Ex-head of Israeli Military Intelligence discusses October 7 attack in leaked recordings
August 25, 2025 6 Comments
IN A SERIES OF leaked recordings, the former head of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate, Major General Aharon Haliva, has expressed strong views about Israel’s war in Gaza. General Haliva headed Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (known as Aman) on October 7, 2023, when Palestinian militants took Israel by surprise in a combined arms attack, killing over 1,200 and kidnapping 250. Since resigning a year ago, Haliva has not made any public statements.
It is unclear who Haliva was speaking to when he was recorded, or by whom he was recorded. Nor is it clear when or where the recordings occurred. They were leaked last week by Israeli television station Channel 12. There follows a summary of Haliva’s comments in the leaked recordings.
Personal Responsibility. Haliva admits that the disaster occurred during his watch; therefore, he bears ultimate responsibility. At the same time, he emphasizes that responsibility is systemic and broad—not only his, but also that of the entire Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Israel Security Agency (ISA), and the country’s senior political leadership. He states: “Anyone who voluntarily assumes a leadership position knows that his decisions will bring both great successes and great failures”.
Systemic and Cultural Failures. Haliva argues that the failure originates from a long-standing organizational culture within the Aman, rooted in arrogance, overconfidence, and the belief that “the enemy is deterred”, as well as the idea that Israel’s intelligence is all-powerful. This mindset led to operational stand-downs during Sabbaths, holidays, and in the month of August, reflecting overconfidence. He warns: “This was not a one-time accident, but something that requires dismantling and rebuilding the system”.
Responsibility of Other Bodies. Haliva points to the ISA as the agency that should have provided human intelligence alerts on the evening of October 6 and the early hours of October 7, 2023, but did not. He criticizes the government and the cabinet for not holding serious, in-depth discussions on Gaza, while for years allowing Hamas to grow stronger with the help of Qatari money and by dividing Gaza from the West Bank.
The Political Leadership and Benjamin Netanyahu. Haliva describes Netanyahu as “a very attentive man, who reads, but is very cowardly—and in the test of results, he failed”. He emphasizes that Israel’s political leadership made decisions that strengthened Hamas and hindered proper preparedness. His conclusion: “In such a biblical-scale disaster, responsibility lies with everyone—they should all step down”. Read more of this post
THE MOSSAD, ISRAEL’S PRIMARY foreign-intelligence agency, played a crucial role in Israel’s most recent attack on Iran. It is clear that, without unique intelligence on key Iranian figures and nuclear sites, much of it gathered by the Mossad, the Israeli Air Force could not have been so precise and deadly against Iranian targets.
THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL recently appointed a new acting chief at the Israel Security Agency (ISA, also known as Shabak or Shin Bet). Identified only by their first initial, “S.”, this individual is one of the deputies of the 
EARLIER THIS WEEK THE High Court of Israel delivered its ruling regarding the 
VETERAN ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER Ronen Bar, who has led the Israeli Security Agency (ISA, more widely known as the Shin Bet) since 2021, has submitted an affidavit to Israel’s Supreme Court, accusing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of serious misconduct. Netanyahu fired Bar in March, but the Supreme Court later 
protesting activists, because, according to Netanyahu, they were “following security targets”.
LAST MONTH, ISRAEL ARRESTED two reservists following an investigation that lasted several months and centered on uncovering espionage for an Iranian state entity during wartime. The two reservists had completed their regular military service before joining the reserves.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on December 8 caught the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s intelligence community —mainly Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Mossad— by surprise. Assad’s collapse occurred much faster than Israel had estimated. Israel did not expect that the Syrian Arab Army would disintegrate so resoundingly, within 48 hours of the attack by the Syrian rebels.
southern Syria, as well as what is happening at the Syrian and Russian military bases in Latakia and Tartus. Moreover, the IDF is monitoring the activities of Iranian elements in Syria, including on the border with Lebanon, to prevent the possibility of military equipment being transferred from Syria to Hezbollah.
THE ISRAELI SECURITY AGENCY (ISA) has announced the 
THE OFFICIAL INTERNAL INVESTIGATION into the performance of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) during the run-up to the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, has been released. Known as The Road to War, the report addresses the central question of: how did the MID –the main military intelligence body of the Israel Defense Forces, or IDF– miss all the signs of the pending Hamas attack, and how did all the available warnings go unheeded?
THE TARGETED KILLING OF Hassan Mahdawi, a high-ranking member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, was carried out by Israel on April 1, 2024. The actual assassination was based on precise operational intelligence, while Israel’s assessment of Iran’s response was wrong.
