Israel releases findings of internal probe into October 7 intelligence disaster

August 12, 2024 by 17 Comments

Hamas GazaTHE OFFICIAL INTERNAL INVESTIGATION into the performance of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) during the run-up to the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, has been released. Known as The Road to War, the report addresses the central question of: how did the MID –the main military intelligence body of the Israel Defense Forces, or IDF– miss all the signs of the pending Hamas attack, and how did all the available warnings go unheeded?

To compline the report, the Intelligence Directorate of the IDF investigated how the most significant intelligence failure in the history of the State of Israel occurred, as well as how the MID analysts and other members of the intelligence community failed to notice the attack that Hamas had been planning.

According to the findings of the investigation, Hamas began planning its attack between seven and eight years ago, which means that Israeli intelligence should have been able to observe the relevant warnings as early as 2016. However, the IDF’s intelligence division missed the early signs.

It appears that the MID assumed Hamas had been deterred by Israel. There was also a prevailing assumption that the group’s military wing, led by Yahya Sinwar, had settled on improving the economic situation of Gaza Strip residents while securing its internal sovereign status in the Gaza Strip. The MID intelligence analysts were uniformly immersed in the concept that Hamas “did not want to and could not” go to war against Israel.

The main findings of the investigation are as follows: Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , ,

Interview reveals state of mind of Israeli intelligence prior to October 7 attack

April 1, 2024 by 4 Comments

Israeli General Staff MilitaryON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.

But on March 23, after about 5 months, Channel 12 aired the original interview with Elya. The retired official spoke with glee about the advanced technological capabilities developed by the ISA in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. Elya said Israeli intelligence had built a unique system, known as “the Tool”, which allegedly provided intimate knowledge about the life of every Palestinian living in the West Bank and Gaza. This technologically advanced surveillance system allegedly monitored every move of its targets, all for the purpose of preventing potential terrorist attacks against the Jewish state. Elya claimed that, as a result of this advanced technological system, there was no chance that Israel would be surprised by Palestinian militants. This system was so advanced, he said, that intelligence agencies from all over the world were coming to Israel to learn about it.

Thanks to Channel 12, we can now examine Elya’s interview retrospectively, and especially in light of the ISA’s poor performance on October 7, as well as its failure to warn Israeli authorities about Hamas’ preparations for the attack. Notably, Elya was interviewed again for the same television program. Predictably, he admitted that his prior assessment had been wrong and regretted being so overly confident about the technology.

This case demonstrates the overestimation by Israeli intelligence of its own capabilities, because of arrogance and over-confidence. This approach refutes the basic premise of intelligence work: be skeptical and be modest. Furthermore, this case highlights that Israeli intelligence agencies overly relied on technology (SIGINT) in the lead-up to October 7, while seemingly neglecting the low-tech activity of gathering information through human intelligence (HUMINT).

The system that Elya described in his initial interview as the ultimate counterintelligence tool was reportedly criticized internally by some in the ISA for gathering huge amounts of information without offering sufficient analytical capability. This imbalance between collection and analysis can render an entire surveillance system practically useless. The bottom line is that, almost by accident, we are now aware of the state of mind that the ISA was in before the sudden attack by Hamas on October 7, which cost so many lives as a result of the ISA’s complacency.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 01 April 2024 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , ,

Opinion: Five months into the war, Israeli intelligence failure looks even worse

March 11, 2024 by 4 Comments

Israel Hamas warSINCE OCTOBER 7, 2024, when Israel was caught off guard by a sudden and highly damaging attack from Hamas, more information has surfaced regarding why there was no prior warning about the attack and the failures of Israeli intelligence in this regard.

It has become clear that Israeli intelligence miscalculated Hamas’s intentions. The Israeli security concept, spearheaded by the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Israel Security Agency (ISA), was that: (a) Hamas had been deterred from launching large-scale attacks; and (b) Hamas was focused on carrying out terrorist attacks against Israelis in the West Bank and not on Israel proper. This flawed security concept, which had been fully adopted by the Israeli cabinet and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was proven to be groundless. In fact, Hamas successfully exploited it in order to develop and accelerate its attack strategy.

One significant reason for the failure of the IDF, both in the area of intelligence collection and operationally, was its underestimation of the capabilities of Hamas and the intentions of its leader, Yahya Sinwar. There was also an overestimation by many in Israel, including the security establishment, of Israel’s own intelligence Q Quotecapabilities. Another important insight is that the counterintelligence structures inside Hamas were successful in preventing Israeli intelligence from recruiting agents who were close enough to Sinwar to be able to alert Israel about the impending attack. Furthermore, Israel’s collection and analysis of signals intelligence was unproductive, possibly because Hamas was successful in countering Israel’s ability to produce effective intelligence from signals intercepts.

