of its political programming. However, broadcasts featuring political content were resumed in 2016, as relations between the two warring sides began to deteriorate once again.

For much of its existence, the Voice of Korea has also been known to operate as a so-called numbers station. The term denotes shortwave radio stations, usually sponsored by a government entity, that regularly air broadcasts consisting of formatted number sequences. These sequences are widely believed to be encrypted communications addressed to intelligence officers operating abroad. They contain operational instructions and other directives that are typically undecipherable without the use of an encryption protocol. These stations also broadcast certain types of music, which function as codewords and are believed to signal specific directives to spies.

But the Voice of Korea unexpectedly fell silent last week. Its website, which features content in several languages, also appears to have been taken down. The sudden changes occurred days after North Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, delivered a key address during the year-end plenum of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in Pyongyang, on December 31. In his speech, which became public on January 6, the North Korean leader declared that the reunification of Korea under communist principles —a longstanding goal of the WPK—had been rendered “impossible” due to widening differences in approach between the two Koreas.

The North Korean strongman also called for “a fundamental change” in the WPK’s policy on inter-Korean affairs. Finally, he discussed a series of steps for the “reorganization of entities” that govern North Korea’s relations with South Korea. Several North Korean government websites focusing on the reunification of Korea, including the Voice of Korea website, have since been taken down. North Korea observers suggest that the daily radio broadcasts of the Voice of Korea appear to be part of the reorganization declared by Kim Jong-UN on December 31.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 15 January 2024 | Permalink

Canadian judge bars Chinese PhD student from entering, citing espionage concerns

University of WaterlooIN AN UNPRECEDENTED AND potentially highly consequential decision, a judge has barred a Chinese PhD student from entering Canada over concerns he might be pressured to spy by the government of China. The case could have “ripple effects” on universities across Canada and possibly even all of North America, according to legal experts.

The central figure in the case is Yuekang Li, a citizen of China, who was accepted into the Mechanical and Mechatronics Engineering PhD program of the University of Waterloo. Li stated in his application that his goal was to return to his home country after receiving his PhD and work to “improve its public health system”. However, when Li applied for a graduate student visa, his application was denied by an officer of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the government department that oversees applications for entry visas into the country.

In deeming Li inadmissible to Canada, the IRCC officer in charge of his case reportedly cited the student’s strong interest in microfluidics, a niche branch of nanotechnology with a wide range of applications in the biopharmaceutical industry. The IRCC officer also noted growing concerns in the West about the use of students and researchers as “non-traditional collectors of information” by the government in Beijing. In a number of such cases, Chinese students and researchers have been given permission by the Chinese state to work abroad with the understanding that they will deliberately collect information that will benefit China’s military-industrial complex.

Li promptly challenged the IRCC’s decision, which ended up being heard in Federal Court. Li’s legal representatives argued that the rejection of his application for a student visa relied on “an overly broad definition of espionage” and engaged in “speculation”, rather than factual evidence. But on December 22, Federal Court Chief Justice Paul Crampton sided with the IRCC.

In his decision, which was made available late last week, the judge agrees with the IRCC’s view that the graduate research Li proposed to carry out at the University of Waterloo would fall under the definition of “non-traditional espionage”. He referred to China as a “hostile actor” and cautioned that such actors “increasingly make use of non-traditional methods to obtain sensitive information in Canada or abroad, contrary to Canada’s interests”. Given that new reality, Canada’s legal understanding of what constitutes “espionage” must evolve”, Judge Crampton argues in his decision.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 08 January 2024 | Permalink

Analysis: Killing of Hamas leader in Lebanon marks a new phase in Israel’s war

Dahiyeh BeirutMIDDLE EAST OBSERVERS WERE hardly surprised by yesterday’s news of the apparent assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Lebanon. Not only was al-Arouri a senior Hamas official, but he also headed the militant group’s contact team with Lebanese Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons. He was likely at the top of Israel’s permanent assassination list even prior to Hamas’ bloody assault on Israel last October 7. Yet, within the explosive content of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, Tuesday’s assassination signals the opening of a new and highly unpredictable phase in an already uncertain conflict.

The vague statements issued by Israeli officials in response to the news of al-Arouri’s assassination did little to dispel the broadly accepted view that Israel’s intelligence services were behind the killing. Headed by its external intelligence agency, the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence services have a long history of extrajudicial assassinations. In his seminal book Rise and Kill First, the Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman discusses in detail the history of these assassinations, which predate the postwar establishment of the state of Israel. Bergman’s data-rich research reveals that the Israeli intelligence services have performed approximately 2,700 extrajudicial assassinations in their history —more than any Western state.

