Analysis: Escalation Without Endgame and the Limits of Defeating Iran

THE ONGOING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN Iran and its adversaries unfolds against the backdrop of a regime that is strategically depleted yet politically combustible. Yet strategic exhaustion does not equate to imminent collapse. Indeed, the potential degradation of Iran’s coercive institutions raises a more complex question: what follows tactical success? Thus, while Iran appears weakened and vulnerable, the longer-term trajectory of the conflict remains uncertain, fraught with the risk of protracted instability and regional spillover at a level that could make Libya and Syria seem mild by comparison.

Iran is Strategically Depleted and Vulnerable

Decades of crippling sanctions have ruined Iran’s economy and demoralized its population, causing an already polarized society to further-disintegrate. Outside of a small population of religious zealots, Iranians have little interest in martyrdom, and very few are willing to die for a regime that most see as politically and ideologically bankrupt. The stunning degree of the regime’s penetration by Israeli and American intelligence agencies is indicative of the disillusionment of ruling elites, let alone rank-and-file functionaries.

Militarily, this is hardly a war between equals. Even before bombs started falling in Tehran on February 28, Iran’s armed forces and its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had been severely degraded by prior military engagements with the U.S. and Israel. Even with the assistance of its proxies and allies, Iran is demonstrably unable to match the military and intelligence resources of its opponents. As many have noted, Tehran’s retaliatory strikes appear to emphasize economic disruption and psychological pressure on civilian populations. But the marked inconsistency in the scale and delivery of Iran’s retaliatory attacks suggests that it is struggling to respond in a coherent fashion.

Russia, meanwhile, is nowhere to be seen. As in the cases of Venezuela and Cuba, Moscow has restricted its response to this crisis to diplomatic condemnations and offers to mediate, rather than offering military assistance to its Middle Eastern ally. This is hardly surprising, given Russia’s broader strategic priorities and its desire to further its ongoing expansionist goals in Europe by avoid overextension elsewhere.

Iran is weak, exhausted, alone. It is teetering on the edge. Yet, instead of cheering, this appears to trouble even seasoned Iran hawks like John Bolton, Trump’s onetime national security adviser. A veteran Republican, Bolton is probably the most consistent and vociferous Iran critic in the Western Hemisphere. The Iranian government has actively planned to assassinate him in recent years. But in a recent interview, Bolton cautioned about the lack of planning behind Washington’s latest adventurism in the Middle East and waned that the current situation may “deepen conflict, create a dangerous power vacuum, and purge the [entire Middle East] into turmoil”. What is Bolton seeing that Trump’s inner circle is not?

This War Will Not End Soon

American air campaigns have a demonstrated history of obliterating Washington’s tactical targets and severely disrupting its adversaries. Iran is unlikely to prove an exception to this rule. However, air campaigns—no matter how sophisticated—cannot by themselves reorder domestic politics and build long-lasting political outcomes. It follows that, despite delivering a series of indisputable tactical successes, including the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader and senior members of his inner circle, American and Israeli airpower cannot by itself ensure a pro-Western outcome in Iran.

Obliterating the Iranian regime’s military capabilities and degrading its ability to dispense violence against its own population is likely to create a power vacuum. But that is not the same as managing the ensuing political fallout. Even if the regime falls—which is not the likeliest scenario—its successor is unlikely to be friendly to the U.S. or Israel. For over a century, Iran has been permeated by a political culture shaped by fervent nationalism, revolutionary narratives and resistance against foreign intervention. This has been particularly so since 1979, with the theocratic regime building the nation’s identity around the idea of its resistance to the “Great Satan” and its regional allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. This identity permeates Iran’s security apparatus, its state institutions and its education system. Even anti-regime Iranians—including the student demonstrators who cheered Ayatollah Khamenei’s demise—espouse core elements of that narrative. Read more of this post