As the IDF moved deeper into Gaza, and as more information was collected from Hamas facilities, it became clear that there were significant gaps in information regarding the preparations for the attack by Hamas inside Gaza. These preparations lasted for a long time and involved numerous operatives who remained undetected by Israeli intelligence. It looks like the compartmentation system inside Hamas, based on a need-to-know only model, was highly effective.

The IDF attacked the Gaza Strip in 2014 in Operation Protective Edge. Its mission was to destroy Hamas’s ability to carry out assaults against Israel through tunnels dug deep inside Gaza and crossing the border into Israel. Indeed, about 20 such tunnels were destroyed during that operation. Later, Hamas built 250 miles of new tunnels in Gaza that were aimed at defense and to hide combatants when Israel attacked. It has been suggested that this construction project was funded by cash sent to Gaza by Qatar, with Israel’s approval —though Qatar denies this claim. Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , ,

Netanyahu ignored calls to disrupt Hamas finances, claims ex-Mossad official

February 26, 2024 by 8 Comments

Udi LevyA RETIRED SENIOR MOSSAD official has alleged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly ignored, and even frustrated, efforts to stop the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas. This inaction may have enabled the Palestinian militant group to plan, organize and execute Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which killed over 1400 Israelis on October 7, 2023, and sparked the current war between Israel and Hamas.

The allegation was made by Udi Levy, a 30-year veteran of the Israeli intelligence community, who served as an intelligence officer in the Israel Defense Forces before being appointed to head the Economic Warfare Division of the Mossad, Israel’s external intelligence agency. During his tenure in the Mossad, which ended with his retirement in 2016, Levy was a member of Task Force Harpoon, which aimed to disrupt the flow of funds to militant Palestinian groups, including Hamas.

Last week, Levy told the BBC’s flagship investigative television program Panorama that Task Force Harpoon had identified around 40 companies in the Middle East and North Africa, which were part of Hamas’ investment portfolio. These companies, based in countries such as Sudan, Algeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, were active in the areas of real estate, mining, construction, and tourism, among others. Some of the companies were even directly controlled by Hamas, said Levy.

The income from these financial investments allowed Hamas to use “billions, not millions” of dollars to build its military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, according to the former Mossad official. That investment income was supplemented with direct cash infusions from Iran and Qatar, which in some cases arrived monthly through special envoys, according to Levy. He added that Turkey was “a critical focal point” in Hamas’ money network, as it served as a financial hub for the militant group’s holdings.

Levy told the BBC that he personally advised Netanyahu to “target Hamas’ finances” and explained to him that “Israel had the means to crush Hamas by using only financial tools”. However, Levy claims that, not only did the Israeli prime minister ignore Levy’s advice, but he proceeded to shut down the Mossad’s Task Force Harpoon. This is not the first time that Levy has made these claims. In December 2023, he told The New York Times that Task Force Harpoon analysts were so frustrated with the Israeli government’s inertia, that they resorted to “uploading some documents to Facebook” in hopes that the Israeli authorities would be forced to take action once details about Hamas’ finances were disclosed.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 26 February 2024 | Permalink

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , ,

Analysis: Israel underestimated Hamas while overestimating its own capabilities

January 10, 2024 by 10 Comments

IDF IsraelTHE OCTOBER 7 ATTACK on Israel was a total surprise. There was no warning. There were very few signs of a possible attack. Israeli intelligence evaluated these signs as elements of a routine military exercise by Hamas, and even assessed them as parts of an imaginary scenario. It therefore gave no warning to those Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units that were stationed on the border with Gaza. Meanwhile, what we know about the intelligence failure of October 7 will likely pale before what the commission of inquiry will reveal once it is established. That was precisely what happened in the case of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which made significant revelations while investigating the intelligence failings of the IDF in the run up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In the eyes of the Israeli generation of the Yom Kippur War, the possibility of such a failure happening again was unthinkable. Yet there is a significant difference between the events of 1973 and the events of last October 7. In 1973 the intelligence failed, but the IDF reacted quickly and acted efficiently. This Q Quotetime, in the first two days of the conflict the IDF was confused and acted without direction, in the apparent absence of relevant action plans for what to do in the event of a massive invasion. The IDF was clearly not ready for such a scenario.

Recently, another important piece of information about the intelligence failure of October 7 was revealed. It was reported that, two months before the surprise attack by Hamas, information was received from an agent handled by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) in Gaza, with a “very high” reliability level. The agent allegedly reported that Hamas was planning “a major move in the week after Yom Kippur”. Yet that warning was not marked as significant; the assumption was that, if the warning materialized, it would be corroborated with additional intelligence. It was thus kept from higher levels of command and from Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI). The ISA did not deny the report, saying instead in a statement: “Focusing on one specific piece of news or another does not reflect the intelligence picture at the time”.

