November 10, 2023
by intelNews
SINCE OCTOBER 7, WHEN Hamas launched its surprise attack on Israel, many more details about the intelligence failure have emerged. It appears that Israeli intelligence officials have warned for years about military exercises held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which have included practice raids on cities deep inside Israel. However, the Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) did not heed to the warnings, because it considered Hamas operationally incapable of carrying out such raids. Instead, the IMI estimated that the Hamas leadership aimed to arrive at a settlement with Israel. That seems like the result of a highly successful disinformation operation, which added significantly to the effectiveness of the sudden attack on Israel on October 7.
It now appears that several months after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operation Guardian of the Walls, which targeted Hamas in the Gaza Strip in May of 2021, Hamas began to train for a large-scale operation against Israel. However, the IMI estimated that Hamas was not capable of attacking a
large number of settlements simultaneously. It also believed that such an operation would go against the spirit of Hamas leadership’s spirit intention to settle with Israel.
As early as 2022, the IMI had analyzed videos of Hamas’ military exercises, which Hamas itself had made available on social media networks. Meanwhile, the intelligence information that emerged from the Gaza Strip showed that the professionalization of Hamas’ military arm, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was improving. However, IMI officials rejected the need to build an operative response to the mass-attack scenario that these exercises pointed to, because they saw them simply as exercises.
Israeli intelligence also analyzed the communications discourse between the commanders of Hamas, which it had acquired through intercepts. It purportedly indicated that Hamas intended to carry out raids on Israeli communities located near the fence between Israel and Gaza, but also on targets located deeper inside Israel. The communications discourse also indicated that such attacks could occur, not only using tunnels, but with incursions above ground and even through aerial methods.
One of the methods that Hamas trained on, and one that was known to Israeli intelligence, focused on disabling the highly sophisticated observation posts, sensors and remote-controlled machine guns, which Israel has installed along the border fence with the Gaza Strip. The purpose of these exercises was to enable an attack on the fence and overtake it these sophisticated tools with Hamas operatives, thus effectively blinding the Israeli forces. However, Israeli authorities made no effort to prepare for such a scenario by protecting these installations.
The broad picture that is emerging raises serious questions about why the IDF did not take a reasonable course of action against Hamas’ operational plan —and why it failed to do so despite being aware of the intensity of the Hamas exercises, and despite being aware of the group’s stated intentions.
Indeed, a preventive course of action should have been in place even in the absence of specific intelligence warnings —if only to enable the IDF to repel a surprise attack by Hamas. There was no need to estimate what Hamas would do in order to prepare for a surprise attack.
Yet it is now patently obvious that there was ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions. The latter were both apparent and known. Even without the wisdom of hindsight, it is clear there was enough intelligence to enable Israel to act in a timely manner against Hamas’ plan. Yet Israel severely misjudged Hamas’ intentions. In retrospect, it appears that ample intelligence about Hamas’ intentions had been gathered, that the IMI and Shin Bet were severely underprepared for a surprise attack, that the precise details of Hamas’ attack were missed, and that Hamas’ intentions were misjudged. These are the reasons why Israel was caught unprepared and suffered a catastrophic surprise on October 7.
► Author: Dr. Avner Barnea | Date: 10 November 2023 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
Israeli intelligence using Microsoft servers to store intercepted phone call data
August 11, 2025 by intelNews 2 Comments
Citing conversation with 11 sources from Microsoft and within Israel, the investigation reveals that Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Unit 8200 is the primary force behind the interception and data storage project. Operating under Aman, Israel’s military intelligence directorate, Unit 8200 is responsible for collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT), cyber warfare, and code decryption, among other tasks.
Israeli security sources cited in the report explain that the commander of Unit 8200, Brigadier General Yossi Sriel, approached Microsoft because the Israeli intelligence unit lacked enough storage space and processing power to store “billions of files”. General Sriel has led a large-budget project that has significantly expanded the scope of information-gathering on Palestinians and has integrated various databases.
In November 2021, an meeting, described in the report as “extraordinary”, took place at Microsoft’s headquarters in Seattle, Washington. On one side were Microsoft Chief Operating Officer, Satya Nadella, and other company executives, while on the other side were General Sriel and other senior officials of Unit 8200. The agenda centered on a plan, promoted by Sriel, to transfer intelligence information held by the Unit to the computing giant’s servers. According to an internal Microsoft document, which was leaked by The Guardian, Sriel requested the transfer to Microsoft’s cloud of 70% of the unit’s data, including “secret and top secret” data.
The meeting allegedly led to the development of one of the world’s most invasive surveillance systems, which has been employed by Israel to monitor Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. According to documents cited by The Guardian, as of July this year, 11,500 terabytes of Israeli military data—equivalent to 862 billion documents or 195 million hours of audio—were stored on Microsoft Azure public cloud servers in the Netherlands. A smaller portion of the data was stored in Ireland and Israel. Read more of this post
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