Canadian judge bars Chinese PhD student from entering, citing espionage concerns

University of WaterlooIN AN UNPRECEDENTED AND potentially highly consequential decision, a judge has barred a Chinese PhD student from entering Canada over concerns he might be pressured to spy by the government of China. The case could have “ripple effects” on universities across Canada and possibly even all of North America, according to legal experts.

The central figure in the case is Yuekang Li, a citizen of China, who was accepted into the Mechanical and Mechatronics Engineering PhD program of the University of Waterloo. Li stated in his application that his goal was to return to his home country after receiving his PhD and work to “improve its public health system”. However, when Li applied for a graduate student visa, his application was denied by an officer of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the government department that oversees applications for entry visas into the country.

In deeming Li inadmissible to Canada, the IRCC officer in charge of his case reportedly cited the student’s strong interest in microfluidics, a niche branch of nanotechnology with a wide range of applications in the biopharmaceutical industry. The IRCC officer also noted growing concerns in the West about the use of students and researchers as “non-traditional collectors of information” by the government in Beijing. In a number of such cases, Chinese students and researchers have been given permission by the Chinese state to work abroad with the understanding that they will deliberately collect information that will benefit China’s military-industrial complex.

Li promptly challenged the IRCC’s decision, which ended up being heard in Federal Court. Li’s legal representatives argued that the rejection of his application for a student visa relied on “an overly broad definition of espionage” and engaged in “speculation”, rather than factual evidence. But on December 22, Federal Court Chief Justice Paul Crampton sided with the IRCC.

In his decision, which was made available late last week, the judge agrees with the IRCC’s view that the graduate research Li proposed to carry out at the University of Waterloo would fall under the definition of “non-traditional espionage”. He referred to China as a “hostile actor” and cautioned that such actors “increasingly make use of non-traditional methods to obtain sensitive information in Canada or abroad, contrary to Canada’s interests”. Given that new reality, Canada’s legal understanding of what constitutes “espionage” must evolve”, Judge Crampton argues in his decision.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 08 January 2024 | Permalink

Analysis: Killing of Hamas leader in Lebanon marks a new phase in Israel’s war

Dahiyeh BeirutMIDDLE EAST OBSERVERS WERE hardly surprised by yesterday’s news of the apparent assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Lebanon. Not only was al-Arouri a senior Hamas official, but he also headed the militant group’s contact team with Lebanese Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons. He was likely at the top of Israel’s permanent assassination list even prior to Hamas’ bloody assault on Israel last October 7. Yet, within the explosive content of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, Tuesday’s assassination signals the opening of a new and highly unpredictable phase in an already uncertain conflict.

The vague statements issued by Israeli officials in response to the news of al-Arouri’s assassination did little to dispel the broadly accepted view that Israel’s intelligence services were behind the killing. Headed by its external intelligence agency, the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence services have a long history of extrajudicial assassinations. In his seminal book Rise and Kill First, the Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman discusses in detail the history of these assassinations, which predate the postwar establishment of the state of Israel. Bergman’s data-rich research reveals that the Israeli intelligence services have performed approximately 2,700 extrajudicial assassinations in their history —more than any Western state.

Given such a prolific history of targeted killings, al-Arouri’s assassination in Beirut can be described as both expected and unremarkable. Indeed, Israeli officials have stated repeatedly since October 7 that Hamas’ senior leadership will be targeted worldwide. In a leaked recording that emerged last month, Ronen Bar, director of the Israeli Security Agency, was heard announcing to members of Israel’s Knesset that Hamas’ senior leadership would be targeted “in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Lebanon, in Turkey, in Qatar, everywhere”.

At the time the recorded conversation leaked, nobody thought that Bar, a seasoned intelligence officer, was bluffing. Indeed, the operational capabilities and reach of the Mossad are well understood by everyone in the Middle East. That al-Arouri was assassinated in southern Beirut’s Dahiyeh suburb is significant. An undisputed Hezbollah stronghold, Dahiyeh is tightly controlled by the Shiite militant group, which prides itself on ensuring the safety of its residents. Yesterday’s assassination at the very heart of Hezbollah’s lair was nothing short of a demonstration of the Mossad’s competency in special operations.

