The OSINT factor in Hamas’ operational success and Israel’s intelligence failure
December 5, 2023 1 Comment
IT HAS BECOME CLEAR that Hamas had up-to-date intelligence on Israeli targets prior to the attack on October 7, 2023, the largest and most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history. Hamas did not have access to clandestine information sources but rather relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) to understand the structure and weaknesses of Israel’s defense system along the border fence. In addition to publicly available maps, Hamas meticulously gathered online intelligence about specific sites within the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip.
It is also possible that some of the intelligence came from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, largely through Gazan workers who were employed in Israel. Moreover, Hamas had access to constant Israeli media broadcasts, which supplied them with invaluable intelligence on the border communities and adjacent military facilities, as well as on communities that were located further to the north and east. Although the Israeli state exercises censorship in the 
interests of national security, the public’s ‘right to know’ purview is substantial. Thus, significant amounts of information are available online.
In assessing the behavior of Hamas in recent years, one can observe that it did not act as a terrorist group for quite some time. Rather, it operated as a government organization, while monitoring its enemy and waiting patiently for an opportune moment to attack. Simultaneously, Hamas utilized disinformation tools to conceal its attack plans. It trained its fighters within commando units that employed information effectively and relied on actionable intelligence, rather than chance. This can be observed from interrogations of Hamas members who were detained by Israeli authorities after October 7. In one example, Hamas used detailed maps of Israeli communities near the Gaza border, which are available on Google Earth, to plan its attacks of October 7. Printouts of these maps were found among the belongings of Hamas assailants that were killed during the attacks.
Some in Israel are now advocating for increased protection of OSINT, particularly for Israeli sites related to security, including civilian first-response units, defense systems guarding settlements, and civil technological assets. However, implementing such measures within the current framework of Israel’s open society seems challenging. Despite the known importance of OSINT to Hamas and its potential risk to Israel’s security, significant changes in this regard may not occur, as they could impact the country’s democratic values. However, it is still possible to improve the quality of security censorship regarding sensitive civilian information that can be used by adversaries. Such moves would include protecting databases, limiting information relating to the addresses of senior officials, or putting in place stricter policies on the movement of Gazan workers in Israel.
Contrary to Hamas’, Israel’s OSINT systems underperformed in the run-up to the October 7 attacks. That was so especially after the central OSINT unit of 
the Israeli Military Intelligence was dissolved, for reasons that remain to be investigated. CNN was among many news outlets that have revealed how Hamas advertised its military drills on social media, but somehow Israeli intelligence failed to pay attention to them.
When Hamas openly declared its intention to attack communities near the Gaza border, and trained its units for that purpose, the Israeli intelligence community, including the IMI and the Israel Security Agency (ISA), underestimated its real attack capabilities based on OSINT materials. This miscalculation stemmed from incorrectly assessing Hamas’s capabilities and overestimating the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to swiftly respond and prevent the attack on civil and military targets. Unfortunately, this assessment proved to be a significant mistake.
The effective use of OSINT lies at the heart of Hamas’ operational plan to attack simultaneously several Israeli targets and to cause extensive damage. It appears that Hamas was able to utilize the OSINT factor to its maximum extent, thus adding significant value to the success of the attack.
► Author: Dr. Avner Barnea | Date: 05 December 2023 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
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forwarded to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office. The Israeli newspaper that 
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE October 2023 attack on Israel and the Yom Kippur War is reasonable. We still have an obscured perspective on what happened on October 7. But even this partial picture makes it possible to draw a preliminary comparison. Undoubtedly, there is no precedent for such a monumental failure in the history of Israeli intelligence.
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intelNews.org 
A senior American diplomat spied for Cuba for 42 years. How serious is this case?
December 11, 2023 by Joseph Fitsanakis 4 Comments
A STORIED CAREER IN GOVERNMENT
Rocha was born in Colombia in 1950, but grew up in New York City after his mother emigrated to the United States. In 1965, the studious Rocha earned a full-ride scholarship to a prestigious boarding school in Connecticut. This enabled him to earn an undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1973, before completing master’s degrees in public administration and foreign affairs from Harvard University and Georgetown University.
After receiving his security clearance from the Department of State, Rocha relied on his advanced social skills and native command of the Spanish language to quickly rise through the ranks of the diplomatic corps. Within a decade he had served prestigious assignments in Argentina, Honduras, Italy, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, where he held the post of deputy chief of mission. In the mid-1990s, Rocha served as deputy
principal officer in the United States Interests Section in Cuba —effectively the second-in-command in Washington’s de facto embassy in Havana.
Rocha’s diplomatic career culminated with the post of ambassador to Bolivia, from which he abruptly resigned in 2002. He did so reportedly in order to pursue employment in the private sector and raise funds for his children’s college education. Prior to the end of his State Department career, however, Rocha had managed to hold posts as a Latin America adviser to the National Security Council, which is the highest executive decision-making body of the United States government. He had also served as an adviser to the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), which oversees all activities of the Department of Defense in Central and South America, including the Caribbean.
FORMING REVOLUTIONARY LEFTIST IDEALS
By 1978, when he became a United States citizen, the young Rocha had spent time in Chile. While there, he witnessed first-hand the turbulence of Chilean politics in the lead-up to the military coup of 1973, which cut short the presidency of leftist icon Salvador Allende. Washington’s role in the coup, and in the ensuing junta of General Augusto Pinochet, appears to have steered Rocha’s politics decisively to the left. It was in fact in Chile where, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Rocha was recruited by the Dirección de Inteligencia (DI, also referred to by its former acronym, DGI). Read more of this post
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