Given the high number of casualties and the horrendous destruction that resulted from the October 7 attack, many Israelis, including some in the security establishment, feel that it is far too long to wait until a commission of inquiry is established and publishes its conclusions. It will likely take at least two years Q Quotefor those conclusions to become public. What is to be done in the meantime? There is public pressure to launch the inquiry soon.

Recently the State Comptroller of Israel, Matanyahu Engelman, announced that he has begun to investigate the intelligence failure. This is an appropriate move. However, with all due respect to the state comptroller’s inquiries, we know from previous experience that his findings have no teeth. For instance, in the context of Hamas, the state comptroller’s review of Operation TZUK EITAN (the 2014 Gaza War) was published in early 2017. It revealed serious instances of misconduct in the intelligence community dating several years prior to the operation. Yet this severe criticism passed below the public’s radar and was practically ignored, while no actions were taken against IDF and ISA security personnel that were shown to have acted irresponsibly.

I would like to point to a number of stronger factors that led to the tragic complacency of October 7, drawn from the field of psychology. It relates to how a country (mainly through its intelligence analysts) perceives its enemies and how this affects the evaluations of said enemies. We know that there was a conception on the Israeli side that Hamas had no interest in attacking Israel at this stage. It seems that the State of Israel underestimated Hamas and its leader, Yahya Sinwar, based on the available evidence of Hamas and Sinwar. Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , ,

Analysis: Killing of Hamas leader in Lebanon marks a new phase in Israel’s war

January 3, 2024 by 2 Comments

Dahiyeh BeirutMIDDLE EAST OBSERVERS WERE hardly surprised by yesterday’s news of the apparent assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Lebanon. Not only was al-Arouri a senior Hamas official, but he also headed the militant group’s contact team with Lebanese Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons. He was likely at the top of Israel’s permanent assassination list even prior to Hamas’ bloody assault on Israel last October 7. Yet, within the explosive content of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, Tuesday’s assassination signals the opening of a new and highly unpredictable phase in an already uncertain conflict.

The vague statements issued by Israeli officials in response to the news of al-Arouri’s assassination did little to dispel the broadly accepted view that Israel’s intelligence services were behind the killing. Headed by its external intelligence agency, the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence services have a long history of extrajudicial assassinations. In his seminal book Rise and Kill First, the Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman discusses in detail the history of these assassinations, which predate the postwar establishment of the state of Israel. Bergman’s data-rich research reveals that the Israeli intelligence services have performed approximately 2,700 extrajudicial assassinations in their history —more than any Western state.

Given such a prolific history of targeted killings, al-Arouri’s assassination in Beirut can be described as both expected and unremarkable. Indeed, Israeli officials have stated repeatedly since October 7 that Hamas’ senior leadership will be targeted worldwide. In a leaked recording that emerged last month, Ronen Bar, director of the Israeli Security Agency, was heard announcing to members of Israel’s Knesset that Hamas’ senior leadership would be targeted “in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Lebanon, in Turkey, in Qatar, everywhere”.

At the time the recorded conversation leaked, nobody thought that Bar, a seasoned intelligence officer, was bluffing. Indeed, the operational capabilities and reach of the Mossad are well understood by everyone in the Middle East. That al-Arouri was assassinated in southern Beirut’s Dahiyeh suburb is significant. An undisputed Hezbollah stronghold, Dahiyeh is tightly controlled by the Shiite militant group, which prides itself on ensuring the safety of its residents. Yesterday’s assassination at the very heart of Hezbollah’s lair was nothing short of a demonstration of the Mossad’s competency in special operations.

If Israel is truly intent on neutralizing the leadership of Hamas, Mossad’s competency will be increasingly tested in the coming months, as the Jewish state will have to strike repeatedly beyond its borders. This is because, unlike the beleaguered Gazans, who are currently experiencing the most destructive bombing campaign of the 21st century, most leaders of Hamas live in relative luxury in Doha, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, and other Middle Eastern metropolitan centers. It is there, and not in the razed neighborhoods of Khan Yunis and Jabalia, that Israeli assassination teams will need to operate with increasing dexterity. Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , , , , ,

The OSINT factor in Hamas’ operational success and Israel’s intelligence failure

December 5, 2023 by 1 Comment

Hamas GazaIT HAS BECOME CLEAR that Hamas had up-to-date intelligence on Israeli targets prior to the attack on October 7, 2023, the largest and most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history. Hamas did not have access to clandestine information sources but rather relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) to understand the structure and weaknesses of Israel’s defense system along the border fence. In addition to publicly available maps, Hamas meticulously gathered online intelligence about specific sites within the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip.