If Israel is truly intent on neutralizing the leadership of Hamas, Mossad’s competency will be increasingly tested in the coming months, as the Jewish state will have to strike repeatedly beyond its borders. This is because, unlike the beleaguered Gazans, who are currently experiencing the most destructive bombing campaign of the 21st century, most leaders of Hamas live in relative luxury in Doha, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, and other Middle Eastern metropolitan centers. It is there, and not in the razed neighborhoods of Khan Yunis and Jabalia, that Israeli assassination teams will need to operate with increasing dexterity. Read more of this post

China’s spy agency emerges as formidable adversary to CIA, according to report

United States ChinaTHE UNITED STATES CENTRAL Intelligence Agency (CIA) has sharply stepped up its activities on China, but Chinese espionage operations remain formidable and continue to pose challenges for American decision-makers, a new report claims. Citing “interviews with more than two dozen current and former American officials and a review of internal Chinese corporate documents and public [Chinese government] documents”, the New York Times said last week that China’s main intelligence agency the, Ministry for State Security (MSS) is “now going toe-to-toe with the CIA in collection and subterfuge around the world”.

The unprecedented growth of the MSS, according to the paper, is occurring despite the fact that the CIA has doubled its budget on China under the presidency of Joe Biden. The American spy agency also launched a new China Mission Center under its current director, William J. Burns. A major concern for the CIA is reportedly the intense Chinese focus on cutting-edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductor design and manufacture. For this reason, the CIA’s China Mission Center works closely with the agency’s Technology Intelligence Center, claims the paper.

Through these and other efforts, American intelligence officials have reportedly concluded that the “urgency and intensity of technological espionage” by Chinese spy agencies has increased beyond parallel. According to the New York Times, the technological advancements taking place in the state-supported Chinese private sector and the military, known as the People’s Liberation Army, “are surprising the US government”. For this reason, the CIA has focused intensely on “rebuilding a network” of assets within China, a decade after Chinese counterintelligence managed to neutralize CIA operations on Chinese soil.

But the MSS is also increasing its output and “making its own aggressive moves abroad”, says the paper. Unlike Russian intelligence agencies, the MSS does not have a tradition of planting undercover spies inside the United States. Instead, MSS operatives prefer to operate online through front companies with innocuous-sounding names. They use these companies to recruit assets among Chinese expatriates, ethnic Chinese Westerners, and Americans without any ethnic connection to China. Many targets for Chinese intelligence recruitment are members of the scientific, academic, and business communities, the New York Times reports.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 01 January 2024 | Permalink

Veteran Belgian politician was a spy for Chinese intelligence, report alleges

MSS ChinaA LONGTIME BELGIAN POLITICIAN worked as a spy for Chinese intelligence for at least three years, according to a joint investigation by a consortium of European news media. Until last week, the politician, Frank Creyelman, 62, was a leading member of Vlaams Belang, a far-right separatist party that draws nearly the entirety of its support from northern Belgium’s Dutch-speaking Flemish regions. In addition to seeking to separate Flanders from Belgium, Vlaams Belang opposes immigration and multiculturalism, with much of its criticism directed at Islam.

From 1995 until 2014, Creyelman served as a member of the Flemish Parliament or the Belgian Senate, representing the Antwerp Province. During that time, he became known for his pro-Russian views, which he continued to propagate in retirement. In 2021, he voiced strong skepticism against the Belgian government’s efforts to provide diplomatic, financial, and military support to Ukraine. Following his retirement from frontline politics, Creyelman became an honorary member of the Flemish Parliament. He also remained chairman of Vlaams Belang in his home city of Mechelen, a Dutch-speaking stronghold.

Last week, however, a joint investigation by the British newspaper The Financial Times, French newspaper Le Monde and German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, claimed that Creyelman worked as a spy for China for at least three years. Citing unnamed “intelligence officials from four Western countries”, the investigation claimed that Creyelman had been recruited by Daniel Woo, a case officer for China’s Ministry of State Security. Woo is believed to work out of the MSS branch in China’s far-eastern province of Zhejiang, though he has also served tours in Europe under diplomatic cover, including in Romania and Poland.

It is not known how the MSS recruited Creyelman. It appears that most of his communication with his alleged MSS handler took place via text messages. However, it is claimed that in 2019 Creyelman traveled to Sanya, a popular tourist resort in China’s Hainan Island, where he allegedly met Woo and possibly other MSS operatives. Notably, the journalists behind the investigation into Creyelman claim that they have accessed incriminating messages exchanged between Creyelman and Woo. The text messages span the period between early 2019 and late 2022.

