December 20, 2024
by intelNews
THE COLLAPSE OF THE regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on December 8 caught the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s intelligence community —mainly Israel Military Intelligence (IMI) and the Mossad— by surprise. Assad’s collapse occurred much faster than Israel had estimated. Israel did not expect that the Syrian Arab Army would disintegrate so resoundingly, within 48 hours of the attack by the Syrian rebels.
Israeli intelligence assessed that, despite the shocks it had suffered in recent months, the so-called Axis of Resistance against Israel —mainly Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran— was stable. A scenario of rapid collapse of the government in Syria had not been assessed as a possibility, or even given a low probability tag. That was primarily because the Assad family had governed Syria for almost 60 years.
Following the Assad regime’s collapse, the focus of Israel’s intelligence is on analyzing the intentions of the major rebel organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and understanding how —if at all— it will lead the new administration in Syria. Israel is also examining developments in
southern Syria, as well as what is happening at the Syrian and Russian military bases in Latakia and Tartus. Moreover, the IDF is monitoring the activities of Iranian elements in Syria, including on the border with Lebanon, to prevent the possibility of military equipment being transferred from Syria to Hezbollah.
It is clear to Israel that Turkey stands behind the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization and that Ankara armed and supported the group for a significant period. What is less clear is whether and how Turkey’s involvement in Syria could threaten Israel’s interests, given that Israel’s relations with Turkey have deteriorated dramatically in recent years.
Assad was a key member of the pro-Iranian Axis of Resistance. Following his fall from power, Iran and Hezbollah could lose their main logistical hub for producing, transferring, and storing weapons, as well as training their forces and militias. Additionally, Syria under Assad constantly posed the threat of turning into yet another battlefront against Israel. Without Assad, Russia could lose its grip on Syria —the only country in the Middle East where Russian influence dominates that of the United States. The Russians could also lose access to their military bases in Syria, which offered the Russian Navy access to the waters of the Mediterranean.
Despite the fall of the bitter enemy that was Assad’s Syria, and the deep shock suffered by the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance camp that has been dominant in the Middle East in recent decades, Israeli intelligence is not optimistic about the emerging situation in post-Assad Syria. Syria is a collection of minorities —Druze, Kurds, Alawites, and Christians— that have been artificially joined together despite carrying bitter, bloody scores. The latter may erupt sharply, especially against the Alawites. Concepts such as liberal politics, civil society, or a cohesive nation-state, have never existed inside Syria.
It follows that Israel is very concerned about the emerging uncertainty in Syria. Immediately after the fall of Assad, the IDF strengthened its defenses on the Golan Heights border to ensure that the chaos in Syria did not spill over into Israel. Meanwhile, Israel is in contact —both directly and through intermediaries— with several Syrian rebel groups, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The Israeli message at this stage is a demand that the rebels not approach the border, along with a warning that, if they violate the separation of forces agreement, Israel will respond with force.
And a final note: assessments in relation to the Syrian regime’s collapse continue to emerge in the IDF and the Israeli intelligence community. These assessments concern the extent to which the lessons of October 7 have been sufficiently analyzed and assimilated within Israel. Specifically, there are questions about whether this new intelligence surprise in Syria may stem from the fact that an in-depth investigation into the lessons of October 7 has yet to be carried out during the 14 months of the war with Hamas.
► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 20 December 2024 | Permalink
Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
Analysis: Escalation Without Endgame and the Limits of Defeating Iran
March 3, 2026 by Joseph Fitsanakis 4 Comments
Iran is Strategically Depleted and Vulnerable
Decades of crippling sanctions have ruined Iran’s economy and demoralized its population, causing an already polarized society to further-disintegrate. Outside of a small population of religious zealots, Iranians have little interest in martyrdom, and very few are willing to die for a regime that most see as politically and ideologically bankrupt. The stunning degree of the regime’s penetration by Israeli and American intelligence agencies is indicative of the disillusionment of ruling elites, let alone rank-and-file functionaries.
Militarily, this is hardly a war between equals. Even before bombs started falling in Tehran on February 28, Iran’s armed forces and its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had been severely degraded by prior military engagements with the U.S. and Israel. Even with the assistance of its proxies and allies, Iran is demonstrably unable to match the military and intelligence resources of its opponents. As many have noted, Tehran’s retaliatory strikes appear to emphasize economic disruption and psychological pressure on civilian populations. But the marked inconsistency in the scale and delivery of Iran’s retaliatory attacks suggests that it is struggling to respond in a coherent fashion.
Russia, meanwhile, is nowhere to be seen. As in the cases of Venezuela and Cuba, Moscow has restricted its response to this crisis to diplomatic condemnations and offers to mediate, rather than offering military assistance to its Middle Eastern ally. This is hardly surprising, given Russia’s broader strategic priorities and its desire to further its ongoing expansionist goals in Europe by avoid overextension elsewhere.
Iran is weak, exhausted, alone. It is teetering on the edge. Yet, instead of cheering, this appears to trouble even seasoned Iran hawks like John Bolton, Trump’s onetime national security adviser. A veteran Republican, Bolton is probably the most consistent and vociferous Iran critic in the Western Hemisphere. The Iranian government has actively planned to assassinate him in recent years. But in a recent interview, Bolton cautioned about the lack of planning behind Washington’s latest adventurism in the Middle East and waned that the current situation may “deepen conflict, create a dangerous power vacuum, and purge the [entire Middle East] into turmoil”. What is Bolton seeing that Trump’s inner circle is not?
This War Will Not End Soon
American air campaigns have a demonstrated history of obliterating Washington’s tactical targets and severely disrupting its adversaries. Iran is unlikely to prove an exception to this rule. However, air campaigns—no matter how sophisticated—cannot by themselves reorder domestic politics and build long-lasting political outcomes. It follows that, despite delivering a series of indisputable tactical successes, including the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader and senior members of his inner circle, American and Israeli airpower cannot by itself ensure a pro-Western outcome in Iran.
Obliterating the Iranian regime’s military capabilities and degrading its ability to dispense violence against its own population is likely to create a power vacuum. But that is not the same as managing the ensuing political fallout. Even if the regime falls—which is not the likeliest scenario—its successor is unlikely to be friendly to the U.S. or Israel. For over a century, Iran has been permeated by a political culture shaped by fervent nationalism, revolutionary narratives and resistance against foreign intervention. This has been particularly so since 1979, with the theocratic regime building the nation’s identity around the idea of its resistance to the “Great Satan” and its regional allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. This identity permeates Iran’s security apparatus, its state institutions and its education system. Even anti-regime Iranians—including the student demonstrators who cheered Ayatollah Khamenei’s demise—espouse core elements of that narrative. Read more of this post
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