It is also possible that some of the intelligence came from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, largely through Gazan workers who were employed in Israel. Moreover, Hamas had access to constant Israeli media broadcasts, which supplied them with invaluable intelligence on the border communities and adjacent military facilities, as well as on communities that were located further to the north and east. Although the Israeli state exercises censorship in the Q Quoteinterests of national security, the public’s ‘right to know’ purview is substantial. Thus, significant amounts of information are available online.

In assessing the behavior of Hamas in recent years, one can observe that it did not act as a terrorist group for quite some time. Rather, it operated as a government organization, while monitoring its enemy and waiting patiently for an opportune moment to attack. Simultaneously, Hamas utilized disinformation tools to conceal its attack plans. It trained its fighters within commando units that employed information effectively and relied on actionable intelligence, rather than chance. This can be observed from interrogations of Hamas members who were detained by Israeli authorities after October 7. In one example, Hamas used detailed maps of Israeli communities near the Gaza border, which are available on Google Earth, to plan its attacks of October 7. Printouts of these maps were found among the belongings of Hamas assailants that were killed during the attacks.

Some in Israel are now advocating for increased protection of OSINT, particularly for Israeli sites related to security, including civilian first-response units, defense systems guarding settlements, and civil technological assets. However, implementing such measures within the current framework of Israel’s open society seems challenging. Despite the known importance of OSINT to Hamas and its potential risk to Israel’s security, significant changes in this regard may not occur, as they could impact the country’s democratic values. However, it is still possible to improve the quality of security censorship regarding sensitive civilian information that can be used by adversaries. Such moves would include protecting databases, limiting information relating to the addresses of senior officials, or putting in place stricter policies on the movement of Gazan workers in Israel.

Contrary to Hamas’, Israel’s OSINT systems underperformed in the run-up to the October 7 attacks. That was so especially after the central OSINT unit of the Israeli Military Intelligence was dissolved, for reasons that remain to be investigated. CNN was among many news outlets that have revealed how Hamas advertised its military drills on social media, but somehow Israeli intelligence failed to pay attention to them.

When Hamas openly declared its intention to attack communities near the Gaza border, and trained its units for that purpose, the Israeli intelligence community, including the IMI and the Israel Security Agency (ISA), underestimated its real attack capabilities based on OSINT materials. This miscalculation stemmed from incorrectly assessing Hamas’s capabilities and overestimating the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to swiftly respond and prevent the attack on civil and military targets. Unfortunately, this assessment proved to be a significant mistake.

The effective use of OSINT lies at the heart of Hamas’ operational plan to attack simultaneously several Israeli targets and to cause extensive damage. It appears that Hamas was able to utilize the OSINT factor to its maximum extent, thus adding significant value to the success of the attack.

► Author: Dr. Avner Barnea | Date: 05 December 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , ,

Analysis: Israel’s misjudgment of Hamas caused the October 7 intelligence failure

November 10, 2023 by 6 Comments

Gaza StripSINCE OCTOBER 7, WHEN Hamas launched its surprise attack on Israel, many more details about the intelligence failure have emerged. It appears that Israeli intelligence officials have warned for years about military exercises held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which have included practice raids on cities deep inside Israel. However, the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) did not heed to the warnings, because it considered Hamas operationally incapable of carrying out such raids. Instead, the IMI estimated that the Hamas leadership aimed to arrive at a settlement with Israel. That seems like the result of a highly successful disinformation operation, which added significantly to the effectiveness of the sudden attack on Israel on October 7.

It now appears that several months after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operation Guardian of the Walls, which targeted Hamas in the Gaza Strip in May of 2021, Hamas began to train for a large-scale operation against Israel. However, the IMI estimated that Hamas was not capable of attacking aQ Quote large number of settlements simultaneously. It also believed that such an operation would go against the spirit of Hamas leadership’s spirit intention to settle with Israel.

As early as 2022, the IMI had analyzed videos of Hamas’ military exercises, which Hamas itself had made available on social media networks. Meanwhile, the intelligence information that emerged from the Gaza Strip showed that the professionalization of Hamas’ military arm, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was improving. However, IMI officials rejected the need to build an operative response to the mass-attack scenario that these exercises pointed to, because they saw them simply as exercises.

Israeli intelligence also analyzed the communications discourse between the commanders of Hamas, which it had acquired through intercepts. It purportedly indicated that Hamas intended to carry out raids on Israeli communities located near the fence between Israel and Gaza, but also on targets located deeper inside Israel. The communications discourse also indicated that such attacks could occur, not only using tunnels, but with incursions above ground and even through aerial methods.

