Tradecraft observations on the Reichenbach/Fischer espionage case
May 3, 2024 3 Comments
SEVERAL CASES OF CHINESE espionage have been announced recently in Europe. Thomas Reichenbach and Herwig and Ina Fischer —a married couple— were arrested on April 22, 2024, for illegal exports of dual use technology with military (naval) applications.
Reichenbach lists himself as a contract marketing manager for the Hong Kong Trade Development Council. He studied at Peking University in the mid-1980s. He worked in China, speaks Mandarin, and has a Chinese wife.
Herwig and Ina Fischer own a small engineering consulting company named Innovative Dragon in Duesseldorf. Both have travelled extensively in China. Innovative Dragon contracts for technical research with universities. Herwig studied mechanical engineering and aircraft and spacecraft construction at the Rhine-Westphalia Higher Technical School, focusing on guidance technology and composite fiber materials. The company headquarters are in London and there are offices in Duesseldorf and Shanghai (Donghua University Science and Technology Park). The London office does not appear to have a functioning telephone number.
Reichenbach is suspected of having been recruited by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) in China. The German government has accused the trio of having illegally exported dual use technology since at least 2022. At the time of the arrests, the suspects were in negotiations on additional research projects useful for expanding the combat strength of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy.
Status: Alleged
Tradecraft observations:
- Use of a potential front company in London to facilitate allegedly illegal exports.
- Use of third countries to facilitate allegedly illegal exports.
- Reichenbach allegedly recruited Herwig and Ina Fischer and handled them as in-country assets.
- It is alleged that the MSS probably recruited Reichenbach in China.
- An MSS officer allegedly handled Reichenbach from China (linear control).
- The MSS allegedly funded the operation through front companies.
► Author: Nicholas Eftimiades* | Date: 03 May 2024 | Permalink
* Nicholas Eftimiades is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He retired from a 34-year government career that included employment in the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He held appointments on the Department of Defense’s Defense Science Board and the Economic Security Subcommittee of the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. He is an advisor to the United States Intelligence Community. Eftimiades authored numerous works on China’s espionage methods. His books, Chinese Intelligence Operations (1994) and Chinese Espionage: Operations and Tactics (2020) are examinations of the structure, operations, and methodology of China’s intelligence services. They are widely regarded as seminal works in the field.
THE TARGETED KILLING OF Hassan Mahdawi, a high-ranking member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, was carried out by Israel on April 1, 2024. The actual assassination was based on precise operational intelligence, while Israel’s assessment of Iran’s response was wrong.
ON GOOD FRIDAY, MARCH 29, Egisto Ott, a former member of Austria’s now-dissolved domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT), was arrested in his house in Carinthia, Austria’s southernmost state. Ott had frequently been at the center of media attention in the past year, in connection with the network surrounding the fugitive 
These included contacts in friendly foreign police services, whom Ott knew from his time as a liaison officer in Italy and Turkey. According to Gridling, these contacts were unaware that Ott had been removed from the BVT under suspicion of being unreliable and potentially even working for Russia. They therefore continued to help him when asked. Ott allegedly deceived his contacts by claiming that he needed information on cases relating to different kinds of extremism. As it turned out, according to the leaked arrest warrant, several of the individuals referred to by Ott as “suspects” in terrorism investigations were in fact Russian dissidents or intelligence defectors who were living as protected persons in Austria and elsewhere outside Russia.
ON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.
SINCE OCTOBER 7, 2024, when Israel was caught off guard by a sudden and highly damaging attack from Hamas, more information has surfaced regarding why there was no prior warning about the attack and the failures of Israeli intelligence in this regard.
capabilities. Another important insight is that the counterintelligence structures inside Hamas were successful in preventing Israeli intelligence from recruiting agents who were close enough to Sinwar to be able to alert Israel about the impending attack. Furthermore, Israel’s collection and analysis of signals intelligence was unproductive, possibly because Hamas was successful in countering Israel’s ability to produce effective intelligence from signals intercepts.
THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES have been “bolstering the[ir] architecture” aimed at stopping potential defectors and “liquidating” those who have already defected and are living in exile, according to a new report. In a 
A RETIRED SENIOR MOSSAD official has alleged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly ignored, and even frustrated, efforts to stop the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas. This inaction may have enabled the Palestinian militant group to plan, organize and execute Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which killed over 1400 Israelis on October 7, 2023, and sparked the current war between Israel and Hamas.