ON MARCH 23, CHANNEL 12 of Israeli television aired a remarkable interview with Sassi Elya, the former director of technology at the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Better known by the acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak, the ISA is Israel’s domestic security service. The interview had initially been scheduled for broadcast as part of the evening news on October 7, 2023. However, its airing was canceled due to the attack on Israel by Hamas, which occurred that morning.
SINCE OCTOBER 7, 2024, when Israel was caught off guard by a sudden and highly damaging attack from Hamas, more information has surfaced regarding why there was no prior warning about the attack and the failures of Israeli intelligence in this regard.
capabilities. Another important insight is that the counterintelligence structures inside Hamas were successful in preventing Israeli intelligence from recruiting agents who were close enough to Sinwar to be able to alert Israel about the impending attack. Furthermore, Israel’s collection and analysis of signals intelligence was unproductive, possibly because Hamas was successful in countering Israel’s ability to produce effective intelligence from signals intercepts.
THE OCTOBER 7 ATTACK on Israel was a total surprise. There was no warning. There were very few signs of a possible attack. Israeli intelligence evaluated these signs as elements of a routine military exercise by Hamas, and even assessed them as parts of an imaginary scenario. It therefore gave no warning to those Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units that were stationed on the border with Gaza. Meanwhile, what we know about the intelligence failure of October 7 will likely pale before what the commission of inquiry will reveal once it is established. That was precisely what happened in the case of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which made significant revelations while investigating the intelligence failings of the IDF in the run up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
time, in the first two days of the conflict the IDF was confused and acted without direction, in the apparent absence of relevant action plans for what to do in the event of a massive invasion. The IDF was clearly not ready for such a scenario.
for those conclusions to become public. What is to be done in the meantime? There is public pressure to launch the inquiry soon.
IT HAS BECOME CLEAR that Hamas had up-to-date intelligence on Israeli targets prior to the attack on October 7, 2023, the largest and most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history. Hamas did not have access to clandestine information sources but rather relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) to understand the structure and weaknesses of Israel’s defense system along the border fence. In addition to publicly available maps, Hamas meticulously gathered online intelligence about specific sites within the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip.
interests of national security, the public’s ‘right to know’ purview is substantial. Thus, significant amounts of information are available online.
the Israeli Military Intelligence was dissolved, for reasons that remain to be investigated. CNN was among many news outlets that have 
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Ashraf Marwan: Israel’s ‘Angel’ or Egypt’s Double Agent?
October 13, 2025 by intelNews 3 Comments
However, a comprehensive investigation by two Israeli journalists, Ronen Bergman and Yuval Robovitz, published in the popular Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth under the title “The Angel of Lies”, presents a different picture. Based on thousands of secret documents not yet revealed and rare conversations with people involved in the operation, their report claims that ‘the Angel’ was actually the spearhead of Egypt’s deception plan before and during the war—and that he succeeded beyond all expectations.
A Spy or Double Agent?
Bergman and Robovitz examined whether Ashraf Marwan—advisor to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and a Mossad agent who died in 2007—was truly the best agent Israel had before the Yom Kippur War. Their findings indicate that a series of serious operational failures, combined with arrogance within the Israeli intelligence community, made Marwan one of the most dangerous spies ever to act against Israel.
They also investigated whether he was genuinely an Israeli agent who contributed meaningfully to Israel’s national security, as claimed by Mossad and by scholar Professor Uri Bar-Joseph, who wrote extensively about the Yom Kippur War intelligence failure and authored the well-known book The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel. Netflix later produced a film, The Angel, based on Bar-Joseph’s book.
Or, was Marwan, as the journalists argue, a double agent working for Egypt from the beginning—since volunteering for Israeli intelligence in 1970—and who managed to deceive Israel for years, particularly by delaying his warning about Egypt’s impending attack until roughly 12 hours before it began? According to Bergman and Robovitz, Marwan knew about Egypt’s plans weeks earlier but withheld that information, allowing Egypt to launch a surprise attack.
A Public Debate
Following the article’s publication, a public debate erupted between Bergman and Robovitz on one side and Professor Uri Bar-Joseph on the other, over Marwan’s true motives. Whether he was a double agent or a loyal Israeli operative, all agree he played a key role in the intelligence drama preceding the Yom Kippur War. Read more of this post
Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with 1973 Yom Kippur War, Ashraf Marwan, Avner Barnea, double agents, Egypt, espionage, HUMINT, Israel, Mossad