One of the methods that Hamas trained on, and one that was known to Israeli intelligence, focused on disabling the highly sophisticated observation posts, sensors and remote-controlled machine guns, which Israel has installed along the border fence with the Gaza Strip. The purpose of these exercises was to enable an attack on the fence and overtake it these sophisticated tools with Hamas operatives, thus effectively blinding the Israeli forces. However, Israeli authorities made no effort to prepare for such a scenario by protecting these installations.

The broad picture that is emerging raises serious questions about why the IDF did not take a reasonable course of action against Hamas’ operational plan —and why it failed to do so despite being aware of the intensity of the Hamas exercises, and despite being aware of the group’s stated intentions. Q QuoteIndeed, a preventive course of action should have been in place even in the absence of specific intelligence warnings —if only to enable the IDF to repel a surprise attack by Hamas. There was no need to estimate what Hamas would do in order to prepare for a surprise attack.

Yet it is now patently obvious that there was ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions. The latter were both apparent and known. Even without the wisdom of hindsight, it is clear there was enough intelligence to enable Israel to act in a timely manner against Hamas’ plan. Yet Israel severely misjudged Hamas’ intentions. In retrospect, it appears that ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions had been gathered, that the IMI and Shin Bet were severely underprepared for a surprise attack, that the precise details of Hamas’ attack were missed, and that Hamas’ intentions were misjudged. These are the reasons why Israel was caught unprepared and suffered a catastrophic surprise on October 7.

► Author: Dr. Avner Barnea | Date: 10 November 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , , , ,

In entering Gaza, the IDF will be facing not just Hamas, but Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’

October 23, 2023 by 1 Comment

Hamas GazaARGUABLY NO COUNTRY BENEFITED more from the American invasion of Iraq than the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a war that lasted over a decade, Washington spent over $2 trillion of its own funds to eliminate one of Iran’s most powerful regional adversaries. In the process, the invasion facilitated the rise of Iraq’s militant Shia movement, which today forms the core of the Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Although it is technically an auxiliary branch of the Iraqi security forces, the PMF regularly looks to Tehran for guidance.

The PMF belongs to what Iranian leaders refer to as the ‘Axis of Resistance’ (mehvar–e moqâvemat in Farsi), a term that denotes the extraordinary expansion of Iran’s influence in the Middle East and Central Asia in recent years. In addition to the PMF in Iraq, the Axis of Resistance incorporates an international coalition of dozens of armed groups, militant factions, Shia tribes, and political parties. They range from the Houthis in Yemen and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, to entire branches of the Syrian Armed Forces, and even Shia militias in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain. The coalition also includes a complex mosaic of armed Palestinian groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and —increasingly after 2018— Hamas.

These actors are certainly disparate, and often contrast with each other. For instance, relations between Hamas and the Syrians have been strained for years. All of them, however, are united in their common anti-Western stance and contempt for pro-Western states in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. Moreover, their ties under the Axis of Resistance umbrella remain informal and relatively loose. However, they all receive support —including funding and training— from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces that protects and promotes the ideological inheritance of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Since 2011, the IRGC has viewed the Axis of Resistance as a vital element of its asymmetric military strategy. Its purpose is to help Iran successfully confront its much stronger adversaries, two of which —the United States and Israel— are nuclear-armed. That is precisely why Tehran has invested nothing short of a fortune to transform Hezbollah into what experts describe as “a force multiplier” that can give Israel a run for its money. In 2014, Tehran launched a similar effort in the Gaza Strip, initially with Palestinian Islamic Jihad —a group that, very much like Hamas, emerged out of the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood in the 1980s.

The financial arrangement between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iran alarmed Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2008. Over time, however, Hamas too began to flirt with Iran’s Axis of Resistance, enticed by the lucrative funding and training opportunities offered by Tehran. By 2020, Hamas was actively engaging with the IRGC under the Axis of Resistance umbrella. To a significant extent, the operational sophistication of the October 7 attack on Israel, which was jointly led by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, provided clear evidence of Iran’s patronage of these two militant groups. Because of Iran, the Palestinian armed factions in Gaza are today better-armed and better-trained than at any time in the past. They will likely demonstrate that in the coming days or weeks, as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) begin their ground offensive on Gaza.

The big question, however, is how the other components of the Axis of Resistance will respond to the impending IDF attack. Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , ,

Analysis: How Israeli Intelligence Failed to Anticipate the Hamas Attack

October 16, 2023 by 1 Comment

Hamas GazaSEVERAL DAYS HAVE PASSED since October 7, the day when Hamas stunned Israel with a surprise attack against several settlements near the Gaza border. It is now clear that Israeli intelligence was in possession of warning indicators about the attack, and that these indicators were misjudged.