THE OCTOBER 7 ATTACK on Israel was a total surprise. There was no warning. There were very few signs of a possible attack. Israeli intelligence evaluated these signs as elements of a routine military exercise by Hamas, and even assessed them as parts of an imaginary scenario. It therefore gave no warning to those Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units that were stationed on the border with Gaza. Meanwhile, what we know about the intelligence failure of October 7 will likely pale before what the commission of inquiry will reveal once it is established. That was precisely what happened in the case of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which made significant revelations while investigating the intelligence failings of the IDF in the run up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
time, in the first two days of the conflict the IDF was confused and acted without direction, in the apparent absence of relevant action plans for what to do in the event of a massive invasion. The IDF was clearly not ready for such a scenario.
for those conclusions to become public. What is to be done in the meantime? There is public pressure to launch the inquiry soon.
IT HAS BECOME CLEAR that Hamas had up-to-date intelligence on Israeli targets prior to the attack on October 7, 2023, the largest and most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history. Hamas did not have access to clandestine information sources but rather relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) to understand the structure and weaknesses of Israel’s defense system along the border fence. In addition to publicly available maps, Hamas meticulously gathered online intelligence about specific sites within the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip.
interests of national security, the public’s ‘right to know’ purview is substantial. Thus, significant amounts of information are available online.
the Israeli Military Intelligence was dissolved, for reasons that remain to be investigated. CNN was among many news outlets that have 
SINCE OCTOBER 7, WHEN Hamas launched its surprise attack on Israel, many more details about the intelligence failure have emerged. It appears that Israeli intelligence officials have warned for years about military exercises held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which have included practice raids on cities deep inside Israel. However, the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) did not heed to the warnings, because it considered Hamas operationally incapable of carrying out such raids. Instead, the IMI estimated that the Hamas leadership aimed to arrive at a settlement with Israel. That seems like the result of a highly successful disinformation operation, which added significantly to the effectiveness of the sudden attack on Israel on October 7.
large number of settlements simultaneously. It also believed that such an operation would go against the spirit of Hamas leadership’s spirit intention to settle with Israel.
Indeed, a preventive course of action should have been in place even in the absence of specific intelligence warnings —if only to enable the IDF to repel a surprise attack by Hamas. There was no need to estimate what Hamas would do in order to prepare for a surprise attack.
SEVERAL DAYS HAVE PASSED since October 7, the day when Hamas stunned Israel with a surprise attack against several settlements near the Gaza border. It is now clear that Israeli intelligence was in possession of warning indicators about the attack, and that these indicators were misjudged.
forwarded to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office. The Israeli newspaper that 
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE October 2023 attack on Israel and the Yom Kippur War is reasonable. We still have an obscured perspective on what happened on October 7. But even this partial picture makes it possible to draw a preliminary comparison. Undoubtedly, there is no precedent for such a monumental failure in the history of Israeli intelligence.
for the professionalism and resilience of the IDF, which was there in 1973, continues to exist.
LAST WEEK, LEBANON’S GENERAL Security Directorate 
intelNews.org 
German intelligence agencies discuss ongoing espionage and hybrid challenges
May 6, 2024 1 Comment
The event (see agenda in .pdf) was organized by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Chancellery Office. This year’s topic was: “Intelligence Agencies and Armed Conflicts”. It included the tried and tested mix of academics —predominantly legal scholars—, practitioners and heads of various government authorities. The majority of the external experts discussed the complicated and, in Germany, arduous parliamentary procedures that would arise in the event of a war.
In view of the controls increasingly being placed on German intelligence agencies by various bodies and authorities —which were also represented at the symposium— a certain discrepancy became apparent repeatedly in the presentations: How can the German intelligence agencies react adequately and quickly to hybrid threats when these types of threat do not concern themselves with administrative-legal subtleties and parliamentary procedures? Although the concept of hybrid threats was generally taken for granted and therefore hardly discussed in terms of content, those present agreed at a minimum that disinformation is part of it. All the more worrying was the statement by one speaker who explained that there was no official definition of disinformation within the German security authorities’ legal codes.
In the discussion, the panel moderated by Center for Intelligence Service Training and Further Education (ZNAF), the common training and study location of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), clearly stood out and underscored that this relatively new institution has made a name for itself in the academic intelligence landscape since its establishment in 2019.
However, the symposium also showed that the German security bureaucracy tends to reach its limits when it comes to current developments in the unconventional domain. This was demonstrated, for example, by a speaker’s demand that hybrid risks ought to be assigned to a “state area of responsibility”. The problem, however, lies precisely in the statelessness of hybrid risks. The existing regulations are also proving to be counterproductive, in view of the challenges: there would simply be highly heterogeneous participants in the so-called Cyber Defense Centre, which would also include police authorities. However, due to the strict separation in the legal domain, personal data cannot simply be passed on from the BND to the Federal Police, for example. Read more of this post
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