Given such a prolific history of targeted killings, al-Arouri’s assassination in Beirut can be described as both expected and unremarkable. Indeed, Israeli officials have stated repeatedly since October 7 that Hamas’ senior leadership will be targeted worldwide. In a leaked recording that emerged last month, Ronen Bar, director of the Israeli Security Agency, was heard announcing to members of Israel’s Knesset that Hamas’ senior leadership would be targeted “in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Lebanon, in Turkey, in Qatar, everywhere”.

At the time the recorded conversation leaked, nobody thought that Bar, a seasoned intelligence officer, was bluffing. Indeed, the operational capabilities and reach of the Mossad are well understood by everyone in the Middle East. That al-Arouri was assassinated in southern Beirut’s Dahiyeh suburb is significant. An undisputed Hezbollah stronghold, Dahiyeh is tightly controlled by the Shiite militant group, which prides itself on ensuring the safety of its residents. Yesterday’s assassination at the very heart of Hezbollah’s lair was nothing short of a demonstration of the Mossad’s competency in special operations.

If Israel is truly intent on neutralizing the leadership of Hamas, Mossad’s competency will be increasingly tested in the coming months, as the Jewish state will have to strike repeatedly beyond its borders. This is because, unlike the beleaguered Gazans, who are currently experiencing the most destructive bombing campaign of the 21st century, most leaders of Hamas live in relative luxury in Doha, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, and other Middle Eastern metropolitan centers. It is there, and not in the razed neighborhoods of Khan Yunis and Jabalia, that Israeli assassination teams will need to operate with increasing dexterity. Read more of this post

Veteran Belgian politician was a spy for Chinese intelligence, report alleges

MSS ChinaA LONGTIME BELGIAN POLITICIAN worked as a spy for Chinese intelligence for at least three years, according to a joint investigation by a consortium of European news media. Until last week, the politician, Frank Creyelman, 62, was a leading member of Vlaams Belang, a far-right separatist party that draws nearly the entirety of its support from northern Belgium’s Dutch-speaking Flemish regions. In addition to seeking to separate Flanders from Belgium, Vlaams Belang opposes immigration and multiculturalism, with much of its criticism directed at Islam.

From 1995 until 2014, Creyelman served as a member of the Flemish Parliament or the Belgian Senate, representing the Antwerp Province. During that time, he became known for his pro-Russian views, which he continued to propagate in retirement. In 2021, he voiced strong skepticism against the Belgian government’s efforts to provide diplomatic, financial, and military support to Ukraine. Following his retirement from frontline politics, Creyelman became an honorary member of the Flemish Parliament. He also remained chairman of Vlaams Belang in his home city of Mechelen, a Dutch-speaking stronghold.

Last week, however, a joint investigation by the British newspaper The Financial Times, French newspaper Le Monde and German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, claimed that Creyelman worked as a spy for China for at least three years. Citing unnamed “intelligence officials from four Western countries”, the investigation claimed that Creyelman had been recruited by Daniel Woo, a case officer for China’s Ministry of State Security. Woo is believed to work out of the MSS branch in China’s far-eastern province of Zhejiang, though he has also served tours in Europe under diplomatic cover, including in Romania and Poland.

It is not known how the MSS recruited Creyelman. It appears that most of his communication with his alleged MSS handler took place via text messages. However, it is claimed that in 2019 Creyelman traveled to Sanya, a popular tourist resort in China’s Hainan Island, where he allegedly met Woo and possibly other MSS operatives. Notably, the journalists behind the investigation into Creyelman claim that they have accessed incriminating messages exchanged between Creyelman and Woo. The text messages span the period between early 2019 and late 2022.

In the text messages, Woo asks Creyelman to try to influence senior-level discussions in Belgium and elsewhere concerning China’s treatment of its ethnic Muslim populations in the Xinjiang Province. The far-right politician was also instructed to find ways to vilify and discredit European researchers and academics who were documenting China’s treatment of ethnic Muslims in Xinjiang. Woo also asked Creyelman to try to quell criticism of China’s crackdown of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. In one message, Woo explained that China’s purpose was “to divide the US-European relationship”.

Last Friday, just hours after the allegations about Creyelman’s alleged espionage emerged, Vlaams Belang announced that it had expelled him from its ranks. In a social media post, the party’s leader, Tom Van Grieken, denounced Creyelman’s espionage as going “against the purpose and essence, even the name, of our party”. He added: “The only loyalty for nationalists can only be to their own nation”.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 18 December 2023 | Permalink