The IMI and ISA Assessment

It is important to note that the intelligence division of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), known as Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI), and the  Israel Security Agency (ISA), have been monitoring Hamas for years. These two agencies are believed to have conducted a situation assessment approximately two weeks before the October 7 attack. The assessment concluded that Hamas was deterred and had no interest in changing the status quo by attacking Israel in the short run. This assessment was communicated to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant.

It appears that this assessment was not supported by concrete intelligence. The agencies that produced it relied primarily on monitoring the recent behavior of Hamas, including the fact that it was allowing Palestinians living in Gaza to work inside Israel. Additionally, the assessment noted the fact that Hamas was receiving funds from Qatar to help the poverty-stricken residents of Gaza. In retrospect, this assessment appears to have been based on wishful thinking.

The Egyptian Warning

It is now known that Abbas Kamel, Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, sent a warning to Israel a few days before Hamas’ attack. Kamel allegedly warned of “something unusual, a terrible operation”, which was about to take place from the direction of Gaza. The warning was forwarded to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office. The Israeli newspaper that published this report, Yedioth Ahronot, is known for its serious reputation and quality sources inside the Egyptian establishment. According to the report, Kamel was told by the Israelis that they were focused on preventing terrorist attacks in the West Bank.

Yet, in a speech that Netanyahu delivered immediately after the October 7 attack broke out, he denied claims about the Egyptian warning and claimed that they were fake news. However, American Congressman Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said on October 11: “We know that Egypt […] warned the Israelis three days prior that an event like this could happen”. Speaking to reporters following a closed-door intelligence briefing on the crisis for American lawmakers, McCaul added: “I don’t want to get too much into classified [details], but a warning was given”. An Egyptian government source also asserted that Egyptian intelligence officials warned their Israeli counterparts that Hamas was planning “something big” ahead of the October 7 surprise onslaught. But this intelligence appears to have been ignored. Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , ,

Analysis : Attack on Israel Points to Systemic Failure at All Levels

October 11, 2023 by 4 Comments

Hamas Israel - BarneaTHE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE October 2023 attack on Israel and the Yom Kippur War is reasonable. We still have an obscured perspective on what happened on October 7. But even this partial picture makes it possible to draw a preliminary comparison. Undoubtedly, there is no precedent for such a monumental failure in the history of Israeli intelligence.

The most striking difference between the two case studies is that in 1973 the system as a whole did not fail. The failure was personal, on the part of several key people, who did not perform according to expectations. The events of 2023 point to a systemic failure at all levels, not personal mistakes. The failure is at the level of intelligence warning, the military response to the attack, and even the actions of Israel’s political leadership.

An Intelligence and Military Failure

In 1973, the intelligence-gathering system was working well, and Egypt’s war intentions were known. Thousands of reports from observations along the Suez Canal spoke of the Egyptian preparations. The wireless transmissions that were issued testified to preparation for war in the Egyptian army. All this did not translate into a warning of war, due to the failed performance of some senior officers in the Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI), who stuck to their preconceived notions until the last moment.

In 2023, the failure is systemic. It involves both the level of collection and at the level of assessment. It relates both to the IMI and the Israel Security Agency (ISA). It has already become clear that the intelligence collection mechanisms failed to detect large-scale preparations for an all-out attack from the Gaza Strip. A massive intelligence system failed to detect the preparatory actions of the assailing forces.

When the perceived enemy is Palestinian civilians and when Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers spend their time guarding settlements and worshipers, instead of engaging in hard training, the result is catastrophic. On October 7, we witnessed the operations of an army whose main mission is occupation. Given what we saw on that day, namely more than 1,000 civilian and military casualties and approximately 150 kidnapped Israelis, it is not clear how this army will be able to face the upcoming challenges in this war. The need for the professionalism and resilience of the IDF, which was there in 1973, continues to exist.

A Political Failure

The comparison between the political leadership of 1973 and 2023 is also discouraging. Back then, the root of the failure was that the intelligence information the leadership received from Eli Zeira, the director of IMI, who was the nation’s most senior intelligence officer, was distorted and false. It is now understood that the IMI’s assessments were based on the concept of reassuring the political leadership. Yet, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan were challenged after the war, and were eventually removed from their positions. However, they acted responsibly.

In contrast, there is not much to say about Israel’s current political leadership. It suffices to look at the composition of the Security Cabinet and the first leaks that have already begun to emanate from it, or at the surge of slander that members of the governing coalition have begun to heap on the finest of the IDF’s officers. It is nothing short of a disgrace and a disaster.

This war has just begun. It is still too early to draw conclusions. But we can examine the conclusions from the Yom Kippur War and assess their relevance to today. When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu talks about revenge, it is advisable to remember those lessons. The conflict with the Palestinians is long and bitter. They will not give up their ambition for their state. It is now time to comprehend the full cost of the continuation of the conflict.