In the text messages, Woo asks Creyelman to try to influence senior-level discussions in Belgium and elsewhere concerning China’s treatment of its ethnic Muslim populations in the Xinjiang Province. The far-right politician was also instructed to find ways to vilify and discredit European researchers and academics who were documenting China’s treatment of ethnic Muslims in Xinjiang. Woo also asked Creyelman to try to quell criticism of China’s crackdown of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. In one message, Woo explained that China’s purpose was “to divide the US-European relationship”.

Last Friday, just hours after the allegations about Creyelman’s alleged espionage emerged, Vlaams Belang announced that it had expelled him from its ranks. In a social media post, the party’s leader, Tom Van Grieken, denounced Creyelman’s espionage as going “against the purpose and essence, even the name, of our party”. He added: “The only loyalty for nationalists can only be to their own nation”.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 18 December 2023 | Permalink

A senior American diplomat spied for Cuba for 42 years. How serious is this case?

Victor Manuel RochaLAST WEEK THE UNITED States Department of Justice announced the arrest of Victor Manuel Rocha, 73, a former senior American diplomat, whose career included stints as ambassador and advisor to the National Security Council and the United States Southern Command. Cuban intelligence allegedly recruited Rocha when he was a student in the 1970s and inspired him to spend his entire professional life in search of opportunities to supply intelligence to Cuba —and possibly Russia and China. United States Attorney General Merrick Garland said Rocha’s case was “one of the highest-reaching and longest-lasting infiltrations” of the US government by a foreign agent. This may be an understatement.

A STORIED CAREER IN GOVERNMENT

Rocha was born in Colombia in 1950, but grew up in New York City after his mother emigrated to the United States. In 1965, the studious Rocha earned a full-ride scholarship to a prestigious boarding school in Connecticut. This enabled him to earn an undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1973, before completing master’s degrees in public administration and foreign affairs from Harvard University and Georgetown University.

After receiving his security clearance from the Department of State, Rocha relied on his advanced social skills and native command of the Spanish language to quickly rise through the ranks of the diplomatic corps. Within a decade he had served prestigious assignments in Argentina, Honduras, Italy, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, where he held the post of deputy chief of mission. In the mid-1990s, Rocha served as deputy principal officer in the United States Interests Section in Cuba —effectively the second-in-command in Washington’s de facto embassy in Havana.

Rocha’s diplomatic career culminated with the post of ambassador to Bolivia, from which he abruptly resigned in 2002. He did so reportedly in order to pursue employment in the private sector and raise funds for his children’s college education. Prior to the end of his State Department career, however, Rocha had managed to hold posts as a Latin America adviser to the National Security Council, which is the highest executive decision-making body of the United States government. He had also served as an adviser to the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), which oversees all activities of the Department of Defense in Central and South America, including the Caribbean.

FORMING REVOLUTIONARY LEFTIST IDEALS

By 1978, when he became a United States citizen, the young Rocha had spent time in Chile. While there, he witnessed first-hand the turbulence of Chilean politics in the lead-up to the military coup of 1973, which cut short the presidency of leftist icon Salvador Allende. Washington’s role in the coup, and in the ensuing junta of General Augusto Pinochet, appears to have steered Rocha’s politics decisively to the left. It was in fact in Chile where, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Rocha was recruited by the Dirección de Inteligencia (DI, also referred to by its former acronym, DGI). Read more of this post

The OSINT factor in Hamas’ operational success and Israel’s intelligence failure

Hamas GazaIT HAS BECOME CLEAR that Hamas had up-to-date intelligence on Israeli targets prior to the attack on October 7, 2023, the largest and most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history. Hamas did not have access to clandestine information sources but rather relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) to understand the structure and weaknesses of Israel’s defense system along the border fence. In addition to publicly available maps, Hamas meticulously gathered online intelligence about specific sites within the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip.

It is also possible that some of the intelligence came from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, largely through Gazan workers who were employed in Israel. Moreover, Hamas had access to constant Israeli media broadcasts, which supplied them with invaluable intelligence on the border communities and adjacent military facilities, as well as on communities that were located further to the north and east. Although the Israeli state exercises censorship in the Q Quoteinterests of national security, the public’s ‘right to know’ purview is substantial. Thus, significant amounts of information are available online.

In assessing the behavior of Hamas in recent years, one can observe that it did not act as a terrorist group for quite some time. Rather, it operated as a government organization, while monitoring its enemy and waiting patiently for an opportune moment to attack. Simultaneously, Hamas utilized disinformation tools to conceal its attack plans. It trained its fighters within commando units that employed information effectively and relied on actionable intelligence, rather than chance. This can be observed from interrogations of Hamas members who were detained by Israeli authorities after October 7. In one example, Hamas used detailed maps of Israeli communities near the Gaza border, which are available on Google Earth, to plan its attacks of October 7. Printouts of these maps were found among the belongings of Hamas assailants that were killed during the attacks.

Some in Israel are now advocating for increased protection of OSINT, particularly for Israeli sites related to security, including civilian first-response units, defense systems guarding settlements, and civil technological assets. However, implementing such measures within the current framework of Israel’s open society seems challenging. Despite the known importance of OSINT to Hamas and its potential risk to Israel’s security, significant changes in this regard may not occur, as they could impact the country’s democratic values. However, it is still possible to improve the quality of security censorship regarding sensitive civilian information that can be used by adversaries. Such moves would include protecting databases, limiting information relating to the addresses of senior officials, or putting in place stricter policies on the movement of Gazan workers in Israel.

Contrary to Hamas’, Israel’s OSINT systems underperformed in the run-up to the October 7 attacks. That was so especially after the central OSINT unit of the Israeli Military Intelligence was dissolved, for reasons that remain to be investigated. CNN was among many news outlets that have revealed how Hamas advertised its military drills on social media, but somehow Israeli intelligence failed to pay attention to them.

When Hamas openly declared its intention to attack communities near the Gaza border, and trained its units for that purpose, the Israeli intelligence community, including the IMI and the Israel Security Agency (ISA), underestimated its real attack capabilities based on OSINT materials. This miscalculation stemmed from incorrectly assessing Hamas’s capabilities and overestimating the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to swiftly respond and prevent the attack on civil and military targets. Unfortunately, this assessment proved to be a significant mistake.

The effective use of OSINT lies at the heart of Hamas’ operational plan to attack simultaneously several Israeli targets and to cause extensive damage. It appears that Hamas was able to utilize the OSINT factor to its maximum extent, thus adding significant value to the success of the attack.

► Author: Dr. Avner Barnea | Date: 05 December 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

US is helping Israel detect intelligence blind spots and locate Hamas leaders: report

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES are actively assisting Israel identify the intelligence blind spots that led to the security failure of October 7, and locate senior Hamas leaders, according to the chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Representative Mike Turner (R-OH) said during an interview on Sunday with CBS’s Face the Nation that American intelligence agencies are “working closely” with the Israeli intelligence community.

The purpose of the collaboration is to find intelligence “gaps” and identify the “institutional bias that resulted in” Israeli intelligence officials dismissing warnings about a potential attack by Hamas in the months leading to October 7. The United States is also providing Israel with “selective […] information” about Hamas targets, including senior Hamas officials. Turner noted that “we are not just providing direct access to our intelligence” and that “caution” is being used in determining the types of intelligence that United States agencies are sharing with Israel.

Turner’s comments come less than a week after The New York Times reported that Israeli intelligence had managed to obtain Hamas’ detailed battle plan for the October 7 attack in 2022. It was a 40-page document, written in Arabic, which allegedly contained the precise details of Hamas’ attack plan, but did not specify a date. Senior intelligence officials dubbed the battle plan “Jericho Wall”, but dismissed it as purely aspirational and thought it too elaborate to be carried out in practice.

On November 27, Israel’s Channel 12 television revealed a series of leaked emails from officers in Israel’s 8200 Intelligence Corps unit of the Israel Defense Forces. The emails reportedly raised concerns about an impending attack by Hamas in southern Israel. According to Channel 12, the Unit 8200 emails provided a “highly detailed warning” about Hamas’ plans to take over Israeli villages near the Gaza Strip and kill hundreds of Israelis. However, senior military officials dismissed the plans as “an imaginary scenario”.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 04 December 2023 | Permalink

South Korean president fires nation’s spy chiefs in major intelligence shake-up

NIS South Korea - IAIN A SURPRISING MOVE that has stirred curiosity across Asia, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has abruptly ousted the entire senior leadership of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), a powerful entity in the country. The announcement came through a statement released on Sunday by the Office of the President, stating that President Yoon had accepted the resignations of the NIS director and two deputy directors. However, it is widely understood that these resignations were not voluntary but rather a result of pressure exerted by the president.