► Author: Avner Barnea | Date: 11 October 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , ,

How Did Israel Miss This Attack? Some Likely Explanations

October 9, 2023 by 7 Comments

Gaza HamasTHE HAMAS-LED OPERATION al-Aqsa Flood, which began on October 7, marked the first large-scale conflict within the borders of Israel since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. However, unlike the coalition of Arab armies it faced in 1948, Israel now confronts an alliance of sub-state groups. Led by Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, this alliance includes the Syrian- and Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad and a number of secular groups, such as the Fatah-aligned al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

Such groups are lesser-known than Hamas; however, they often bring with them expertise in niche areas, such as handling networks of informants inside Israel, building sophisticated explosives, employing unmanned combat drones, or procuring specialized weaponry. They are therefore likely to have contributed greatly to the outcome of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Their participation also enabled Hamas to launch what essentially amounted to a combined arms assault on Israel. The latter included coordinated land, sea and air elements, which were purposefully low-tech. That may explain why the assailants were able to short-circuit and overwhelm the purportedly impregnable security perimeter that Israel maintains around the Gaza Strip.

Iranian and Lebanese Coaching

Putting aside the individual low-tech elements of the operation, its overall level of tactical organization almost certainly points to considerable support from actors beyond the Gaza Strip. Such actors likely include networks of informants within Israel, as well as possibly Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Both are well-versed in hybrid warfare and have studied Israeli defense systems more extensively than any other regional actor. Additionally, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah’s Lebanese Resistance Brigades are seasoned practitioners of deception operations. They likely coached Hamas, not only on how to carry out Operation al-Aqsa Flood, but more importantly on how to prevent Israel and its allies from gathering intelligence about it.

There is no question that an operation of such a magnitude must have taken months —possibly even years— to conceive, develop and organize. Such a complex process would have taken place under the watchful eyes and ears of Israeli and Egyptian intelligence agencies, who have historically faced little resistance in penetrating Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas. Yet none seem to have collected enough intelligence to anticipate the attack. It is equally stunning that the meticulous planning of Operation al-Aqsa Flood appears to have escaped the attention of American intelligence agencies, whose presence in the Middle East is significant. How was that even possible? Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , ,

A dramatic kidnap case in Malaysia may point to changes in Mossad’s tactics

October 24, 2022 by 2 Comments

Kuala Lumpur MalaysiaREPORTS FROM KUALA LUMPUR SUGGEST that Malaysian agents operating in the service of Israeli intelligence carried out the kidnapping of a Palestinian engineer, Omar al-Balbaisi, on September 28. According to the Malaysian newspaper The Straits Times, the kidnap operation was orchestrated by the Israeli external intelligence agency, the Mossad.

Omar al-Balbaisi completed a bachelor’s degree in computer science at the Islamic University in Gaza, where he allegedly joined the Izz-ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, specializing in hacking mobile phones. In or around 2020, al-Balbaisi left the Gaza Strip for Istanbul, where, according to reports, a Hamas secret intelligence and cyber unit was established in 2020. The unit allegedly operated on instructions from the Hamas leadership in Gaza, without the knowledge of the Turkish authorities.

When al-Balbaisi was kidnapped, he was reportedly returning from lunch with another Palestinian expatriate. According to the report, a white van drove toward the two men. Four people emerged from the van, grabbed al-Balbaisi and dragged him into the vehicle, while yelling at him: “our boss wants to talk to you”. The other Palestinian tried to help al-Balbaisi, but was warned to stay away from the scene. He subsequently filed a report at a police station, reportedly about 40 minutes after his friend was kidnapped.

According to the reports, the kidnapped Palestinian was taken bound and blindfolded to a safe house, where his Malaysian captors tied him to a chair. They then called two men, allegedly Israelis, who told the abductee: “you know why you are here”. According to another report, al-Balbaisi was interrogated, allegedly by two Israelis, believed to be Mossad agents, via a video call. However, the video call was disconnected when Malaysian police officers broke into the safe house.

Upon receiving the information about the kidnapping, Malaysian police immediately sought to locate al-Balbaisi. They subsequently managed to raid the house where the Palestinian was being held, while his interrogation was underway. A source told the Malaysian newspaper that “the Israelis wanted to know about [al-Balbaisi’s] experience in the field of software, about the strengths of Hamas in this field, and the members of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades that he knew”. Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , , , ,

Study assesses Hamas’ double-agent operations against Israeli intelligence

August 22, 2022 by Leave a comment

HamasA NEW STUDY SHEDS light on the little-studied topic of counterintelligence operations launched against Israel by the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas. Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist and nationalist organization with a 35-year history, which has controlled the Gaza Strip since 2007. As is typically the case with Middle Eastern non-state actors, Hamas is a complex umbrella organization that combines social-service and administrative functions with armed elements. The latter include internal policing components and a full-time military wing, as well as reserve armed forces.