Among those dismissed, Director Kim Kyou-huyn and First Deputy Director Kwon Chun-taek, both considered close to President Yoon, had lengthy backgrounds in South Korea’s diplomatic corps. Kim, a seasoned executive with deep insights into South Korea-United States relations, had served lengthy tours in the South Korean embassy in Washington. Kwon, with experience in the diplomatic corps and roles at the United Nations, also had a strong international background. Yoon had appointed both to lead the NIS soon after assuming the presidency in May 2022. The third ousted NIS executive was Second Deputy Director Kim Soo-youn, appointed by Yoon in June 2022. The second deputy traditionally oversees activities related to North Korea, while the first deputy is responsible for the agency’s global collection operations, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence.

Speculation in Seoul abounds regarding the reasons behind President Yoon’s swift decision to dismiss the NIS leadership. A firebrand politician who is seen as a representative of a new generation of South Korean conservatives, Yoon has pledged a robust security and defense policy in response to perceived North Korean provocations. Recent media reports have hinted at Yoon’s impatience with bureaucratic obstacles within the NIS, particularly regarding personnel management.

South Korean media reports indicate that another seasoned diplomat, Hong Jang-won, has assumed the NIS first deputy directorship, while the former North Korea area chief, Hwang Won-jin, has taken over as the second deputy director. Notably, the director position remains vacant, with Hong temporarily leading the agency until a new director is appointed in the coming weeks.

Author: Ian Allen | Date: 27 November 2023 | Permalink

Italy investigating suspicious cash withdrawals by Russian embassy staffers in Rome

Embassy of Russia in ItalyAUTHORITIES IN ITALY ARE investigating a series of suspicious cash withdrawals that were made from accounts belonging to the Russian embassy in Rome, according to reports in the Italian press. On November 14, the Rome-based daily La Repubblica reported that the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) of the Bank of Italy had launched a probe to uncover out exactly who made the cash withdrawals and who the money might have gone to.

According to the Italian newspaper, Russian diplomatic personnel withdrew nearly €4 million ($4.35 million) in cash from two accounts belonging to the Russian embassy in Rome. Russian embassy staffers reportedly withdrew the €4 million on 21  separate instances, sometimes in portions amounting to €100,000 at a time. The withdrawals drew the attention of the UIF, which is now reportedly investigating the withdrawals.

La Repubblica said that UIF investigators are anchoring their probe on several hypotheses. These include the possibility that the cash withdrawals were meant to bypass the progressively stricter financial sanctions that the European Union has been imposing on Moscow. The bulk of these sanctions began shortly February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Notably, Russian embassy staffers started to withdraw the funds almost immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.

The correlation between the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the cash withdrawals has led Italian authorities to entertain another hypothesis, namely that Rome embassy staffers have been using the cash to pay Russian intelligence personnel working without a diplomatic cover in Italy and elsewhere in Europe. A third hypothesis is that Russian intelligence personnel have been using the cash to support information operations that target European audiences. According to La Repubblica, the cash could have been used for “paying influencers to espouse the Kremlin’s cause in Italy, thus influencing public opinion”.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 20 November 2023 | Permalink

France accuses Russia of disinformation campaign using Star of David graffiti in Paris

Star of David graffitiTHE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS accused Russia of carrying out a disinformation campaign using stenciled images of Stars of David that mysteriously appeared in the streets of Paris late last month. The stars, between 60 and 80 in number, were found in the 14th arrondissement of the French capital, as well as in several Parisian suburbs in the early hours of October 31. The stars (see accompanying picture) are all blue and all have the same size. They appear to have been hurriedly stenciled and have no accompanying text.

A statement issued on November 8 by the prosecutor for the city of Paris, Laure Beccuau, said that police had identified and arrested a man and a woman in connection with the graffiti. Referencing surveillance camera footage, Beccuau’s statement said the two suspects had stenciled the stars overnight, working in unison with a third individual who took photographs of the graffiti. The statement added that the alleged perpetrators of the graffiti may have contacts with another couple, consisting of an unnamed 28-year-old Moldovan woman and a 33-year-old Moldovan man. Police had arrested the Moldovans in Paris on October 27, for painting the same stenciled Start of David on a building in Paris.

The statement by the Paris prosecutor alleges that both couples had been in contact “with the same third party”, a Russian-speaking individual who had offered to pay them in exchange for graffitiing the stars. “It therefore cannot be ruled out that the tagging of the blue Stars of David in the Paris region was carried out at the explicit request of a person living abroad”, the statement concludes. Some reports speculated that the graffiti may have been part of a campaign by a “foreign actor trying to undermine French social cohesion”.

Last Thursday, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs openly accused Russia for carrying out a disinformation campaign aimed at amplifying the Star of David graffiti on social media, allegedly in order to discredit France. The ministry said the disinformation campaign reflected “a persisting opportunistic and irresponsible strategy of using international crises to create confusion and tensions in the public debate in France and in Europe”. Later on the same day, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Paris issued a statement on social media, condemning France’s “groundless attempts to seek out a ‘Russian connection’ in events having no connection with our country and pin responsibility on Russia with the sole aim of discrediting it”.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 13 November 2023 | Permalink

Analysis: Israel’s misjudgment of Hamas caused the October 7 intelligence failure

Gaza StripSINCE OCTOBER 7, WHEN Hamas launched its surprise attack on Israel, many more details about the intelligence failure have emerged. It appears that Israeli intelligence officials have warned for years about military exercises held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which have included practice raids on cities deep inside Israel. However, the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) did not heed to the warnings, because it considered Hamas operationally incapable of carrying out such raids. Instead, the IMI estimated that the Hamas leadership aimed to arrive at a settlement with Israel. That seems like the result of a highly successful disinformation operation, which added significantly to the effectiveness of the sudden attack on Israel on October 7.

It now appears that several months after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operation Guardian of the Walls, which targeted Hamas in the Gaza Strip in May of 2021, Hamas began to train for a large-scale operation against Israel. However, the IMI estimated that Hamas was not capable of attacking aQ Quote large number of settlements simultaneously. It also believed that such an operation would go against the spirit of Hamas leadership’s spirit intention to settle with Israel.

As early as 2022, the IMI had analyzed videos of Hamas’ military exercises, which Hamas itself had made available on social media networks. Meanwhile, the intelligence information that emerged from the Gaza Strip showed that the professionalization of Hamas’ military arm, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was improving. However, IMI officials rejected the need to build an operative response to the mass-attack scenario that these exercises pointed to, because they saw them simply as exercises.

Israeli intelligence also analyzed the communications discourse between the commanders of Hamas, which it had acquired through intercepts. It purportedly indicated that Hamas intended to carry out raids on Israeli communities located near the fence between Israel and Gaza, but also on targets located deeper inside Israel. The communications discourse also indicated that such attacks could occur, not only using tunnels, but with incursions above ground and even through aerial methods.

One of the methods that Hamas trained on, and one that was known to Israeli intelligence, focused on disabling the highly sophisticated observation posts, sensors and remote-controlled machine guns, which Israel has installed along the border fence with the Gaza Strip. The purpose of these exercises was to enable an attack on the fence and overtake it these sophisticated tools with Hamas operatives, thus effectively blinding the Israeli forces. However, Israeli authorities made no effort to prepare for such a scenario by protecting these installations.

The broad picture that is emerging raises serious questions about why the IDF did not take a reasonable course of action against Hamas’ operational plan —and why it failed to do so despite being aware of the intensity of the Hamas exercises, and despite being aware of the group’s stated intentions. Q QuoteIndeed, a preventive course of action should have been in place even in the absence of specific intelligence warnings —if only to enable the IDF to repel a surprise attack by Hamas. There was no need to estimate what Hamas would do in order to prepare for a surprise attack.

Yet it is now patently obvious that there was ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions. The latter were both apparent and known. Even without the wisdom of hindsight, it is clear there was enough intelligence to enable Israel to act in a timely manner against Hamas’ plan. Yet Israel severely misjudged Hamas’ intentions. In retrospect, it appears that ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions had been gathered, that the IMI and Shin Bet were severely underprepared for a surprise attack, that the precise details of Hamas’ attack were missed, and that Hamas’ intentions were misjudged. These are the reasons why Israel was caught unprepared and suffered a catastrophic surprise on October 7.