Although much research has focused on Hamas’ military and non-military components, the organization’s intelligence functions remain under-studied. For this reason, a new article that assesses Hamas’ double-agent operations against Israeli intelligence deserves attention. The article is titled “An Asymmetric Doubling”: A Nonstate Actor Using the Method of Doubling Sources —Hamas against Israeli Intelligence”, and was authored by Netanel Flamer, a lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University and postdoctoral fellow at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. It was published last week by the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence.

In his article, Flamer explains the usefulness of double-agent operations for non-state actors engaged in asymmetric conflicts against opponents with superior resources. Non-state actors tend to place tremendous value in double-agent operations, because they offer them the opportunity to “generate achievements of the greatest impact using the most efficient means”. They can do so despite the relative poverty of their resources, as compared to their adversaries. These types of operations employ human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, who work with two opposing intelligence services, only one of which is privy to their dual role. Such sources are known in intelligence parlance as “double agents”.

Hamas’ Early Counterintelligence Efforts

Interestingly, Hamas’ first counterintelligence outfit preceded its own establishment. Upon its founding in 1987, at the peak of the First Intifada, Hamas was immediately able to rely on al-Majd, a counterintelligence apparatus that had been established a year earlier by Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. The mission of al-Majd was to uncover suspected Israeli collaborators among Palestinian communities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The organization was also known for deploying varying levels of torture against suspected collaborators, or against their relatives.

By the early 1990s, al-Majd was in a position to launch a number of confirmed counterintelligence operations. A notable early case is that of Maher Abu Srur, a Hamas member who had been recruited by the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service. At the culmination of this double-agent operation, Srur actually murdered his Israeli handler at a Shin Bet safe house in Jerusalem. According to Flamer, al-Majd is known to have launched several other double-agent operations against the Shin Bet, with varying levels of success. Importantly, it often is difficult to determine whether al-Majd double agents were deployed after they were first recruited by the Shin Bet, or whether they were originally deployed by al-Majd as “dangles”. Read more of this post

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , , ,

In rare move, Israel identifies special operations officer killed in Gaza Strip raid

May 17, 2022 by 1 Comment

IDF Gaza Strip HamasIN A RARE MOVE, Israel released the identity last weekend of a special operations officer who was killed by Islamic Hamas during a 2018 covert mission in the Gaza Strip. As intelNews reported at the time, an undercover team of Israeli operatives was exfiltrated by helicopter from Gaza on November 11, 2018. The exfiltration took place after the Israelis were spotted by members of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which is part of Hamas’ armed wing.

The incident was followed by a barrage of nearly 500 rockets and mortars fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel. The Israelis responded by firing more than 160 missiles that fell throughout the Palestinian enclave. Hostilities were halted on November 13, when Hamas declared a unilateral ceasefire brokered by Egypt. The incident prompted the resignation of Israel’s Defense Minister, Avigdor Liberman. At the time, the Israel Defense Forces, which were behind the botched operation, refused to comment on the team’s mission, admitting only that its troops “operated […] in the Gaza Strip”.

It was said at the time that the members of the undercover team were dressed in civilian clothes and that at least two of them were disguised as women. After entering Gaza in a civilian Volkswagen vehicle, they drove to Khan Yunis, a city in the south of the Strip, near the Egyptian border. It was there that they were discovered by the al-Qassam Brigades, who stopped them at a checkpoint, asking for identification. The Israeli team opened fire using a silenced gun. Following a high-speed car chase, the Israelis left via helicopter. Their abandoned Volkswagen car was then blown up by an Israeli fighter jet.

On Sunday, the IDF declassified the name of the fallen officer. It also released a photograph of the man, who has been identified as Lt. Col. Mahmoud Kheir el-Din, 41, from Galilee. A member of Israel’s Druze community, el-Din served in the Mista’arvim, a counter-terrorism unit of the IDF’s Special Operations division that is trained to capture or assassinate targets in enemy territory. El-Din joined the IDF’s Special Operations division in 2002, after having served as a platoon commander.

The IDF also provided limited details about the botched operation that led to el-Din’s death. It claims that el-Din “physically confronted” one of the Hamas operatives, thus giving another one of the Israeli soldiers the opportunity to open fire and kill seven Hamas members. El-Din was killed during the shootout, according to the IDF. The Israeli government said the decision to release el-Din’s identity was coordinated with his family. It added, however, that it does not plan to release further details about the botched operation.

► Author: Ian Alen | Date: 17 May 2022 | Permalink

Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with , , , , , , ,

← Older posts