Author: Dr. Avner Barnea | Date: 10 November 2023 | Permalink

Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).

China accuses ‘foreign governments’ of installing fake weather stations to collect data

Chinese Ministry of State SecurityBEIJING HAS ACCUSED “FOREIGN governments” of collecting data on China through hundreds of fake meteorological stations that have been illegally installed throughout Chinese territory. The announcement appears to form part of a broader “people’s anti-espionage war” that the Communist Party of China launched in 2015 in order to create a “positive atmosphere of national security” across the nation.

On Tuesday of last week, China’s civilian spy agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), shared information about the alleged fake meteorological stations on its WeChat social media account. The agency said it had discovered hundreds of fake stations in over 20 Chinese provinces. The discovery resulted from an investigation of 10 firms that specialize in installing meteorological stations, which was broadened to include a probe of over 3,000 “foreign-linked” meteorological stations across China.

The MSS claims that some of the foreign companies involved in installing meteorological stations had not obtained the required administrative licenses. Furthermore, some of the stations had been placed in the vicinity of food-production hubs or defense-related installations, allegedly in order to record geolocational data. The latter were transmitted abroad in real time, the MSS said.

According to the spy agency, some of the fake meteorological stations were “directly funded by foreign governments”. However, there was no mention in the statement of the specific governments that allegedly funded these stations. Instead, the statement noted that “the illegal collection and cross-border transmission of meteorological data endangers China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests”.

It is rare for the reclusive and secrecy-prone MSS to make any public announcements relating to counter-espionage. In the past year, however, it has announced the arrests of several Chinese officials who allegedly spied on China for the United States Central Intelligence Agency. There is no information about whether the alleged fake meteorological stations are connected to prior arrests of Chinese officials for espionage.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 06 November 2023 | Permalink

Ex-Russian spy can sue British government for revealing his identity, court rules

High Court UKA FORMER SOVIET KGB officer, who now lives in the United Kingdom under witness protection, can sue the British state for revealing his identity to Latvian authorities, which may have put his life in danger, a judge has ruled. Boris Karpichkov, 64, joined the Soviet KGB in 1984, but became a defector-in-place for Latvian intelligence in 1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated.

He then allegedly spied on Latvia for one of the KGB’s successor agencies, the Federal Security Service, before switching sides again and spying on Russia for the Latvians. He also claims to have spied on Russia for French and American intelligence. In 1998, carrying two suitcases filled with top-secret Russian government documents, and using forged passports, he arrived with his family in Britain, where he has lived ever since. Shortly after he was granted asylum, the British government issued Karpichkov with a new identity to protect him from the Russian security services. In 2018, Karpichkov claimed that, despite the British government’s efforts to protect him, Russian intelligence had tried to kill him three times since 2006.

Since Karpichkov’s relocation to the United Kingdom, Latvian authorities have twice attempted to have him extradited there. A High Court judge rejected the first extradition request, ruling that Karpichkov’s life would be in danger if he were to be handed over to Latvia. But in 2018 the Latvian authorities issued a follow-up request for Karpichkov’s extradition. At that time the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency (NCA), which manages the UK Protected Persons Service, shared information about Karpichkov’s protected identity with the Latvians. A judge later quashed that extradition request too, warning that the former KGB intelligence officer had “an abundance of dangerous enemies in both Latvia and Russia”.

Karpichkov claims that the information that the NCA shared with the Latvians during the extradition negotiations, resulted in him receiving death threats from his enemies abroad. The NCA claims it was under a European Arrest Warrant legislation mandate to disclose Karpichkov’s protected identity to the Latvian authorities. On Friday, however, a High Court judge ruled that Karpichkov had the right to sue the NCA for unlawfully disclosing Karpichkov’s details in violation of data protection rules. This means Karpichkov is now entitled to file a lawsuit against the British government for allegedly misusing his private information.

Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 30 October 2023 | Permalink

Ukraine’s spy services are using assassinations as weapons or war, report claims

Security Service of Ukraine SBUTHE GROWING LIST OF assassinations of prominent Russians and Ukrainian separatists shows that the Ukrainian intelligence services are using “liquidations” as a weapon of war, according to The Washington Post. Citing “current and former Ukrainian and United States officials”, the paper said on Monday that funding and training by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) explains much of the success of Ukraine’s covert operations against Russia. However, the CIA is not involved in Ukraine’s state-sponsored assassination efforts at the operational level, and some US officials are uneasy about these activities.

A CIA Spy Directorate in Ukraine

In 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea, Ukrainian intelligence services were in an almost paralytic state. Like most of Ukraine’s state sector, the intelligence agencies were endemically bloated and closely resembled Soviet-style bureaucracies in sluggishness and corruption. More importantly, they were “riddled with Russian spies, sympathizers and turncoats”, according to observers. Few were surprised when, almost as soon as Russia annexed Crimea, the local head of the domestic security agency, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) defected to Russia.

According to The Washington Post, immediately after the Russian invasion of Crimea, the CIA sought to prevent further Russian encroachment in Ukraine. That is why in 2015 it built the SBU’s Fifth Directorate. That entirely new directorate was —and today remains— insulated from the rest of the SBU. The CIA also reportedly built a new division, complete with a brand-new headquarters building, inside Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR), which operates as the intelligence wing of the Ministry of Defense.

Active-Measures Training

Seeing the GUR as a more agile and flexible agency than the SBU, the CIA began to train GUR paramilitary “spetsnaz” divisions in “active measures” —a term that describes methods of political warfare, ranging from propaganda, sabotage operations, and even assassinations. However, The Washington Post claims that the CIA training focused on “secure communications and tradecraft” with an eye to enabling GUR teams to operate covertly behind enemy lines using clandestine maneuvers. Targeted assassinations were not included in the training. Read more of this post

In entering Gaza, the IDF will be facing not just Hamas, but Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’

Hamas GazaARGUABLY NO COUNTRY BENEFITED more from the American invasion of Iraq than the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a war that lasted over a decade, Washington spent over $2 trillion of its own funds to eliminate one of Iran’s most powerful regional adversaries. In the process, the invasion facilitated the rise of Iraq’s militant Shia movement, which today forms the core of the Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Although it is technically an auxiliary branch of the Iraqi security forces, the PMF regularly looks to Tehran for guidance.

The PMF belongs to what Iranian leaders refer to as the ‘Axis of Resistance’ (mehvar–e moqâvemat in Farsi), a term that denotes the extraordinary expansion of Iran’s influence in the Middle East and Central Asia in recent years. In addition to the PMF in Iraq, the Axis of Resistance incorporates an international coalition of dozens of armed groups, militant factions, Shia tribes, and political parties. They range from the Houthis in Yemen and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, to entire branches of the Syrian Armed Forces, and even Shia militias in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain. The coalition also includes a complex mosaic of armed Palestinian groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and —increasingly after 2018— Hamas.

These actors are certainly disparate, and often contrast with each other. For instance, relations between Hamas and the Syrians have been strained for years. All of them, however, are united in their common anti-Western stance and contempt for pro-Western states in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. Moreover, their ties under the Axis of Resistance umbrella remain informal and relatively loose. However, they all receive support —including funding and training— from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces that protects and promotes the ideological inheritance of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Since 2011, the IRGC has viewed the Axis of Resistance as a vital element of its asymmetric military strategy. Its purpose is to help Iran successfully confront its much stronger adversaries, two of which —the United States and Israel— are nuclear-armed. That is precisely why Tehran has invested nothing short of a fortune to transform Hezbollah into what experts describe as “a force multiplier” that can give Israel a run for its money. In 2014, Tehran launched a similar effort in the Gaza Strip, initially with Palestinian Islamic Jihad —a group that, very much like Hamas, emerged out of the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood in the 1980s.

The financial arrangement between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iran alarmed Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2008. Over time, however, Hamas too began to flirt with Iran’s Axis of Resistance, enticed by the lucrative funding and training opportunities offered by Tehran. By 2020, Hamas was actively engaging with the IRGC under the Axis of Resistance umbrella. To a significant extent, the operational sophistication of the October 7 attack on Israel, which was jointly led by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, provided clear evidence of Iran’s patronage of these two militant groups. Because of Iran, the Palestinian armed factions in Gaza are today better-armed and better-trained than at any time in the past. They will likely demonstrate that in the coming days or weeks, as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) begin their ground offensive on Gaza.

The big question, however, is how the other components of the Axis of Resistance will respond to the impending IDF attack. Read more of this post